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IN THIS THESIS, THE TERMINOLOGY OF SCOTS LAW IS USUALLY
DEPLOYED. HOWEVER, WHEN DEALING WITH ENGLISH CASES, THE
TERMINOLOGY OF ENGLISH LAW IS USED.
ABSTRACT
This thesis is an analysis of directors' powers, duties
and liabilities under British Company Law. It
consists of ten chapters the first of which is an
introductory one. The second chapter discusses the
powers of directors. Directors' duties to the company
are examined in chapters 3,4,5 and 6. The fair dealing
rules (i.e. the no-conflict rule and the no-profit rule)
and the statutory as well as the common law roleid
r e 1 axinjjthern are examined in both chapter 3 and 4. The
fifth chapter is concerned with directors' duty of
honesty and good faith . The duty of skil 1 and
care is examined in chapter G. Directors' duty to
individual shareholders is the subject of chapter 7. In
chapter 8 directors' duties to the creditors of their
company are highlighted. Litigation and the
protection of minority shareholders have been examined
in chapter 9. The thesis ends with a summary and
conelusions.
The power to manage a company is usually vested in the
board of directors. A director's primary duty is owed
to his company. However, in some exceptional cases a
director may owe duties to the company's shareholders
and its creditors. It is submitted that the fair
dealing rules as applied in the U.K. are inflexible.
The courts, however, have shown their willingness to
relax them. The test of the duty to act bona fide is
mainly subjective. The test of the proper
purpose is mainly objective. Directors' duties of skill
and care are mainly governed by the common law rules.
The AfpUecl to the duty of care and skill is mainly
subjective. Since a director's breach of duty may harm
the minority shareholders, the common law as well as the
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I have chosen this topic for two reasons. First, the
importance of the position of directors in the company.
A company consists, basically, of two main organs. One
is the shareholders in general meeting; the other is the
board of directors. The board of directors which is
elected by the general meeting is usually entrusted with
the management of the company. So, to a large extent
directors are considered the agents of the company;
because the company, being an artificial entity, can
only act through human agents. The considerable tract
of legal rules governing directors' powers, duties and
liabilities constitutes, in my personal view, a
cornerstone of company law. The second reason is the
depth and the width of the issue of directors' powers,
duties and liabilities. Being from Jordan, a country
whose company law, particularly in relation to limited
liability companies, was derived from the British
Companies Act 1907, examining this wide issue is not
without merits. While British company law has gone
through different stages of development and been
subjected to a variety of amendments up to the Companies
Act 1989, Jordanian company law has failed, apart from
some minor amendments, to accompany its predecessor.
- 1 -
Thus, it is to my advantage irv examin\«-\cj a subject which
covers a wide area of company law to be aware of the
development of the British company law.
In this thesis the powers, duties and liabilities of
directors will be explored. In addition to their duties
and liabilities to their companies, directors' duties
arid liabilities to the shareholders and creditors of
their companies wi11 also be examined. The substantive
rules of the Companies Acts and related legislation and
the principles of common law in respect of this issue
are to be analysed. Where appropriate, the law of some
Commonwealth countries will be referred to. In the next
chapter of this thesis, the powers of directors will be
discussed. Great importance, however, will be attached
to the power to sue in the name of the company in case
of a receivership, the power to delegate functions, and
the power to bind the company. The third chapter is
concerned with the directors' fiduciary duties, in
particular, the fair dealing rules. The no—conflict
rule and the no—profit rule are to be examined.
Examples of situations of conflict of interests are to
be explored. Great significance, however, will be
attached to the use of corporate information, insider
dealing and exploiting corporate opportunities. In the
fourth chapter, it will be shown that the fair dealing
rules as applied in the United Kingdom are fairly
inflexible. In addition, it will be shown that because
- 2 -
of that inflexibility which is not always appropriate,
the common law and the legislation have played a major
role in relaxing the fair dealing rules. Further, it
will be shown that the courts have also tried to relax
the rigidity of those rules. The analysis and the
examination of directors' fiduciary duties will extend
to occupy the fifth chapter of this thesis. There, the
fiduciary duty of honesty and good faith will be
discussed. In chapter six, the problematical duty of
skill and care which is owed by directors to their
companies will be tackled. The development of the law
of negligence and it§ effect, if any, on directors'
duties of skill and care will be explored.
Not only to their companies d.o directors owe duties but
also to the shareholders and creditors of their
companies. Thus, the examination of directors' duties
and liabilities will extend horizontally to both chapter
seven and chapter eight. Chapter seven is taken up to
directors' duties to individual shareholders. There,
the duties of directors to individual shareholders at
the common law will be examined. Further, some selected
statutory duties owed by directors to shareholders are
to be discussed. Chapter eight is concerned with
directors' duties to the creditors of their companies.
The statutory and the judicial protection of creditors
will be examined in the necessary detail. Great
significance will be attached to both fraudulent and
- 3 -
wrongful trading as being sources of directors'
liability to creditors. In addition, it will be shown
that the courts have made an attempt to protect the
interests of creditors even in the absence of statutory
provisions. Further, concurrent liability of directors m
some selected issues, will be examined. Chapter nine is
concerned with the various forms of litigation by means
of which the duties and liabilities of directors can be
enforced. The rule in Foss v. Harbot 11e and the
exceptions to it will be examined in detail. Great
importance will be attached to the proceedings which may
be initiated by minority shareholders who allege that
the affairs of their company have been conducted in a
manner unfairly prejudicial to their interests. The
winding up of a company on the "just and equitable
ground" as being a manner to protect minority
shareholders will be discussed. In chapter ten, a
summary and conclusions will be laid down in general
terms. Thus, it should be noted that the conclusions in
chapter ten do not reflect every single idea or personal
view expressed in the main body of this thesis.
Finally, I am obliged to admit that the work done in
this thesis is not comprehensive, and cannot be made so





In this chapter two main issues are to be examined.
First, the division of powers between the company in
general meeting and the board of directors. The
importance of this issue stems from the fact that the
directors are, usually, appointed for the purpose of
conducting the company's affairs' 1 ' . They derive their
powers from those of the company. In other words, their
powers are derived from the shareholders in general
meeting. Since the shareholders in general meeting
constitute an effective organ of the company, it is
important to know how the powers are divided between
them and the board of directors. It is also important
to know the extent to which the shareholders are
excluded from the management of their company's affairs,
and the extent to which they can intervene in the
management. Second, the specific powers of directors.
It should be noticed that only some of those powers,
which are felt to be important, will be examined in
detail.
2.2. DIVISION OF POWERS BETWEEN THE SHAREHOLDERS IN
GENERAL MEETING AND THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS.
Until at least the end of the nineteenth century, the
courts were inclined to examine the relationship between
the general meeting and the board of directors as one
existing between a principal and agents. Thus, company
law in its early stages had been influenced by notions
derived from the law of partnership. Considering
directors as agents of a company, produced the result
that the general meeting had complete control over the
acts of the directors in relation to the conduct of the
company's affairs' 2) . The first case, apart from Foss
v . Harbo11Ie'3 > , dealing with the relationship between
the general meeting and the board of directors was Isl_e
of Wight Railway Co. v. Tahourdin' ' 1 . In that case, the
required number of shareholders requisitioned a meeting,
inter alia, to appoint a committee to reorganise the
management of the company. The directors wanted to
restrain the holding of the meeting. They applied to
the court for an injunction' 5 ' for this purpose. The
Court of Appeal rejected that application. Cotton L.J.
said:
It is a very strong thing indeed to prevent
shareholders from holding a meeting of the
company, when such a meeting is the only way
in which they can interfere, if the majority
of them think that the course taken by
directors, in a ma 11 e r intra vires of the
directors, is not for the benefit of the
company'6 > .
His Lordship also observed that if a shareholder
complains of the conduct of directors while they are
acting within their powers, then the court says to him,
if you want to alter the management of the
affairs of the company go to a general
meeting, and if they agree with you they will
pass a resolution obliging the directors to
alter their course of proceeding'7'.
Those observations led to the assumption that the
general, meeting could direct and control the board of
directors in relation to the management of the
company'8 > .
The issue of the division of powers between the general
meeting and the board of directors u>as clarified
and settled by the decision of the Court of Appeal in
the case of Au torna t ip_ _Se 1 f — C I eans ing Filter Synd i ca t e
Co. Ltd. v. Cuninghame' 8 > . In that case, article 9 6 of
the company's articles of association vested in the
directors the power to manage the business of the
company including the power to sell any property of the
company on such terms and conditions as they might think
proper. At a general meeting, the shareholders passed
an ordinary resolution instructing the directors to sell
the company's undertaking to a particular company. The
directors refused to carry out the sale. The court of
Appeal relied on the true construction of the articles
and held that the power to sel 1 was vested in the
- 7 -
directors alone, and the shareholders were not entitled,
by passing an ordinary resolution, to instruct the
directors as to the management of the company. Cozens—
Hardy L.J. observed that the articles constituted a
contract between the members of the company; by which
they had agreed that the "directors and the directors
alone shall manage"'101. His Lordship challenged the
view that by analogy to partnerships, the general
meeting of shareholders can direct the directors of the
company. His Lordship pointed out that even in the case
of a partnership, the partners may not direct the
managing partner as to the management of the the
partnership. His Lordship said:
. if you once get clear of the view that
the directors are mere agents of the company,
I cannot see anything in principle to justify
the contention that the directors are bound to
comply with the votes or the resolutions of a
simple majority at an ordinary meeting of the
shareholders' 1 1 ' .
The Cun i nghame case'12' was followed by the case of
Gramophone and Typewriter Ltd. v. Stanley' 1 3 > in whi ch
the Court of Appeal delivered a decision similar to that
of the Cuninghame case. It is worth noting, however,
that in the Stanl e y case Buckley L.J. had changed his
view which was expressed in his book in 1897' l 4 > . His
Lordship said:
The directors are not servants to obey
directions given by the shareholders as
individuals; they are not agents appointed by
and bound to serve the shareholders as their
principals. They are persons who may by the
i -. • regulations be entrusted with the control of
- 8 -
the business, and if so entrusted they can be
dispossessed from that control only by the
statutory majority which can alter the
articles. Directors are not, I think, bound
to comply with the directions even of all the
corporators acting as individuals( 1 5 ' .
The decision of the Court of Appeal , in the Stan 1 ey
case, as it was clear from the judgment of Buckley L.J.
(quoted above), made it clear that neither ordinary nor
extraordinary resolution of the general meeting could
bind the directors to follow the instructions or the
directions of the shareholders, unless the shareholders
in general meeting were empowered by the articles to do
so. This, however, does not mean that the shareholders
in general meeting cannot remove the directors who do
not act as the shareholders desire'16' . The directors
can be removed from office by an ordinary resolution
even before the expiration of their period of office.
The shareholders in general meeting can also alter the
articles of the company, so as to limit the powers of
directors, or to give the company, in general meeting, a
supervisory power over the directors. However, a
company's articles can only be altered by a special
resolution*17'. The decision of the court in the
Stanl e y case has been described* 1 8 ' as the first clear
formulation of the principles governing the relationship
between the company in general meeting and the board of
directors* 19) .
- 9 -
The principles governing the relationship between the
general meeting and the board tuev-e further
considered in Qui n & Ax tens v. Sal rnon( 2 ° > , and Shaw &
S o n s (Sa 1 f o_rd) Ltd. v. Shaw' ^ l ) . In both cases the
court gave a similar decision to that the
Cuninghame<22) case and the S t an1e y <23 1 case. That is,
where the articles, clearly, give the board of directors
the power to manage the company's business, then, the
shareholders in general meeting have no control over the
board in relation to the management of the company. In
Shaw & Sons (Sal ford) Ltd. v. Shaw' "4 ) ( the court held
that the resolution taken by the shareholders in general
meeting disapproving the commencement of an action by
the directors was a nullity. Greer L.J. said:
A company is an entity distinct alike from its
shareholders and its directors. Some of its
powers may, according to its articles, be
exercised by directors, certain other powers
may be reserved for the shareholders in
general meeting. If powers of management are
vested in directors, they and they alone can
exercise these powers. The only way in which
the general body of the shareholders can
control the exercise of the powers vested by
the articles in the directors is by altering
their articles, or, if opportunity arises
under the articles, by refusing to re-elect
the directors of whose actions they
disapprove. They cannot themselves usurp the
powers which by the articles are vested in the
directors any more than the directors can
usurp the powers vested by the articles in the
general body of shareholders' 25) .
At this stage, it could be concluded that the courts had
relied upon the true construction of the articles of
association to find out the relationship between the
- 10 -
board and the shareholders in general meeting. This
attitude seems to be the correct one since there is
nothing in the law preventing a company from giving or
taking away from the shareholders in general meeting a
supervisory power over the board of directors' 26) .
Consequently, if the shareholders are empowered to give
directions to the board in relation to the management of
the company, then, a resolution instructing the
directors or giving them directions will not be held
void. That is because the articles constitute a binding
contract between the members of the company'27). So,
the law leaves the distribution of powers between the
two main organs of the company to the articles of
association. This is, of course, with the exception of
some powers which are, expressly, given by the law to
the shareholders in general meeting and can only be
exercised by them'281 . Because the division of powers
is a contractual issue, the company is free to adopt
whatever form of articles it desires. The form of
management articles, normally, adopted by companies is
that found in art. 70 of the 1985 Table A. Art. 70
provides:
Subject to the provisions of the Act, the
memorandum and the articles and to any
directions given by special resolution, the
business of the company sha 1 1 be managed by
the directors who may exercise all the powers
of the company. No alteration of the
memorandum or articles and no such direction
shall invalidate any prior act of the
directors which would have been valid if that
-11-
alteration had not been made or that direction
had not been given.
In respect of art. 70, it is worth noting that:
First, the first sentence of the article allows a
company in general meeting to direct the board of
directors on how to act. However, this can only be done
by a special resolution. This permission reminds us of
art. 80, of the 1948 Table A, which referred to
"regulations . . . prescribed by the company" rather
than "... directions given by special resolution".
Many commenta tors' 29) argued that, according to the
wording of art. 80 and particularly the word
"regulation", a company could give directions to the
board, even by passing an ordinary resolution, so long
as the management function was vested in the board in
general terms*30). However, in both the Gramophone
case* 3l ) t and the Stanley case'32) r it was held that the
word "regulation" indicated that only by way of a
special resolution, could the general meeting have
control over the board*33). Further discussion of the
meaning of the word "regulation" is no longer necessary
since art. 70 of the 1985 Table A makes it clear the a
special resolution is needed for the purpose of
directing the board on how to manage the company's
business.
Second, the second sentence of art. 70 makes it clear
that neither alteration of the articles or the
- 12 -
memorandum nor the directions of the shareholders in
general meeting can have any retrospective effect on
previous acts of directors' 34> . Similarly, the removal
of directors from office must have no retrospective
effect on their previous acts. In other words, the
exercise by the general body of the shareholders of
their powers under art.70 affects only future acts of
directors. However, it would seem that proposed acts
can be affected by the exercise of the powers given by
art. 70.
It remains to examine the extent to which the
shareholders in general meeting can intervene in the
management of the company. This issue wi11 be examined
in brief since it does not directly relate to the powers
of directors.
The legislation as well as the case law empowers, in
some situations, the shareholders in general meeting to
intervene in the management of the company. In other
words, the shareholders in general meeting may have
control of the company by virtue of the statutory
provisions or of the case law.
2.2.1. The Statutory Powers of the Shareholders in
General Meeting.
It is clear f r om art. 70 of the 1985 Table A that the
directors' powers to manage the company are subject to
the provisions of the Companies Act 1985. So, the
Companies Act 1985 reserves some powers which can only
be exercised by the shareholders in general meeting.
Similarly, the Insolvency Act 1986 reserves some powers
to this organ of the company. Examples of those powers
are the following:
a) the power to approve of compensation to directors for
loss of of fice(3 5 > ;
b) the power to approve of substantial property
transactions involving directors or connected
persons' 36) ;
c) the power to alter the share capital'37';
d) the powe r to allot relevant securities'38' . This
power cannot be exercised by directors without being
authorised to do so by the company in general meeting or
by the company's articles'33';
e) the power to authorise the market purchase by the
company of its own shares' 40) ;
f) the power to approve of funds to directors to meet
expenditure on company business'41'•
g) • the power to approve of directors contracts of
employment for periods in excess of 5 years which make
no term for extinction by notice or provide for such
extinction only in specified circumstances'42' ;
h) the power to consider the necessary steps to deal
with a serious loss of capital of a public company'43';
-14-
i) the power to approve of terms of an agreement made by
a public company to acquire non-cash assets from a
certain member during the initial period'44';
j) the power to sanction the variation of class rights
in some circumstances. An extraordinary resolution is
required here(45);
k) the power to resolve, by an extraordinary resolution,
to wind up the company voluntarily when it cannot
continue its business because of its 1iabi1ities' 4 6 > ;
1) the power to authorise the liquidator, in cases of
members' voluntary winding up to pay a class of
creditors in full or to make a compromise over any of
the company's debts'47* .
It should be noticed that the powers rehearsed (above)
are mere examples of those, given by the statutes, to
the company in general meeting.
2.2.2. Reversion of Powers to the Company in General
Mee ting.
In- some situations, directors' powers revert to the
company and can be exercised by it in general meeting.
Examples of these situations are where a deadlock exists
between the directors and where there are no directors.
a) Deadlock situations.
In Barron v. Potter'4 8 > , the company had two directors.
-15-
They were given the power to appoint additional
directors. They failed to do so because^fthe refusal of
one of them to attend any board meeting. The court held
that the company in general meeting could exercise such
power. Warrington J. said:
If directors having certain powers are unable
or unwilling to exercise them - are in fact a
non-existent body for the purpose - there must
be some power in the company to do itself that
which under other circumstances would be
otherwise done. The directors in the present
case being unwilling to appoint additional
directors under the power conferred on them by
the articles, in my opinion, the company in
general meeting has power to make the
appointment' 49> .
b) Where there are no directors.
In Alexander Ward & Co. Ltd. v. Samyang Navigation Co.
Ltd.'5 0) f the directors were given a general power, by
the articles, to manage the company. The shareholders
in general meeting wanted to institute legal proceedings
on the company's behalf because there were no directors.
The House of Lords held that they could. Lord
Kilbrandon said:
I am not at all convinced that, the management
of a company having been confided to the
directors, and the instructing of actions at
law being an act of management, then, if the
company has for the time no directors, it
cannot during that time take step to recover
its debts. I think the [relevant article]
probably means no more than this, that the
directors, and no one else, are responsible
for the management of the company, except in
the matters specifically allotted to the
company in general meeting. This is a term of
the contract between the shareholders and the
company. But it does not mean that no act of
management, such as instructing the company's
;t solicitor, can validly be performed without
- 1G -
the personal and explicit authority of the
directors themselves* 51' .
Similarly, it was held that the company in general
meeting could exercise the powers of the directors in
cases where an effective quorum could not be
obtained* 52 ) . It was also held that if the directors
failed to bring an action on behalf of the company,
then, the shareholders in general meeting could sue or
authorise someone to sue on behalf of the company* 5 31 .
c) Ratification.
If directors exceed their powers or exercise those
powers for improper purpose, the company can, in general
meeting, ratify their acts so long as the ratification
does not amount to a fraud on the minority*54).
2.3. Specific Powers of Directors.
It has already been mentioned that directors derive
their powers, generally, from the company's articles.
However, some specific powers have been recognised by
the law as being exercisable by directors. Examples of
these powers are the following:
1) the power to sue in the name of the company* 55' ;
2) the power to bind the company* 5 6 ' ;
3) the power to appoint additional directors*57);
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4) the power to borrow and to give securities for such
borrowing'581;
5) the power to compromise'88';
6) the power to convene meetings'60 ' ;
7) the power to delegate their powers'61' ;
8) the power to grant pensions to staff'62' ;
9) the power to forfeit shares'63' ;
10) the power to issue shares and debentures' 6'' ;
11) the power to make calls'65' ;
12) the power to issue negotiable instruments'66';
13) the power to petition in bankruptcy'67'; and,
14) the power to reject a transfer of shares'68'.
It has already been declared that only some of those
powers (which in one's opinion are very important) will
be examined in detail .
2.3.1. Power to Sue in the Name of the Company.
If a company's articles confer the power to initiate
litigation in the company's name on the board of
directors, then, the decision whether or not to litigate
must be taken by the board'70 ' . If the board brings an
action in the name of the company, the shareholders in
general meeting cannot order the board to abandon
litigation by passing an ordinary resolution. If,
however, the articles of association give the
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shareholders in general meeting the right to give
directions or instructions to the board on how to manage
the company, the shareholders can ask the board, by
passing a special resolution, to abandon actions brought
by the board in the name of the company. If the board
decides not to bring an action in the name of the
company, the shareholders, in general meeting, can, by
passing an ordinary resolution, override the board's
decision and appoint someone to litigate in the name of
the company. This is so even if the shareholders are
not empowered to give directions to the board171) .
In the case of liquidation, directors' powers including
the power to 1itigate in the name of the company, cease
on the appointment of a 1 iquidator1 72 ) . This result is
justified by the purpose lying behind appointing a
liquidator. A liquidator is appointed with the object
of terminating the existence of the company and winding
i t up1 7 3).
•■an
In the case of^administration order, the administrator
has, during the period for which the administration
order is in force, a general power to manage the
"affairs, business and property of the company"17 4) ;
those powers include the "power to bring or defend any
action or other legal proceedings in the name and on
behalf of the company175). Unlike liquidation, it would
appear that the directors' powers do not cease on the
appointment of the administrator, but the exercise of
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those powers becomes subject to the administrator's
consent. That is, the administrator's status overrides
that of the directors. If the exercise, by directors,
of a particular power interferes with the powers of the
administrator, that power cannot be exercised except
with the consent of the administrator. S.14(4) of the
Insolvency Act 1986 provides:
Any power conferred on the company or its
officers, whether by this Act or the Companies
Act or by the memorandum or articles of
association, which could be exercised in such
a way as to interfere with the exercise by the
administrator of his powers is not exercisable
except with the consent of the administrator,
which may be given either generally or in
relation to particular cases.
Thus, directors cannot initiate litigation in the
company's name without the consent of the administrator.
This result is justified by the fact that an
administrator is appointed with the object of reviving
the company. He is obliged to take care of the
interests of the company including the interests of its
creditors* 76) . Thus, it is for the benefit of the
company as a whole not to allow directors to interfere
with the exercise, by the administrator, of his powers.
Because directors are not allowed to act on behalf of
the company without the consent of the administrator,
the Insolvency Act 1986 gives creditors and members of a
company the right to petition (to the court for an
order, at any time when an administration order is in
force) on the ground-
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a) that the company's affairs, business and
property are being or have been managed by the
administrator in a manner which is unfairly
prejudicial to the interests of its creditors
or members generally, or of some part of its
creditors or members (including at least Cthe
petitioner], or
b) that any actual or proposed act or omission
of the administrator is or would be so
prejudicial I 77 > .
So, if the administrator fails to act and prevents
directors from acting on behalf of the company, then, it
is the administrator not the directors who is to be
blamed if the company suffers loss.
The situation might be different in the case of
receivership. First of all it should be noticed that
S.42(2>(78) and S.55(l) and (2><79) of the Insolvency
Act 198S, make it clear that the powers of a receiver
apply only to the assets which are subject to the
charge. Consequently, in respect of assets which are
not within the scope of the charge, the directors retain
the power to act on behalf of the company. The
difficulty arises in relation to the exercise of powers
by directors in respect of the property subject to a
floating charge'30> . Does the appointment of a receiver
supersede the powers of directors to the effect that
they cannot raise an action in the name and on behalf of
the company, in relation to the rights (whether property
or undertaking) which are subject to the charge, without
his consent?. Do directors need the consent of the court
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the one who has been appointed by the court?. Who is to
be blamed if the interests of creditors (other than
those who have been granted a floating charge over the
company's assets) have been jeopardised?. It is
appreciated that all the questions stated above revolve
around one substantial point which is the existence of
the directors' powers in case of receivership. Before
giving any answer to those questions, it would seem
necessary to draw a distinction between the aim of
appointing a receiver on the one hand and that of
appointing a liquidator and of appointing an
administrator on the other hand. It has already been
mentioned that the aim of appointing the liquidator is
the winding up of a company and the termination of its
existence. It has also been mentioned that the aim of
appointing the administrator is the reviving of the
company and the protection of its interests including
tlie interests of its creditors. A receiver is, usually,
appointed to protect company's rights which are
within the scope of a fixed or a floating charge. Thus,
the receiver is concerned with the interests of the
debenture holder or the creditor who has appointed
h i rn< 8 J > . It would appear that even if a receiver is
appointed by the court, he remains interested in the
protection of the interests of those who opplied to the
court to appoint him. So, the fact that the receiver
who is appointed by the court is an officer of the
- 22 -
court' 8 2' and , thus, not an agent o F any debenture
holder'83)( does not mean that the receiver is concerned
with the protection of the interests of the company as a
whole. Similarly, the fact that a receiver enjoys many
of the administrator's powers does not mean that the aim
of appointing him is the furtherance of the company's
interests. Again, a receiver who is appointed by the
court is an officer of the court'84' , whereas the
receiver who is appointed by a debenture holder is an
agent of the company'85', unless it is agreed as between
the company and the appointor of the receiver that the
receiver is to be deemed the agent of the appointor.
However, whether the receiver is the agent of the
company or of the appointor or an officer of the court,
his main task is to serve the interests of the debenture
holder. It was held that the receiver who is appointed
by the court "supersedes the company which becomes
incapable of making contracts on its behalf"'88' .
However, as it has already been mentioned, the receiver
"supersedes" the company's powers and the authority of
its directors insofar as the rights subject to the
charge are concerned'87' . Now, does the appointment of
the receiver supersede all the directors' powers to the
effect that they cannot sue in the name and on behalf of
the company without his consent?. The importance of
this issue stems from the fact that directors are bound
to serve the interests of their company including the
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interests of its creditors1 83 ' . It seems that if the
receiver who fails to bring an action is the one who is
appointed by the court, the directors cannot bring the
action on behalf of the company without the consent of
the court. This view is reached by analogy to the
court's decision in Viola v. Anglo American Cold Storage
Co .(89) f where it was held that the receiver who was
appointed by the court could not sue or be sued without
the consent of the court. Thus, since the receiver
himself, in this case, cannot sue without leave of the
court, it would appear arguable that the directors
cannot sue instead of him without the consent of the
cour t .
The difficulty, however, arises in cases where the
receiver is appointed by a debenture holder. The
leading case is Newhart Developments Ltd. v. Co-
operative Commercial Bank Ltd. < 90 ) . In that case the
plaintiffs and the debenture holder (the bank) were
engaged in a joint venture involving property
development. The bank were to provide money for the
venture. Things had not gone well and the venture ran
into difficulties. Consequently, the bank had refused
to provide further money and exercised their power to
appoint a receiver of the plaintiffs' company. The
directors brought an action, in the company's name,
against the bank for breach of contract. The receiver
sought to have the action set aside on the ground that
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it was brought without his consent. The Court of Appeal
held that the appointment of the receiver did not
prevent the directors from exercising their power to sue
so long as their act did not jeopardise the property
subject to the charge. Shaw L.J. contrasted a receiver
with the liquidator and said that there is no provision
in the statute which provides that the functions of
directors cease on the appointment of a receiver. The
statute gives certain powers to the receiver to enable
him to perform his duties to the debenture holder; but
those powers do no t
divest the directors of the company of their
power, as the governing body of the company,
of instituting proceedings in a situation
where so doing does not in any way impinge
prejudicially upon the position of the
debenture holders by threatening or
imperi1 1 ing the assets which are subject to
the charge!si).
Shaw L.J. added that if the receiver failed to raise an
action in the name of the company to vindicate rights cjW.lcW
fal1 within the scope of the charge, "it would be
incumbent "<92) on the directors to raise it so long as
the exercise of such power did not harm- the charge
holders in their capacity as such. That is because
directors owe a duty to further the interests of their
company and of its creditors (other than the debenture
holder) who have rights and expectations regardless of
t h e receivership. " Th e receiver is entitled to ignore
the claims of anybody outside the debenture holders.
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Not 30 the company; not so, therefore, the directors of
the company"* 93) _ The facts of the Scottish case of
Imperial Hotel (Aberdeen) Ltd. v. Vaux Breweries Ltd*94)
were similar to those of the Newhart case. A different
decision, however, was reached by the Outer House of the
Court of Session. In that case it was held that it was
not competent for the directors to raise an action on
behalf of the company in connection with the property
which was within the scope of a floating charge. The
Lord Ordinary (Grieve) stated:
I am quite satisfied that the terms of the Act
of 1972*95) Jo not empower the directors of a
company, whose assets are the subject of a
floating charge in connection with which a
receiver has been appointed, to deal in any
way with assets of theirs which are the
subject of such a charge during the currency
of the receivership. In particular it is not
competent for the directors to raise actions
in connection with such property"* 36' .
The uncompromising decision of Lord Grieve, which
subordinates all other interests to those of the
debenture holder, may not stand for long in Scotland.
The Lord Ordinary, in Shanks v. Central Regional
Council*97) r observed that it could not be held that the
directors of a company were not entitled in any
circumstances to deal in any way, including the bringing
of an action, with assets which were the subject of a
floating charge; that while the decision of the Imperia 1
it did not mea n
of a company in
case was applicable to most situations,
that an action brought by the directors
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receivership was "inherently incompetent or necessarily
a fundamental nullity"*9S). Lord Weir said:
The C Companies (Floating Charges and
Receivers) (Scotland)] Act 1972 does not
provide that the powers of a company to raise
proceedings cease upon the appointment of the
receiver and a study of these provisions does
not lead me to conclude that Far 1 iament
intended by implicat ion that these powers
should cease*99 > .
It could be Reduced from the observations of Lord Weir
(quoted above) that the Scottish courts are willing to
bring the Scots law in line with its English counterpart
in relation to the powers of directors during the
currency of the receivership.
It is submitted that the decision of the Court of Appeal
in the Newhart case* 100) and the observations of Lord
Weir in the Shanks case* i°i > , iLLuStrtxt<e the correct
approach. If a receiver failed to bring an action i n
relation to rights which are the subject of a floating
charge, the directors should be allowed to bring the
action on behalf of the company, without the consent of
the receiver, so long as this action would not harm the
interests of the char g e holder qua charge holder. It
fol lows that the directors are those who are to be
blamed if they fai 1 to raise an action in the name and
on behalf of the company in these circumstances. If the
directors failed to raise the action, then, the
shareholders should have the right, by passing an
ordinary resolution, to appoint someone to act on behalf
of the cofflPany' 102) ,
It remains to say that if directors are allowed to raise
an action in relation to the assets which are the
subject of the charge, there can be no reason why they
should not be entitled to indemnification (for the costs
they prop<2rly incurred) out of the company's assets
(which are not the subject of the charge). But, if the
action fails, wh o will bear the costs of litigation in
cases whefe the charge cover al1 the assets and
undertaking of the company both present and future?.
This type of charge was found in the Newhart case'l03) _
In that esse, the company was to be indemni f ied in
respect of the costs of the action. Consequently, it
was held that the right of action against the debenture
holder would not in any way jeopardise the interests of
the debenture holder in the assets which were the
subject of the charge'104). But, what if the company is
not to be indemnified in respect of the costs of the
action?. If the directors' action in the name of the
company is to be allowed, then, it will, definitely,
affect the interests of the debenture holder in his
capacity as such. It will adversely affect those
interests if it has been a failure. On the other hand,
if the action is not to be allowed, then, the interests
of the company and those of the unsecured creditors wi11
be left without protection. These situations have been
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dealt with recen tly in Tudor Grange Holdings Ltd. and
o the r s v . C i t i b a n k NA_ an d_ ano t h e r ' 1 ° 5 ) . In that case C
and his family control led two groups of companies. They
embarked on an expansion programme which led to a
complex system of loans. The loans were to be provided
by banks and a floating charge was granted over all the
assets of the companies to secure their debts. The
companies' project did not prosper and they defaulted in
repaying the interest on the loans. The banks appointed
an administrative receiver of the companies. Without
the receiver's consent, pursuant to resolutions passed
by the board of dir ec tors of each of the companies, C
and the companies brought an action against the banks
claiming damages for misrepresentation' 1061 . The banks
counterc1 aimed for repayment of principal and interest
of various loans; and applied to strike out the
plaintiffs' claim contending that the plaintiffs had no
locus standi to bring the proceedings. Browne—Wi1kinson
V—C held that the directors had no power to bring the
proceedings. He based his decision on the ground that:
[WIhen the directors of the plaintiff
companies decided to start proceedings in the
name of the company they were starting
proceedings which could directly impinge on
the property subject to the receiver's powers
i n t hat they held n o i ndemn i t y against the
liability of the companies' assets to satisfy
a hostile order for costs made against the
companies . . . CTlhe receiver's position was
prejudiced by the decision taken'107'.
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However, in the Tudor case' 1°° ' , the directors offered to
provide an indemnity, within 28 days, against all
liability of the companies in costs to the defendants to
the sum of £200.000. This offer led the judge not
to strike out their action' l09' .
It is plain that the decision of the Tudor case is a
clear application of the decision of the Court of Appeal
in the Mewhart case' 1 1 " ' . According to the decision in
both cases, directors have no locus standi to start
proceedings in the name and on behalf of the company
where the proceedings impinge on the assets subject to
the charge. The proceedings directly impinge on those
assets if the company is not to be indemnified, against
liabilities it may incur, to satisfy a hostile order for
costs made against it. In this case the receiver's
consent is essential if the directors wish to sue in the
name of the company. If the receiver refuses to
sanction the commencement of proceedings made by the
directors, then, the directors themselves wi 1 1 sustain
t he costs of those p roceedings with no right of
indemnity out of the company's assets. If following the
refusal of the receiver, the directors decided not to
commence any proceedings in the name of the company, it
would seem that, the directors would not be blamed or
sued for a breach of duty. It is no t reasonable to
blame them in such a case because it is unfair to ask
— 30 —
them to protect the interests of the company and those
of its creditors at their own expense.
If the company is to be indemnified in respect of the
costs of an action, then directors can bring the action
in its name without the consent of the receiver who
fails to act.
However, despite the fact that Browne-Wi 1 ki son V—C in
the Tudor case followed the decision of the Newha rt
case, he criticised it by stating:
I have substantial doubts whether the Newhart
case was correctly decided in any event. That
may have to be looked at again in the future.
The decision seems to ignore the difficulty
which arises if two different sets of people,
the directors and the receivers, who may have
widely different views and interests, both
have power to bring proceedings on the same
cause of action. The position is exacerbated
where, . . . , the persons who have been sued
by the directors bring a countere 1 aim a gains t
the company. Who is to have the conduct of
that counter c1 aim which directly attacks the
property of the company?. Further, the Court
of Appeal in the Newhart case does not seem to
have had its attention drawn to the fact that
the emb a r r a s sment of the receiver in deciding
whether or not to sue can be met by an
application to the court for directions as to
wh a t course should be taken, an application
now envisaged in S.3 5 of the Insolvency Act
1986<111).
Again, it is submitted that the decision of the Newhart
case is a correct and reasonable one. However, to avoid
multiplicity of actions (i.e, to avoid the case of
bringing proceedings on the same cause of action by two
different sets of people, directors and the
receiver'112))i it is suggested that directors must have
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first made a real attempt to obtain the receiver's co¬
operation. If the receiver refuses to bring the action
on behalf of the company (probably because the defender
is his appointer), directors must have the power to sue
in the name and on behalf of the company to protect its
interests including the interests of the creditors other
than the holder of the charge. It is also suggested
that if the defender makes a counterclaim' 113) against
the company which may attack the property under the
charge, the directors can exercise the power to defend
the action in the name of the company. But , they must
have first made a real attempt to obtain the receiver's
cooperation. If the receiver insists on not defending
the action (probably because the one who made the
counterclaim was his appointer), the directors must not
be prevented from defending the action in the name and
on behalf of the company. It is to be emphasised,
however, that the suggestions made (above) are subject
to the rule that the exercise of the power to sue or the
power to defend an action must not harm the assets
falling within the scope of the charge'114).
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2.3.2. Power to Delegate.
The power to manage a company is usual ly vested in the
board of directors. But it is neither feasible nor
customary for the directors to run the company's affairs
in the sense that they themselves conduct its daily
operations1115' . Directors' duties are of an
"intermittent nature to be performed at periodical board
meetings"'116). Thus, directors are not expected to
devote their whole time to their company's affairs. In
practice, and particularly in large companies, directors
do not enter into or supervise every single transaction
on behalf of the c ompany' 117). It follows that it is
necessary for the board of directors, in some
situations, to delegate some of its powers to others.
A company is an artificial entity. It acts through its
directors. The directors derive their powers, mainly,
from the company's articles. To some extent, directors
may be considered as agents of the company' lis). The
law of agency principle "delega tus non potest delegare"
applies to them'119). Thus, they cannot delegate the
powers vested in them without the authority of the
company's members or the company's articles. The
articles, norma11y, allow the board of directors to
delegate powers to individual directors or committees or
sub-committees of the board'120>. Delegation of powers
by the board is usually revocable' l 21 ' . Proper
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delegation to a committee of the board may in some cases
exonerate the directors who are not on the
committee< 122) .
Fower to delegate: Test of validity
Since directors are subjected to the norm "delegatus non
potest delegare"<123) f their power to delegate is,
usually, strictly construed depending on the articles of
association' 124). in the absence of an express
authorisation to delegate, it was held, that directors
could not delegate their discretionary powers to
others' 1 25 ' . But, like ordinary agents, directors can
delegate those functions " which belong to the
management of the ordinary commercial business"'126) of
the company, without the need for an express
authorisation. In other words, the non-discretionary
functions (i.e. which do not involve an exercise of
judgment and discretion) can be delegated without an
express authorisation.
A company is free to adopt whatever form of articles it
desires. An e x amp 1 e of a man a g ernen t article, which
deals with the issue of delegation of powers, and which
is usually adopted by companies, is found in art.72 of
the 1985 Table A< l 2 7 >. The article provides:
The directors may delegate any of their powers
to any committee consisting of one or more
directors. They may also delegate to any
managing director or any director holding any
other executive office such of their powers as
they consider desirable to be exercised by
him. Any such delegation may be made subject
to any conditions the directors may impose,
and either collaterally with or to the
exclusion of their own powers and may be
revoked or altered. Subject to any such
conditions, the proceedings of a committee
with two or more members shal1 be governed by
the articles regulating the proceedings of
directors so far as they are capable of
app1ying.
If a company has adopted art. 72, then it is competent
for its directors to delegate their powers to a
committee of one *12 8) or more directors or to a managing
director.
Since the validity of delegation depends upon the true
construction of the articles, the difficulty of
distinguishing between delegable and non-de1egab1e
functions (i.e. non-discretionary and discretionary
functions) may hardly arise. If it is found that the
articles do not authorise the delegation of a particular
power, the delegates will have no authority to exercise
that particular power. In Gu i nn ess pic v.
Saunders*129), a committee of directors was formed to
conduct a take—over bid. Following the successful
completion of the bid, the committee authorised special
payment to one of its members (for advice and services
in relation to the bid) despite the fact that it had no
authority to authorise those payments. Such payment
could only be authorised by the board of directors. The
House of Lords held that because the committee had no
power to authorise those payments, the payments were
reelairnable from the director concerned.
Again, because the validity of delegation depends on the
true construction of the articles, the companies in the
U.K. are accustomed to state clearly, in their articles,
the extent to which the powers of directors may be
delegated. The strictness with which the articles and
the service contracts are construed is well illustrated
by the case of Ho 1 dswor th (Harold) & Co. (Wakefield)
Ltd. v. Caddies' 1301 . In that case, the articles of the
company empowered the directors to delegate any of their
powers to a managing director. C was appointed a
managing director for five years under a service
agreement with the company. The agreement provides:
EC] sha 1 1 be and he is hereby appointed a
managing director of the company and as such
managing director he sha11 perform the duties
and exercise the powers in relation to the
business of the company and the business
(howsoever carried on) of its existing
subsidiary companies at the date hereof which
may from time to time be assigned to or vested
in him by the board of directors of the
company*131).
The service agreement also provided that C should devote
all his time and attention to his functions and should
obey the orders of the board. Fol lowing a dispute
between the board and C, the board resolved that C
should confine his attention to a particular subsidiary
company. C brought an action against the company for
breach of contract. His action was dismissed on the
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ground that neither the Act nor the service agreement
could on their true construction be said to prevewtthe
company from limiting his functions to a particular
subsidiary company. The service agreement provided that
C should perform such functions as may be assigned to
him by the board from time to time. Consequently, the
House of Lords held, the limiting of his duties, by the
board, was entirely consistent with the terms of the
agreement. It is clear from the decision of the House
of Lords in the Caddies case' ^ 2) ( that the true
construction of the articles is the touchstone against
which the court examines the validity of a particular
delegation of power. Similarly, the court will rely on
the true and strict construction of a service contract
to find out whether the board is entitled to limit or
abrogate the powers of the managing director.
Delegation of a particular power
If a particular power is expressly vested in the board
of directors, then, the board cannot delegate that power
to others i" [reliance on an authority to delegate given to
it in general terms. In the Howard ' s case* 133) , the
power to allot or to distribute unsubscribed shares was,
under the articles, vested in the directors, three of
who constituted a quorum. A resolution was passed by
the directors providing that "the shares remaining
undistributed, shall be allotted according to the
discretion of the manager and the two private
directors"* 134), Accordingly, the shares were allotted
by the manager and the two directors. The court held
that the al lotment was inval id on the ground that the
delegation by the directors was unwarranted as they had
no authority to delegate that particular power which was
expressly vested in them by the articles. Similarly, in
the Car tme1 1 's case*1 35> , the power to buy shares from
any shareholder on behalf of the company out of its own
funds was expressly given to the board of directors.
The directors were also given the power to appoint a
general manager. The general manager exercised the power
to buy shares from the shareholders on behalf of the
company and out of its funds. The court held that,
"a mere power to appoint a general manager
would not authorise the directors to transfer
to him the power to purchase shares where that
power is by the articles given to the
directors themseIves"*136) .
But, what if the articles authorise directors to
delegate al1 or any of their powers?. Can the
directors, in this case, delegate a particular power
which is by the articles expressly given to them?. The
answer to this question is yes. For example, in Re
Taurine Company* 1 37 ) t the articles of the company
empowered the directors to delegate all or any of their
powers to others. The articles, however, provided:
A trarisfer of a registered share, except a
fully paid up share, shall not be made without
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the approval of the board, who sha 1 1 have an
absolute discretion as to accepting or
rejecting the transfer
The power to approve the transfers was delegated by the
board to a one director committee. The court held that
the delegation was properly made. The decision was
based on the ground that the articles empowered the
directors to delegate any or all of the powers vested in
them. There was no reason to say that the power to
approve of a transfer of shares was excepted.
Accordingly, it is submit ted that, if the articles
empower the directors to delegate all or any of their
powers, then, it is competent to them to delegate any
particular power even if it is, by the articles,
expressly vested in them.
Directors' power to delegate to the exclusion of t h e i r
own powers.
It is competent to a company to adopt an article
authorising the board of directors to delegate its
powers (to a committee consisting of one or more
directors, or to a managing director or any director
holding any executive office) to the exclusion of its
own powers. This is clear from the wording of art. 72
of the 1985 Table A which provides:
The directors may delegate any of their powers
Any such delegation may be made . . . to
the exclusion of their own powers ...
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If a company adopts art. 72, then, it is submitted, the
directors can divest themselves of their own powers and
escape any responsibility for the proper discharge of
the power so delegated'138). Jt is also submi11 ed that,
if the directors delegate any of their powers to the
exclusion of their own powers, they must not be allowed
to supervise the exercise of that power or to give
directions to the delegates on how to exercise that
power. In other words, the directors should not be
allowed to interfere with the delegates' exercise of the
power so delegated, unless they reserve to themselves
the right to interfere. Art. 72 contains the words "
and may be revoked or altered". Despite those
words, it is submitted that, the directors must not be
allowed to revoke the delegation, so long as 3 service
agreement is in existence' 139) f unless they reserve for
themselves the right to do so. Otherwise, directors may
be held liable for a breach of the service contract
entered into with the delegates. In addition, it would
seem that the phrase "to the exclusion of their own
powers" will have a defective meaning if the directors
are allowed to revoke the delegation. This phrase
should be interpreted to mean that the power to
revoke the delegation is also excluded unless, as
already mentioned, the right to revoke is expressly
reserved for the directors by the service agreement
(i.e. the agreement which is entered into with the
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delegates in pursuance of an article similar to
a r t . 7 2 ) < 140) .
It is submitted that the directors' power to delegate
any power, to the exclusion of their own powers, must
not amount to an assignment of office (which can only be
authorised by a special resolution of the general
meeting)(141). Directors' power to delegate to the
exclusion of their powers wi11 not amount to an
assignment of office so long as the delegation: (1) is
made in respect of some, but not all, of the powers of
directors, and/or (2) is made for a specified period of
t irne .
Directors' liability for delegates
The liability in question is, mainly, governed by the
rules of agency. Thus, one intends not to discuss this
issue in detail since this chapter deals mainly with the
powers of directors rather than their liability. It may
not be out of place, however, to refer here to the case
of ■ Re City Equitable Fire Insurance<142). Im that case
Romer J. said:
In respect of all duties that, having regard
to the exigencies of business, and the
articles of association, may properly be left
to some other official, a director is, in the
absence of grounds for suspicion, justified in
trusting that official to perform such duties
honest 1y<l4 3) .
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A director is justified in trusting delegates and can
■i
rely on them where the circumstances of the delegation
give him no ground for suspicion. Thus, a director who
delegates a particular function to others and reserves
for himself the right to supervise the performance of
that function cannot allege and should not be allowed to
maintain that he did not know what was going on.
However, reliance on delegates cannot constitute a
defence in a director's hand unless it is a reasonable
one( 14 4).
Proper delegation to a committee of the board may in
some circumstances exonerate the directors who are not
on the committee. In Land Credit Co. of Ireland v. Lord
Fermoy( 14 5) f some powers were delegated to a sub¬
committee of the board. The sub-committee used the
company1s funds to buy the company"s shares for the
purpose of keeping up their price. This, operation was
cloaked by the sub-committee under the veil of loans
which were disclosed to the full board but the purpose
of which was concealed. It was held that the sub¬
committee had breached its duty by concealing the
objectionable nature of the loans. Consequently, the
sub-committee was made liable to repay those loans.
However, the director who was not on the sub-commi ttee
was exonerated.
It seems that in cases where the directors delegate some
of their powers to the exclusion of their own powers,
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they can escape liability for the proper discharge of
the matters so delegated. No responsibility or blame
could be attached to them so long as they reserved no
right for themselves to supervise the exercise of the
delegated powers' 146) .
Delegation of powers avsj third parties
It should be noticed that this issue will be discussed
only under the Companies Act 1985 as amended by the
Companies Act 1989.. The new S.35A (S.108 CA 1989)
provides:
(1) In favour of a person dealing with a
company in good faith, the power of the board
of directors to bind the company, or authorise
others to do so, sha1 1 be deemed to be free of
any limitation under the company's
constitution'147'.
It seems that this section has almost completely removed
the need to rely on the rules of agency'148'. According
to the new S.35A (1) (quoted above), a person who deals
with a company in good faith is protected
W'k«A<Cv/er the validity of the delegation. In
other words, even if the directors have no authority to
delegate a particular power to others, the exercise of
that power by the delegates will be considered valid
insofar as a bona fide third party is concerned. Good
faith on the part of a third party dealing with the
company is presumed unless the contrary is proved'1 48 ' .
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Further, the mere knowledge, that directors are not
allowed to delegate a particular power under the
company's constitution, does not amount to mala fides on
the part of the third party*150). Furthermore, third
parties are not bound to enquire as to "any limitation
on the powers of the board of directors to bind the
company or authorise others to do su"11511.
The position of a third party has also been strengthened
by the abolition of the constructive notice doctrine for
a 1 most all purposes. Th e new S.711A (S.142 CA 198 9)
provides:
(1) A person shal1 not be taken to have notice
of any matter merely because of its being
disclosed in any document kept by the
registrar of companies (and thus available for
inspection) or made available by the company
for inspection*152).
2.3.3. Power to Issue Shares and Debentures.
S.80 CA 1985 provides:
(1) The directors of a company shal1 not
exercise any power of the company to al lot
relevant securities, unless they are, in
accordance with this section Cor section 80AI,
authorised to do so by—
(a) the company in general meeting; or
(b) the company 1s articles.
Accordingly, directors may only al lot shares if
empowered to do so by the shareholders in general
meeting or by the company's articles of association.
The authority of directors to allot shares under S. 80
may be general or specific< 1 53 ' , but this authority may
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not last for more than 5 years' 154). The maximum amount
of securities which may be allotted must be stated in
the authority; the authority must state the date on
which it expires'!55). The authority may be renewed for
a further period not exceeding 5 years''56'. However,
the new S.SOA'*5?) gives private companies the right to
elect that the provisions of S.80A will apply instead of
S . 80 (4 ) and (5 ) . The new S. 80A (2) all ows a private
company to give the authority to allot shares for an
indefinite period.
Directors must exercise the power to allot shares for a
proper purpose'158).
A company's articles may empower the directors to issue
debentures. There is no provision preventing a company
from issuing debentures at a discount' 159) .
2.3.4. Power to Make Ca1 1s and Forfeiture.
Subject to any 1 imitation in a company1s memorandum,
directors may make ca1 Is upon the members in respect of
any moneys unpaid on their shares. A call, however, may
be revoked before receipt by the company of any payment
and may be postponed' 160). a ca 1 1 can be made at any
time; but it is possible for a company to determine that
any portion of its shares (which has not been already
called up) is not to be called up except on the winding
up of the company. A special resolution is, however,
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required in this case' 161 ) . The unpaid money on a
member ' s shares is a debt owed by him to the
company' 1 6 2 ' . In England, the period within which an
action can be brought for payment of those moneys is 12
years' 163) . in Scotland, the period within which a call
can be enforced is 20 years' 164) .
The power of the directors to make calIs on shares must
be exercised bona fide in the best interest of the
company' 1 6 5 > . Accordingly, they are not entitled to
exercise this power for the purpose of giving themselves
an advantage over other shareholders' 166) . They are,
f or ex amp 1 e , not en t i t 1 ed to make ca lis on a 1 1 the
members of the company except themselves without the
approval of the other members' 167).
A company's articles may empower directors to forfeit
shares' 16 8) . Forfeiture of shares can, however, only be
made for non-payment of a cal 1 or an instalment' 169).
Directors must exercise the power to forfeit shares in
good faith and in the best interest of the company.
Directors, for example, must not exercise this power for
the purpose of relieving shareholders from
1iabi1ity' l7 0) .
2.3.5. Power to Reject a Transfer of Shares.
Directors may reject the transfer of shares if they are
empowered by the articles to do so' 171 ) . in the absence
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of restrictions in a company's articles on transfer of
shares, a shareholder can, by virtue of the statute,
transfer his shares to any transferee. This is so
provided that the transferor, in good faith, divests
himself of any benefit or interests in the shares. If
there are no restrictions on transfer in the articles,
directors cannot refuse to register the transferred
shares to the transferee. These matters are we 1 1
illustrated by Buck ley L.J. in Lindl ar ' s case' . His
Lordship said:
[The Companies Acts provide] that the shares
in a company under these Acts shall be capable
of being transferred in manner provided by
regulations of the company. The regulations
of the company may impose fetters upon the
right of transfer. In the absence of
restrictions in the articles the shareholder
has by virtue of the statute the right to
transfer his shares without the consent of any
body to any transferee, even though he be a
man of straw, provided it is a bona fide
transaction in the sense that it is an out-
and-out disposal of the property without
retai ning any interest in the shares - that
the t ransfe r o r bon a fide divests himself of
all benefit . . . In the absence of
restrictions it is competent to a transferor,
notwithstanding that the company is in
extremis to compel registration of a transfer
to a transferee notwithstanding that the
latter is a person not competent to meet the
unpaid liability upon the shares. Even if the
transfer be executed for the express purpose
of relieving the transferor from liability,
the directors cannot upon that ground refused
to register it unless there is in the articles
some provision so enabling them' 173) .
Restrictions on transfer of shares can only be made by
private companies. In the case of a pub 1ic company,
t r a n s f e r of shares must, normally, free f r om
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restrictions if a stock exchange quotation is to be
obtained. If a company's articles give the directors an
absolute and unlimited discretion (when exercising the
power to refuse a transfer) with no obi i gat ion on them
to give reasons for refusing a transfer, then, they are
not obliged to reveal the reason for the refusal1 ' ) .
In this case, the court would not interfere with the
exercise of, such a power unless it is shown that the
directors were not acting bona fide in the best interest
of the c ompany as who1e ' 1 7 5 ) . it is to be noticed that
bona fides is presumed unless the contrary is
proved'176).
If the articles empower the directors to refuse to
register a transfer on certain grounds, the directors
can be questioned as to the grounds on which they have
refused registration. The directors, here, owe a duty
to the company to exercise such a power for the purpose
for which it is conferred. If the directors give
reasons for their refusal to transfer shares, the court
can decide whether the given reasons are sufficient to
justify the refusal. In Re Bede SS. Co. Ltd,(177), the
articles entitled directors to refuse a transfer of
shares if "in their opinion it is contrary to the
interests of the company that the proposed transferee
should be a member thereof". The directors exercised
that power and refused to register a transfer of single
shares on the ground that a transfer of single shares to
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outsiders (with no interest in, or knowledge of
shipping) was contrary to the interests of the company.
The court held that that reason was not enough to
justify the refusal. Refusal should be based on grounds
personal to the transferee as was stated in the
articles. The law deals with directors' power to refuse
a transfer has been summarised by Vine lott J. in Te 11 v.
Phoenix Property & Investment Co. Ltd.<178). The Judge
said:
CTlhe court will not interfere with the
exercise by directors of a discretion not to
register a transfer if their decision was one
which a reasonable board of directors could
bona fide believe to be in the interests of
the company. If the discretion is an
unfettered one and not limited to specific
grounds of refusal the court wi 1 1 not compel
the directors to give their reasons for their
refusal. If their decision was one which a
reasonable board could consider to be in the
interests of the company then the court
presumes that they acted bona f ide and had
good grounds for their decision. However, if
the directors once give their reasons the
court can consider how far those reasons did
justify their decision*1731.
If a company's articles provide that a member may not
sel1 his shares without first offering them to existing
members, directors are under a duty to refuse to
register a transfer to an outsider if the transferee has
breached the articles by not offering the shares to
existing members f i r s t * 180).
If directors refuse to register a transfer, the company
must send a notice of refusal to the transferee "within
2 months after the date on which the transfer was
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lodged" for registration' 1811 . If the company fails to
send notice of refusal to the transferee within the
specified period, "the company and every officer of it
who is in default is liable to a fine and, for continued
contravention C of S.183 (5)3, to a daily default
fine"'182).
Directors' decision to register a transfer rnust be taken
within a reasonable time after the transfer has been
submitted. The power to refuse registration must be
affirmatively exercised by the board of directors' 133) j
silence is not sufficient since the transferee has a
prima facie right to be registered unless refused'184> .
In the light of S. 183(5) a reasonable time within which
the board of directors can refuse registration of a
transfer is prima facie two months' l85 > .
2.3.6. Power to Bind the Company.
In general, after the incorporation of a company, the
company is bound by the transactions entered into by its
directors on its behalf. The question of directors'
power to bind the company leads one to examine the
position of directors in relation to both pre —
incorporation and ultra vires transac11ons.
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1 ) Pre-incorpora tion transactions' 18 6)
Before the formation of a company, any transaction
entered into by persons purporting to act on its behalf
will not bind the company. Such a transaction cannot
be enforced'187' or ratified by the company after
incorporation' 1881 . Before incorporation, a company has
no capacity to enter into any transaction, and
consequently, no person can enter into a transaction on
behalf of a non-existent principal' 1 83 ' . The effect of
such a transaction is that it binds the person who
enters into it. In Kelner v. Baxter' ' 38 ' , before the
incorporation of the company, the promoters signed a
contract "on behalf of" the proposed company for the
purchase of a quantity of wine. The company was formed
and the wine was handed over to it and consumed.
However, before payment was made the company went into
liquidation. The court held that the promoters were
personally liable to pay for the wine, and no
ratification could release them from liability.
At' the common law, there was a distinction between the
position of a person who acted as an agent and that of a
person who was purporting to authenticate the signature
of the company. The former was held to be personal ly
1 i ab 1 e< 13 1 I , whereas the latter was riot''92'. In
Newborns v. Sensolid (Great Britain) Ltd.' 1 9 3 ) f a
quantity of tinned ham was sold to S Ltd. by a company
which was not in existence at the time of the contract.
The contract was "We have this day sold to you
(Signed) Leopold Newborne (London) Ltd". S Ltd. refused
to take delivery because the market price of the ham was
fallen. It was held that Leopold Newborne (London) Ltd.
could not enforce the contract because it was made
before its incorporation. Leopold Newborne (the
promoter) was also held not to be able to enforce the
contract because the case was not one of an agent
undertaking to do certain things himself as agent for
another, rather it was a case in which a company
purported to sell. So, the contract was held to be "a
c omp1e t e nullity".
The distinction between signature of a person acting as
agent and a signature authenticating that of the company
has been abolished by the enactment of S.36(4) of the
Companies Act 1985*194) . S.3 6(4) has been replaced by,
what is now, the new S.36(c)*195). The section
provides:
(1) A contract which purports to be made by or
on behalf of a company at a time when the
company has not been formed has effect,
subject to any agreement to the contrary, as
one made with the person purporting to act for
the company or as an agent for it, and he is
personally liable on the contract
accordingly* 1 96 ) .
Thus, in Phonogram v. Lane*197), before the formation of
the company, Lane signed a contract "for and on behalf
of Fragile Management Ltd.". Under the contract he
received an advance payment of £6.000 which was
repayable if a recording contract was not entered into
within one month. The company was never formed and no
recording contract was made. The lender sued for the
return of the £6.000. The Court of Appeal held Lane
personally liable for the return of the money despite
the fact that at common law Lane's signature could be
regarded as mere authentication of the company's
signa ture' l9 8' .
What is important in this context is that a person (who
holds himself out as occupying the position of a
director, and who enters into a transaction on behalf of
a company before incorporation) binds himself, not the
company, to that transaction. His liability is presumed
unless there is an agreement to the contrary' 199) .
Consequently, he can escape personal liability by
inserting an exclusion clause in the agreement with the
other party to the transaction. To avoid personal
liability, only a clear exclusion of personal liability
would amount to an agreement to the contrary'200).
2) Ultra vires transactions.
The question of the ultra vires transactions will be
examined only as far as the directors' power to bind the
company is concerned. However, it might be desirable to
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discuss, in brief, the history of the ultra vires
doctrine.
In the past, it was to the advantage of a person who was
about to deal with a company to have regard to the
f o1 lowing matters:
1 ) that the company has the capacity to enter into the
sort of transaction in question;
2) that the company has the power to enter into that
kind of transaction; and
3) that the company 1s officer with whom he dea1s has the
power or the authority to involve the company into that
transaction.
The first and the second matters deal with the capacity
and the power of a company. Prior to the enactment of
the new S.35 of the Companies Act 1985*201) t a company's
capacity is 1 imited by its memorandum. S.2 of the
Companies Act 1985 requires a company to state its
objects. So, any act beyond those objects was
considered to be beyond the capacity of the company.
Any act beyond the capacity of the company was deemed to
be- u I t r a vires and, consequently, void and not
ratifiable. An ultra vires act could not be ratified
even by a unanimous vote of the shareho1ders'202) .
Further, "an uIt r a vires agreement cannot become intra
vires by reasons of estoppel , lapse of time,
acquiescence or delay"*203).
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A company's objects were distinguished, in the past,
from a company's powers. A company could not exercise
any of its powers otherwise than for the purposes of its
objects. In General Auction Estate ot Monetary Co. v.
Sin i th' 2 0 4 ) t the company had borrowed money. The court
was faced with the question whether the company had a
power to borrow and, if so, whether in this particular
case the money was borrowed for the purposes of its
objects. The court held that the company in question
had the power to borrow money and the money were
borrowed for the purposes of its stated objects. Had
the company, in that case, had no power to borrow money,
the borrowing would have been beyond its capacity and
consequently uIt r a vires.
The courts tried to lessen the rigidity of the u 1 t r a
v i r e s doctrine in several ways. Firstly, it had been
held that matters incidental or conductive to the
attainment of the main objects of a company could be
undertaken by the company' 2 0 5 ) . Secondly, the main
object rule was defeated by the decision of the House of
Lords in Cotman v. Brougham'206) r where it was held that
it was competent to a company to declare at the end of
its objects clause that each and every clause should be
regarded as a separate a n d independent object of the
company. Thirdly, in Bel 1 Houses Ltd v. City Wa 1 1
Froperties Ljnd<2 0 7)( the court held valid a clause which
permitted a company to engage in any business which was
regarded by the directors as for the benefit of the
company. The decision in that case^ in effect,
defeated the policy behind having an object clause.
Fourthly, the courts moved toward disregarding any
distinction between objects and powers. Objects and
powers were treated as one and the same. A wide
construction was also given to every word deployed in
the objects c1ause <208). Fifthly, in Rolled Steel
Products Ltd. v. British St eel Corporation ( 2 0 9 ) t the
Court of Appeal rejected the view that a company could
not exercise any of its powers otherwise than for the
purpose of its objects. The court held that if a
company had a particular power in its objects clause
then it would have the capacity to exercise that power
for any legal purpose notwithstanding its objects.
The Companies Acts have also made an attempt to lessen
the effects of the ultra vires rule. Firstly, S.9 of
the Companies Act 1985 allows a company to alter its
Objects by a special resolution' 21 0 ) , Thus, a compaiiy
is allowed to alter it objects clause so as to expand
its activities as it thinks proper. Prior to the
enactment of the Companies Act 1989, an alteration of
the articles could only be made for a specified purpose.
Nowadays, the new S.4 of the companies Act 1985<211)
allows a c ompany to alter its objects clause by a
special resolution at any time and for any purpose.
Secondly, the new S . 3A of the Companies Act l 985' 2 l 2 )
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allows a company to state that its object is "to carry
on business as a general commercial company". This
section has, in fact, great impact on the scope of
application of the uIt r a vires doctrine. That is
because, it allows a company "to carry on any trade or
business whatsoever"'213) f and to "do all such things as
are incidental or conductive to the carrying on of any
trade or business"'2 14) . If a company drafts its
objects clause in the manner described by the new S.3A,
the u 1 t r a vires doctrine may operate only in the field
of corporate gifts and gratuitous transactions' 2'5' .
Thirdly, S.35 of the Companies Act 1 9 8 5' 2 l 6 ) protected a
limited class of person dealing with a c ompany f r om the
devastating effects of the ultra vires doctrine. It
provided:
(1) In favour of a person dealing with a
company in good faith, any transaction decided
on by the directors is deemed to be one which
it is within the capacity of the company to
enter into, and the power of the directors to
bind the company is deemed to be free of any
limitation under the memorandum or articles.
S.35 had been widely criticised as being one which added
a complicated face to the u1t r a vires doctrine' 21 7 ' .
S.35 has been replaced by the new S.35(21S) which
effectively abolishes the u1t r a vires doctrine insofar
as a third party dealing with a company in good faith is
concerned. On the other hand, the new S.35 reserves the
internal effects of the doctrine. The new S.35
provides:
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(1) The validity of an act done by a company
shall not be called into question on the
ground of lack of capacity by reason of
anything in the company's memorandum.
Accordingly, a company's capacity is not limited by its
memorandum' 2 19).
It has already been mentioned that / ; h">
care shou1d be taken to ensure that the company
officer, with whom he deals, has the power to bind the
company to the transaction in question. If a director
has the authority to bind the company to a particular
transaction, then, the third party is well protected.
In other words, the company cannot avoid that
transaction.
A company may try to avoid a transaction by arguing that
it has been entered into, on its behalf, by a person who
is not a director; or by the board in excess of its
authority; or by an individual director without proper
delegation. In the past, a third party could rely on
the rules of agency to enforce such a transaction
against the company'220> . Nowadays, a third party can
rely on the new S.35A instead of the rules of agency to
enforce a transaction against the company. New S.35A
removes the need to rely on the rules of agency in
almost al 1 cases. The section refers to the "power of
the board of directors to bind the company, or authorise
others to do so". It provides:
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In favour of a person dealing with a company
in good faith, the power of the board of
directors to bind the company, or authorise
others to do so, shall be deemed to be free of
any 1 imitation under the company's
constitution".
Thus, so long as a third party is dealing with the
company in good faith (and he is presumed to do so
unless the contrary is proved) ( 221 ) a transaction
entered into with the company is binding on it,
regardless of any limitations, under its constitution,
on the power of the board of directors to bind it. In
other words, the board's excess of power, abuse of power
and defective delegation are no longer effective
defences in the hand of a company to inval idate a
particular transaction so long as those breaches arise
from limitations under the company's constitut ion' 2 2 2) .
The phrase "any limitation under the company's
constitution" has been given a very wide meaning by the
new S.35A (3). The section provides:
ELIimitat ions on directors' powers under the
company's constitution include limitations
deriving:
(a) from a resolution of the company in
general meeting or a meeting of any class of
shareholders, o r
(b) from any agreement between the members of
the company or any class of shareholders.
Thus, the word "limitation" is not limited to those
found in the company's memorandum or articles of
association'223).
The mere knowledge that a particular act is beyond the
directors' powers under the articles does not amount to
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a iti a 1 a fides on the part of a third party! 224 ) . The new
S.711A of the Companies Act 1985*225) abolishes the
doctrine of constructive notice for almost al 1 purposes.
So, a person cannot be taken to have notice of any
matter merely because it is "disclosed in any document
kept by the registrar of companies (and thus available
for inspection) or made available by the company for
inspection"' 2 2 6 1 . The position of a third party has
been further strengthened by the new S.35B which
provides that a person deal ing with a company is not
bound to enquire as to any 1 imitation on the power of
the directors to bind the company or to authorise others
to do so* 2 2 7 ).
To sum up: any 1 imitation on the power of the board to
bind the company or to authorise others to do so ts of
no effect so long as the other party to the transaction
is dealing with the company in good faith. It fol lows
that a company would not be able to avoid a transaction
simply on the ground that the directors had exceeded or
abused the powers vested in them by its constitution.
This rule, however, has been subjected to a very
important exception: An act of a company is voidable at
the instance of the company where the other party to the
act is the company's director or directors or any
director of its holding company or any of their
associates* 22 8 )
. The reason behind this except ion is to
prevent directors from using new S.35A as a vehicle for
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fraud by misusing their powers in order to bind the
company to a transaction from which they are to
benefit'229). However, this restriction does not affect
transactions in which bona fide third parties are
involved. Those transactions remain valid and binding
on the company insofar as the third parties are
concerned' 23 0 )
2.4. Excess of Power, Abuse of Power and Ratification.
It has been mentioned that directors derive
their powers, mainly, from the articles of association.
They are required to exercise the powers vested in them
bona fide in the best interest of the company'23 1 ) .
They are also required not to usurp powers which they
never have (e.g. powers which are vested, by the
articles, in the general meeting of the
shareholders)' 2 32 ) .
Where directors exercise their powers for purposes other
than those for which they are conferred, it can be said
that they are abusing their powers. But where they
usurp a power which they never have, it can be said that
they are exceeding their powers'2 3 3 ) .
Directors' abuse of power can be ratified by the company
in general meeting so long as they have acted bona fide
in what they be 1 i eve to be in the interest of the
company'234). However, any ratification which is
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tantamount to fraud on the minority cannot he
a 1 1 owe d ( 2 3 5 ) .
An abuse of power can be ratified by an ordinary
resolution. In Bamford v. Barnford(236) t the directors
issued shares in exercise of a power vested in them by
the company's articles. It was alleged that the purpose
for which the shares were issued(which was the defeating
of a take—over bid) was improper. However, the company
ratified the directors' act by an ordinary resolution.
The Court of Appeal held that such ratification would be
effective. Harman L.J. said:
The only question is whether the al lotment,
having been made, as one must assume, in bad
faith, is voidable and can be avoided at the
instance of the company— at their instance
only and of no one else, because the wrong, if
wrong it be, is a wrong done to the company.
the company which had the right to reca11
the al lotment, has also the right to approve
of it and forgive it . . .< 2 3 7 > .
Similarly, excess of power can be ratified by the
company by way of ordinary resolution'2381. In Grant v.
United Kingdom Switchback RaiIways( 2 3 9 ) t the articles of
the company disqualified any director from voting at a
board meeting in respect of any contract in which he was
interested. The directors decided to sell the compay's
undertaking to another company despite the fact that
they were the promoters of the purchasing company. The
Court of Appeal held that despite the fact that the
directors had exceeded their powers, their act could be
ratified by a n ordinary resolution of the general
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meeting. The argument that such ratification amounted
to an alteration of the articles (which could only be
done by a special resolution) was rejected by the court.
The court distinguished between the case where a company
ratified an unauthorised act and the case where the
company gave the directors a power to do things in the
future which were not permitted by the articles. The
former was held to be ratification and could be effected
by ordinary resolution, whereas the latter was held to
be an alteration of the articles which could only be
effected by special resolution. Cotton L.J. approached
that distinction and put it in this way:
The ratifying of a particular contract which
had been entered into by the directors without
authority, and so making it an act of the
company, is quite a different thing from
altering the articles. To give the directors
power to do things in future which the
articles did not authorise them to do would be
an alteration of the articles, but it is no
alteration of the articles to ratify a
contract which has been made without
authority"'240).
But, what if the directors do an unauthorised act which
can only be done by a special majority of the
shareholders in general meeting. Can the company ratify
such an act by an ordinary resolution?. The answer to
this question seems to be no. A special resolution may
be needed to ratify such an act.
Excess of power and abuse of power can be regarded as a
breach of duty' 2 4 0 ) . it is as yet unclear whether
ratificat ion will relieve directors from liability for
- G3 -
the breach or merely cure the irregularity in the
transaction'242), In MuItinationa1 Gas and
Petrochemical Co. Ltd. v. Multinational Gas and
Petrochemical Services Ltd.' 2 4 3 ) r May L.J. , in his
dissenting judgment, was of the opinion that
ratification would not deprive the company of its right
to sue the directors in breach of duty in respect of the
alleged negligence. It would seem that this view has
found some support in the new S.35(3) of the Companies
Act 1985< 2 4 4 ) . The section provides that a company can,
by passing a special resolution, ratify an act which
would previously have been regarded as being beyond its
capacity. But a resolution ratifying such act "shall
not affect any liability incurred by the directors or
any other person; relief from any such liability must be
agreed to separately by special resolution"'2451. Thus,
while ratification "cures" the breach of duty, it does
not relieve the directors from liability incurred by
virtue of the directors exceeding their powers. For an
effective relief from liability a separate special
resolution is required. This distinction, it is
agreed'2461 , should be recognised by the courts. It
should be recognised generally and not only in relation
to uIt r a vires transactions. In other words, if a
company ratifies an act done by the directors in excess
of their powers (but intra vires the company) such
- 64 -
ratif ication rnu s t
which is incurred
not affect the directors' liability
as a result of the excess of power.
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CHAPTER 3
DIRECTORS' FIDUCIARY DUTIES: THE FAIR DEALING RULES.
3.1. Introduction
It is well established that a fiduciary is not all owed
to put himself in a position in which his personal
interest may conflict with his duty to his principal, or
in a position in which " his judgment is likely to be
biased" <i> . This principle finds its origins in trust
cases. The leading case in this context is Keech v.
Stanford < 2) t in which a lessor refused to renew the
lease to the infant beneficiary whereupon the trustee
renewed for himself. The court laid down the rigid rule
that a trustee is not allowed to take the lease for
himself even if the lessor refuses to renew it to the
beneficiary. Lord Chancellor King observed'31.
I must consider this as a trust for the
infant; for I very well see, if a trustee on
the refusal to renew, might have a lease to
himself, few trust estates would be renewed to
cestui que ; though I do not say there is a
fraud in this case, yet he should rather have
let it run out, than to have had the lease to
himself. This may seem hard, that the trustee
is the only person of al 1 mankind who might
not have the lease, but it is very proper that
the rule should be strictly pursued, and not
in the least relaxed; for it is very obvious
what would be the consequence of letting
trustees have the lease, on refusal to renew
to cestui que use .
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In Cha r i t ab I e Corporation v . Sutton/ 4 ) t the Commi t teamen
who managed the corporation, which was created by a
royal charter were accused of breach of trust. Lord
Chancel lor Hardwick said that the Committeemen are
agents to those who employed them in this
trust [ and] by accepting of a trust of
this sort, a person is obliged to execute it
with fidelity . "<5) .
The language of trusts and agency was used to hold a
fiduciary liable to account161. Liability was imposed
by analogy mi+k. trust and agency principles in A11 o r n e y
General v. Wi I son' 1 ) . In that case the governing body
of the corporation fraudulently alienated certain parts
of its property. A suit was brought in the name of the
corporation against the wrongdoers. The defendants
argued that the acts complained of were acts of the
corporation and a cestui que trust cannot complain of a
breach of trust to which he was a party. This argument
was rejected by Lord Cot tenham L.C. . His Lordship said:
The true way of viewing this is to consider
the members of the governing body of the
corporation as its agents bound to exercise
its functions for the purposes for which they
were given, and to protect its interests and
its property; and if such agents exercise
these functions for the purpose of injuring
its interests and alienating its property
the corporation may complain, and may have
redress against such members and agents as are
authors of the wrong"' ° > .
The inflexible rules are not restricted to cases in
which a fiduciary deals directly with his principal or
with his principal's property. These rules have, in
fact, a wide scope of application. A fiduciary, for
examipe, is not allowed to use his position to
appropriate for himself benefits or advantages which he
ought to have acquired for his principalis* .
In Hami1 ton v. Wright* * 0> , Lord Brougham stated:
There cannot be a greater mistake than to
suppose, as seem to have been done below, that
a trustee is only prevented from do i rig tilings
which bring an actual loss upon the estate
under his administration. It is quite enough
that the thing which he does has a tendency to
injure the trust; a tendency to interfere with
his duty . . . Nor is it only on account of
the conflict between his interest and his duty
to the trust that such transactions are
forbidden. The knowledge which he acquires as
trustee is of itself a sufficient ground for
disqualification, and of requiring that such
knowledge shall not be capable of being used
for his own benefit to injure the trust "(ill .
The inflexibility of the rules has been emphasised by
Lord Herschel 1 in Bray v. ForcN 1 2 ' , where his lordship
said:
It is an inflexible rule . . . that a person
in a fiduciary position . . . is not, unless
otherwise expressly provided, entitled to make
a profit; he is not a 1 1 owed to put himself in
a position where his interest and duty
conflict . It has, therefore, been deemed
expedient to lay down this positive rule".
The inflexible rules which are applied to trustees have
also been applied to companies' directors because they
too are in a fiduciary position. In Aberdeen Rly Co v.
Blaikie Bros1 1 3) , a director was a member of a
partnership with which his company, the pursuer, entered
into a contract. On a claim by the company against the
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director, the court held that the company was entitled
to set aside that contract. Lord Cranworth L.C said
that a company could only act by an agent and this agent
owed fiduciary duties to the company. He is obliged to
discharge these duties on behalf of, and in the best
interest of, the company,
And it is a rule of universal application,
that no one , having such duties to discharge,
sha 1 1 be al lowed to enter into engagements in
which he has, or can have, a personal interest
conflicting, or which possibly may conflict,
with the interest of those who he is bound to
protect"'14).
Similarly, in Imperial Mercantile Credit Association v.
Co 1 ernan' i 5 > , the court held that a company's director
was not al lowed to obtain any benefit from a contract
entered into by the company and which required the
approval of the board of which he was a member.
Likewise in Cook v. Peeks' 1 61 , the directors of company
A formed another company B and deflected a contract in
which company A was interested to company B which they
owned personally. The court held that the directors must
maintain that contract with company A since the contract
be 1onged to it' l 7 > . In Regal (Hastings) Ltd v.
Gu1 liver' is) the company decided to acquire two cinemas,
in addition to the one which it already had. A
subsidiary company had been formed for this purpose.
The old company , i ,e, Regal , could not take up more
than 2000 shares in the subsidiary company. The
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directors took up the other 3000 shares for themselves.
Ultimately the directors sold the two companies' shares
to outsiders and made personal profit. The purchasers
of Regal brought an action against the former directors
to account for the profit made. The court held the
defendants liable to account on the grounds that they
obtained those shares " by reason and only by reason of
the fact that they were directors of Regal and in the
course of the execution of that office . .
It is to be concluded that an inflexible rule which
prohibits conflicting situations and disallows the
making of a profit out of a directorial position, has
been created' 20 ) . This rule can be described as a
prophylactic rule against transactions in which a
director has an interest conflicting with that of the
c ompany.
3.2. THE NO CONFLICT RULE AND THE NO PROFIT RULE.
It may not be out of place to recalI here Lord
Hersche 1 1 ' s observations which were made in Bray v .
Ford' 21) ( Cjuc IjLci & bo\/e ) — P
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The question here is thvs : Is his Lordship stating two
separate rules or a single rule in two different ways ?
Is he stating a wide basic rule from which a derivative
rule stems? If he states a basic rule and a derivative
one, which one is the basic rule and which one is the
derivative ?<22) .
To answer these questions, it seems necessary to examine
the existing case law. In Aberdeen Town Counc i 1 v.
Aberdeen University^"3) r the judges did not refer to the
no-conflict rule. The liability was imposed on the
trustees by applying the no-profit rule independently.
Th e facts of that case were as foilows: the counci1 was
the trustee of certain lands. It was acting through an
agent. the trustees bought the lands and then acquired
certain fishing rights which could be granted by the
Crown to the owner only. It did not appear that the
trustees were under a duty to acquire the fishing rights
for the beneficiaries. The House of Lords held that
both the land and the fisheries were to be held for the
original beneficiaries and a trustee could not hold for
his own benefit any benefit obtained as a result of his
being a trustee. Thus, since there was no duty to
acquire fishing rights for the beneficiaries the no-
conflict rule could not arise. The no—profit rule
achieved a great i rr>p© y rice in this case. Similarly,
in Re Lewis' 2 4 ) , the no —profit rule only was applied.
In that case t he defendant had been emp1o y e d as a
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salesman by a partnership, in which his father was a
partner. In 1905 the father died a n d the defendant
became a partner by virtue of being a trustee of his
father's will. The defendant also continued to act as
a salesman for the partnership and in 1909 he entered
into an agreement with the partnership. The
beneficiaries claimed that he was liable to account to
the trust for his salaries. Warrington J. disregarded
the no—conflict rule and applied the no—profit rule
on 1 y. He held that the defendant had not received his
salaries as a result of being a trustee or a partner,
and thus he was not liable to account. It is said' 2 5 )
that the court could have reached the opposite result if
it applied the no—conflict rule. The personal interest
of the defendant in getting the highest possible salary
conflicted with his duty to the trust which was to
consider only the interest of that trust.
In Regal (Hastings) Ltd v. Gulliver'26) t the defendants
argued that they owed no duty to Regal to acquire the
shares to it and it would have been a breach of duty to
do so in the light of Re g a 1 1s financial inability. In
other words, it was argued that the no-conflict rule
could not be applied . Four of the judges relied
exclusively on the no-prof it rule'27) . Lord Russe11 of
Kill owe n made it clear that " The liability arises from
the mere fact of a profit having . . . been made"'28).
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Thus, it is plain that the no-profit rule on 1 y was
app 1 ied in the Rega 1 case. Lord Wright put it in this
way :
if a person in a fiduciary relationship
makes a secret profit out of the relationship,
the court will not inquire whether the other
person is damnified or has lost a profit which
otherwise he would have got. The fact is in
itself a fundamental breach of the fiduciary
relationshi p < 2 9 > .
The House of Lords also held the def endents liable to
account, depending on the no-profit rule only, in Brown
v. I .R.C.'3 0). in tha t case it wa s held that a
solicitor could not retain for himself the interest on
his trust accounts. Lord Reid and Lord Upjohn stated
that the rule which was applied was that a trustee was
not allowed to make a profit out of his trust'31' .
To sum up: even if there is no—conflict between a
director's interest and his duty to the company
(probably because no duty is owed in a particular
instance), liability may be imposed upon a director if
he makes a profit out of his directorial position'32) .
The courts, on the other hand, relied on the no-conf1 ict
rule alone in some cases. For example, in Wright v.
Morgan'33) t a testator devised certain lands to trustees
and gave one of them, Harry, who was also a beneficiary,
the option to buy the lands if the trustees decided to
sell. Douglas, who was a trustee, bought Harry's
beneficial interest and his "option". When the trustees
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decided to sel1, the lands were offered to and bought by
Douglas. Some of the beneficiaries claimed that the
sale should be set aside. The Privy Council held that
Douglas had placed himself in a conflicting position by
taking an assignment of and exercising the "option".
The decision of the Privy Council, therefore, based only
on the rule that "equity wi11 not allow a person who is
in a position of trust to carry out a transaction, where
there is a conflict between his duty and his
interest"!34) . However, in some other cases, both the
no—conflict and the no-profit rules were taken into
account. That is, the courts relied upon the two rules
to hold the defender liable. In some cases, the
relation between the two rules was unclear. For
example, in Re Macadam1 3 5 > , two trustees were given the
power to appoint directors. They appointed themselves.
The court held that they were accountable to the trust
for the salaries they received. Cohen J. referred to
the two rules in his judgment as follows:
I think that the root of the matter really is:
Did [ the defendant ] acquire the position in
respect of which he drew the remuneration by
virtue of his position as a trustee?!36).
It is clear from the above statement that the judge
referred to the no-profit rule. He described it as the
root of the matter. On the other hand , later in his
judgment, Cohen J. referred to the no-conf1ict rule. He
said:
- 89 -
the opportunity to receive that
remuneration was gained as a result of a
discretion vested in the trustees, and they
had put themselves in a position where their
interest and duty conflict'.
It is said'3 3 > that Cohen J. in his judgment brought the
no—profit rule to the level of equality with the no-
conflict rule. However, since Cohen J. described the
no—profit rule as the "root of the matter", it would
appear that he was considering it as the basic rule.
But, there was nothing in Cohen J.1s statement to
indicate that the no—conflict rule was the derivative
one. Thus, the relation between the two rule was
unclear in that case.
In Boardman v. Phipps'39) t a trust consisted, partially,
of shares in Laster and Harris Ltd. Mr Boardman, the
solicitor of the trust arid Mr Phipps, a be nef i c i ary
under the trust attended a company meeting.
Accordingly, they thought that buying the outstanding
shares in the company would improve the position of the
trust. However, the trustees were unable to buy these
shares and in fact they had no legal power to do so. Mr
Boardman was purporting to act for the trust and gained
valuable and confidential information about the company.
U1timately Mr Boardman and Mr Phipps bought most of the
outstanding shares in their own right. Some of the
beneficiaries under the trust claimed that the shares
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should be held for the trust and the defendants should
be made accountable for the profit so derived.
At first instance, Wilberforce J. applied the no-profit
rule. He held that "trustees or agents shall not retain
a profit made in the course of or by means of their
office"*40' . The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision
of Wilberforce J.. However, Lord Denning indicated that
liability can also be imposed by applying the no-
conflict rule. He pointed out that Mr Boardman had "
placed himself in a position where there was a conflict
between his duty to advise an application to the court
[by the trustees] and his interest to acquire the
shares himself . . ."(41) . Mr Boardman's advice would
be influenced by his personal interest if he was
consulted by the trustees. He would be unable to give
an unprejudiced advice as to how they should act. Thus,
in Lord Denning's decision the no—profit rule appears as
separate and distinct f rom the no-conf1ict ru1e* 4 2) .
The House of Lords upheld the decision by a majority of
three to two. Lord Guest relied solely on the no—profit
rule. Lord Cohen relied on both the no—conflict and the
no—profit rules as grounds for his decision. Lord
Hodson opened his judgment with an approval, of the no-
profit rule and ended it on a conflict basis, saying
that there was a possibility of conflict and that
possibility was enough to bring the rule into operation
or to warrant the court's intervention.
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Of the two dissenting judgments, Viscount Dilhorne
recognised both the no—profit rule and the no-conf I ict
rule. But he held that none of them appl ied to the
case. He pointed out that the trust indicated that it
was not interested in acquiring the shares. Thus, there
was no possibility of Boardman being asked to advise the
trust on the purchase of the shares. Accordingly, there
was no evidence of conflict of interest and duty. He
aslo pointed out that the knowledge acquired by Mr
Boardman and Mr Phipps was not trust property, nor did
their saying that they represented the trust amounted to
a use of fiduciary position.
Lord Upjohn, in his dissenting judgment, said:
The relevant rule for the decision of this
case is the fundamental rule of equity that a
person in a fiduciary position must not make a
profit out of his trust which is part of the
wider rule that a trustee must not place
himself in a position where his duty and
interest may conflict'43> .
It is clear that Lord Upjohn recognised the two rules.
On the one hand the no—prof i t rule which was described
by his Lordship as " the fundamental rule of equity
and on the other hand the no-conf1ict rule. His
Lordship considered the no—profit rule as part of the
wider rule which is the no-conflict rule. Thus, he
determined the relationship between the two rules. The
no—conflict rule is the basic one while the no—profit
rule is a derivative from it.
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However, in the light of the Phipps case'44' , and that
of the Rega1 c a s e' 4 5 ' , it is argued'^ 6) that the law, in
the U.K. recognises two rules applied to fiduciaries
including directors, i.e, the no-profit rule and the no-
conflict rule. The two rules are certainly not rigidly
separated in most of the judicial pronouncements. This
is perhaps because they represent two perspectives on
the same problem which is generally described by the no-
conflict rule as a catch—all. However, it is quite
possible for a profit to be made without there being a
conflict of interest and vice versa' 4 7 > . And it is
quite possible, in s ome cases, that the application of
one will impose liability while the application of the
other will not'48) . It is submitted that, in fact,
there is a continuum between two extremes characterised
by the two rules and that often both questions are
merely different sides of the same coin.
The Advantages of the r igid Application of the Fair
D_eaJ irig Ru 1 es
In favour of a rigid application of the rules it has
been argued:
i) By rigid application of the rules, the question of
preferring the director's personal interest over that of
the company will not arise'*9) . That is, because of
their clear cut prohibition of conflict of i nterest the
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rules remove any doubt surrounding the directors'
motives.
ii) Rigid application of the rules will save time and
money because the court wi11 not be required to examine
the fairness of the transaction'50).
iii) The rigid application of the rules is the mo s t
effective way to resist temptation. That is, since
directors and businessmen, generally, measure their
success by what they gain personally, not by what their
companies gain, the absence of the rigid rules may tempt
them to breach their fiduciary duties by exploiting
their positions to gain personal profit'51' . A rigid
application of the rules will help to keep directors
sing1e—minded1y devoted to their companies'52' .
iv) Morris J. in Peso Silver Mines Ltd v. Cropper'5 3' ,
argued that the complexities of modern business require
a rigid application of the rules because any relaxation
of them would allow today's comp1 exitie s to be come a
cloak for fraud. Ordinary people's confidence in their
dealing with companies could be weakened by any
relaxation of these rigid rules. People are assured of
having some protection against directors' improper acts
if the rigid rules apply. Applying these rules will
also remind directors of their fiduciary duties and,
hopeful ly, mean that they wi 1 1 avoid breaching them.
Morris J. also argued that a rigid application of the
rules wi11 not harm directors. They can escape
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liability by making a full disclosure to the company in
general meeting and seeking its approval.
v) Final lyf the common law rigid rules have an obvious
advantage which is the ease with which they can be
app1ied<54).
3.3. SITUATIONS OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST
3.3.1. Directors' interests in contracts
The general rule at common law is that a director may
not have a direct or indirect interest in a contract
with his company unless permitted by the company's
articles or by the company in general meeting*55). The
reason behind such an embargo is to avoid the
possibility of conflict between a director's personal
interest and his duty to the company. The most famous
case in which the no—conflict rule has been applied is
Aberdeen RIy Co. v. Blaikie Bros* 56 ) . In that case, a
director was a member of a partnership with which his
company, the pursuer, entered into a contract. On a
claim by the company against the director, the court
held that the company was entitled to set aside that
contract. Lord Cranworth L.C said that a company can
only act by an agent, and this agent owes a fiduciary
duties to the company. He is obliged to discharge these
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duties on behalf and in the best interest of the
company,
and it is a rule of universal application that
no one, having such duties to discharge, shall
be allowed to enter into engagements in which
he has, or can have, a personal interest
conflicting, or which possibly may conflict,
with the interests of those whom he is bound
to protect"* 57) .
Similarly, the court, in Imperial Mercantile Credit
Association v. Co 1eman *53) t held that a company's
director was not allowed to obtain any benefit from a
contract entered into by the company, and which required
the approval of the board of which he was a member.
This is the general rule at Common Law. This rule
applies to situations in which a director has a direct
as well as an indirect interest in transactions with his
company*59).
Applying the above rule makes a director's contract with
the company voidable at the instance of the company, and
makes the interested director liable to account for the
profit made*60'. A director may also be interested as a
member of another company in a contract made between
that company and the company of which he is a director.
In such a case he is liable to disclose his interest to
the board of directors . If he fails to do that he will
be liable to a fine*61' . \ntddeh-TlDO SmcU a.c^nitTxcti^vo i dab 1 e
at the instance of his company unless the other company,
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°f which he is a member, is unaware of the director's
interest when the contract is entered into16 2) .
• 3 - 2 . The use of a company ' s property.
By using a company's property, a director may place
himself in a conflicting position. He may make a
profit out of that use. Thus, like a trustee, a
director is liable to account to his company for a
profit made out of using its assets unless he makes a
ful 1 disclosure to the company and obtains the
shareholders' approval in general meeting. The use by a
director of a company's assets for his own benefit is a
clear breach of fiduciary duties. A director in such a
situation will be made liable as a constructive
t rus tee< 6 31 .
In Menier v. Hooper's Telegraph Workjs* 6 4 > , the
defendants, who had a majority of shares in the company,
had made an arrangement by which they had dealt with
matters affecting the whole company. They had dealt
with them in consideration of their obtaining for
themselves certain advantages. The minority of the
shareholders brought an action al leging that the
majority shareholders had divided the assets of the
company among themselves. The court found that the case
was within the scope of the "fraud on the minority"
exception to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle'65) t a rid field
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that the defendants were not allowed to sell the
company's assets and keep the consideration for
t herase Ives.
Purchasing assets from the company or se1 ling assets to
it by directors are situations in which a conflict of
interest may arise. Moreover, a conflict of interests
may arise if these transactions are entered into by
companies in which the directors have an interest. In
respect of such transactions, the shareholders' approval
must be sought before the transaction is entered
into's 6) .
The Companies Act 1985 deals with this issue.
S . 3 2 0's 7) requires a director to obtain the shareholders'
approval to enter into transactions which relate to the
assets of the company'68). Shadow directors are also
caught by this section'691. Non-compliance with
S. 320( 1 ) makes the contract or the arrangement voidable
at the instance of the company' 7" ' . It makes a director
liable to account for any gain which he has made
directly or indirectly out of the arrangement in
quest i on' 7 1 > . A di rec tor may a 1 so be he Id 1 i ab 1 e to
indemnify the company for any loss resulting from that
arrangement even if the company does not exercise its
right to avoid the transaction'7 9' . However, the
company wi11 be unable to avoid an arrangement if
restoration is impossible or if it has been indemnified
for the resulting loss'73> . Similarly, the company
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cannot invalidate the transaction if a third party
acquired rights bona fide by that transaction''4) t or if
the arrangement, is within a reasonable period, affirmed
by the company in general meeting' 75> . However, a
director can escape liability if he shows that he took
all reasonable steps to secure the company's compliance
with S . 3 2 0' 7 5 > . In any case, no liability can be
imposed on a director who authorised the prohibited
transaction if he shows that at the time the transaction u)3S
entered into, he <Ji<L not know the relevant
circumstances constituting the contravention'77 > . These
provisions are intended to make a balance between the
rights of the innocent parties and the company's right
to avoid'7 8 > .
Exceptions to the rule stated in S.320(1)
(1) Sma11 amounts
S.320(2)'79 > provides that an approval is not required
if the requisite value of the non-cash assets, at the
time the arrangement is entered into, is less than
£100,000 or 10% of the company's assets value. The
amount should be less than £2,000 if the criterion used
is the 10% of the company's assets value in order to
ignore the approval requirement. The company's net
assets value is determined by reference to its last
annual accounts. If no accounts have been prepared and
- 99 -
laid under Part VII of the Companies Act 1985 , the
"amount of the company's called up share capital"*so) .
(2) Transactions between the holding company and its
subsidiaries.
Since there are no outside shareholders in a who 1 ly
owned subsidiary wh o need protection, S.321(2)(a)
permits a holding company to acquire a non-cash asset
from its wholly owned subsidiaries and vice versa. It
also permits a wholly owned subsidiary of a holding
company to acquire such assets from another who 1 ly owned
subsidiary of that same holding company* si ) .
(3) Winding up .
Shareholders will have little interest in the disposal
of the company's assets if the company is being wound
up * 3 2) . Therefore, S.321(2)(b) does not require an
approval if the arrangement is entered into by a company
which is being wound up*83).
However, since shareholders wi11 retain an interest in
the disposal of their company's assets , an approval is
required in cases of voluntary winding up by the
company's members*3 4 ' .
(4) Acquisition by a member
S. 321(3) provides that no approval is required if the
arrangement is entered into by a member in his capacity
as a member. This subsection applies to the acquisition
of a non-cash asset by a member from the company, but
not the acquisition by the company from a member*83).
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3.3.3. Remunerat ion.
Remuneration is another field in which a possibility of
conflict of interests inay arise. It is in a director's
self-interest to bargain for the highest remuneration
obtainable. But it is in the best interests of the
company to pay the lowest remuneration for directors or
officers in general. And since directors are under a
duty to act in the best interests of the company, a
conflict of interests may arise. Under Art. 82/Table A
1985'86> , remunerations of directors are to be
determined by way of ordinary resolution of the general
meeting'87) . Directors are not prohibited from voting
on remunerations or compensation schemes in the
company's general meeting and starting from this point a
conflict of interests and duty may arise'88> . The
problem becomes more serious in cases where directors
have the control over the majority votes in the general
meeting. It would seem not easy to avoid the conflict
of interest in such a case. However, a derivative
action may be brought against the directors in such a
case if the compensations obtained by them are unfair
or if the resolution regarding these compensations is
unduly passed'895 .
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3.3.4. Loan a f rorn a company.
A loan from a company is another field from which a
conflict of interests may stem. This issue is the
subject of S.330 (2)(a) of the Companies Act 1985
which prohibits a company from making loans to its
directors or the directors of its holding company!30).
Loans to directors of the subsidiary companies are not
af f ected by this section unless they are also directors
of the holding company' 9 1 ' . If the directors of the
subsidiary company are themselves the directors of the
holding company, then, loans to them are subject to this
section because those directors may have the control
over the subsidiary company. A relevant company' 9 2 ) is
not a I lowed to make a loan to a person connected with
its directors' 93 * . However, private companies, which
are not relevant companies, are not prohibited from
making loans to "connected persons"'94' .
Exceptions to the rule that prohibi ts the making of
loans to directors
(1) Loans of sma11 amounts
S.334 CA 1985 provides that a company is not
prohibited "from making a loan to [its directors or to
directors of] its holding company if the aggregate of
the relevant amounts does not exceed £5,000"'95) . By
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using the aggregate of the relevant amounts as a
formula, the Legislature attempts to avoid the
possibility of circumventing the Legislation by dividing
a transaction into a number of sma11er transactions*36).
(2) " Inter— company loans in same group"* 97 ) . A
relevant company*98) which is a member of a group of
companies is not prohibited from making a loan to
another member of that group* 99 > . Moreover, making a
loan by a subsidiary company to its holding company is
not prohibited by the Act* * " *> ' . It is to be noted that
while making a loan by a company to its holding company
is all owed according to 3.336(a), it is not all owed t o
be made to the directors of the holding company* loi ) .
(3) Money—1 ending companies
S.338(2) CA 1985 defines "money lending company" as " a
company whose ordinary business includes the making of
loans or quasi — loans, or the giving of guarantees in
connection with loans or quasi —loans Such kind of
companies is not prohibited from making a loan to any
person*102) including directors provided that the loan
must be made " in the ordinary course of the company's
business"* 103) t and its amount must not be greater, and
its terms must not be more favourable than, those which
it is reasonable to expect the company would have
offered to a person of "the same financial -standing but
unconnected with the company"* 104) . S. 333(4) does not
allow a relevant company to enter into a transaction if
the aggregate uf the relevant amounts exceeds
£100,000<105).
3.3.5. Quasi — loans.
Quasi — loans are another field in which a conflict of
interests may arise* 1 1)6' . A relevant company is
prohibited from making a quasi—loan to its directors.
It is said that this prohibition would cover the
provision by the company of a credit card to its
directors who will be given the authority to use it on
the basis that the company wi 1 1 psy instead of him
initially and the users will reimburse the company
latter* 107 ' . However, this prohibition does not apply
to private companies which are not relevant
companies* l08' . A relevant company is also prohibited
from making quasi—loans to the directors of its holding
company or to persons connected with those
directors*109).
Exceptions to the rule that prohibits quasi—loans to
directors
(1) Sma11 amounts
Making a quasi—loan to a director of the company or a
director of its holding company is not prohibited if
(a) the quasi—loan contains a term requiring a
director or a person on his beha 1 f to
reimburse the creditor his expenditure within
2 months of its being incurred; and
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(b) the aggregate of the amount of that quasi-
1 oan and of the amount outstanding under each
relevant quasi—loan does not exceed
[£5,000]"(110) .
However, it would seem that the exception provided by
S.332 does not cover the making of a quasi —loan by a
relevant company to persons connected with its director
or the directors of its holding company.
(2) Inter company quasi—loans in same group.
S.333(a) permits a relevant company which is a member of
a group of companies to make a quasi—loan to another
member of that group. S.336(a) permits such a company
to make a quasi—loan to its holding company.
(3) Money-1 ending companies
S . 338( 1 )(a) allows money—1 ending companies to make a
quasi—loan to any person if that quasi—loan satisfies
certain conditions. The conditions imposed on making
quasi—loans are identical to those imposed on making
loans' 1 1 1 ) . Those conditions are : 1) A quasi-loan
must be made in the ordinary course of the company's
business; and 2) the amount of the quasi—loan is not
greater, and its terms are not more favourable than
those which it is reasonable to expect that company to
have offered to a person of the same financial standing
but unconnected with the company' 1 1 2) .
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The aggregate of the re lev
relevant company must
However, there is no limit
recognised bank'!14l.
3.3.6. Credit transactions.
ant amount, in relation to a
not exceed £100,000'113).
if the relevant company is a
A relevant company' 1 ' 5) ja not allowed to enter into a
credit transaction as creditor for its directors or a
director of its







or a person so
no t
f rom en tering into
transaction has been defined
c ompallies which are
by S.331(7) CA 1985 as follows:
A credit transaction is a transaction under
wh i c h one party ('the creditor' )-
(a) supplies any goods or sells any land under
a hire-purchase agreement or a conditional
sale agreement;
(b) leases or hires a n y land or goods in
return for periodical payments;
(c) otherwise disposes of land or supplies
goods or services on the understanding that
payment (whether in a lump sum or instalments
or by way of periodical payments or
otherwise) is to be deferred".
Again, by entering into such a transaction a director
places himself in a conflict of interest situation and
accordingly he is liable to disgorge any profit so
derived.
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Exce£t i ons t_o the ru 1 e proh i b i ting a company f rom
en tering into credit transactions
( 1 ) Sifia 1 1 amounts
S.335(1) CA 1985 allows a company to enter into a credit
transaction if the aggregate of the relevant amounts
does not exceed £10,000'117).
(2) Inter-company credit transactions in the same group
3.336(6) allows a c ompany to enter into a credit
transaction as creditor for its holding company.
(3) " Ordinary course of business"'118'
Similar to that exception to loans, a company may enter
into a credit transaction if it is in the ordinary
course of business; and that the value of it is not
greater, and its terms are no more favourable, than
those which it is reasonable to expect the company to
have offered to a person of the same financial standing
but unconnected with the company' ' ' 3 1 .
3.3.7. Back to back transactions, assignment, guarantees
and expenditures incurred for the company1s purposes.
(1) Back to back transactions
S. 330(7) provides:
A company sha 1 1 not take part in any
arrangement whereby—
(a) another person enters into a transaction
which, if it had been entered into by the
company, would have contravened any of
subsections (2), (3), (4) or (6) Cof this
section]; and
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(Li) that other person, in pursuance of the
arrangement, has obtained or is to obtain any
benefit from the company or its holding
company or a subsidiary of the company or its
ho 1ding company".
Thus, a transaction by which a company agrees to make
loans to the directors of another company in return for
a loan or loans to its own directors from that other
company is caught by S.33CK7) and accordingly is
prohibited. S.330(7) also catches an arrangement by
which a director of a company obtains a loan from a bank
on favourable terms in return for the company's
business* 120).
It is clear that s.330(7) is designed to prevent any
device to circumvent subsection (2), (3), (4) and (6) of
section 330 of the Companies Act 1985
(2) Assignment to the company
S . 330(6 ) CA 198 5 provides:
A company sha11 not arrange for the assignment
to it, or the as sump tion by it, of any rights,
obligations or liabilities under a transaction
which, if it had been entered into by the
company, would have contravened subsection (2)
, (3) or (4) . . ."(121).
This prohibition is restricted to transactions
prohibited by 3.330(2), ( 3 ) , and ( 4 ) on 1 y * 1 2 2 ) . An
example of the assignment is the case in which a company
buys the right to repayment of a loan which is made by a
third party to a director of the company.
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(3) Guarantees
Since a company is prohibited from entering into some
transactions, such as loans, quasi—loans etc, with its
directors, it is also prohibited from giving a guarantee
or providing security in respect of that prohibited
transaction' 1 23 1 . Moreover, despite the fact that a
company is permitted to enter into loans or quasi—loans
under some special conditions, it cannot give a
guarantee or provide a security in respect of such
transactions "which presumably therefore remain
prohibited"' 124) . However, one cannot see the wisdom of
prohibiting a company from giving guarantees or
providing securities in respect of transactions which
the company is allowed to enter into under some special
conditions. It would seem that there is no clear reason
justifyiWj this restriction.
(4) Expenditures incurred for a company's purposes
S. 337 CA 1985 provides:
"(1) A company is not prohibited by S.330 from
doing anything to provide a director with
funds to meet expenditures incurred or to be
incurred by him for the purposes of the
company or for the purpose of enabling him
properly to perform his duties as an officer
of the company".
Thus, a company may give its director a bridging loan to
enable him to perform his duties towards the company.
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But this assistance cannot be provided by the company
un less one o f the foil owi ng cond i t i oris i s sa t i s f i ed :
i) The assistance is done with the prior approval of the
company in general meeting* 1 25 ' , or
ii) it is done on condition that, "if the approval of
the company is not so given at or before the next annual
general meeting, the loan is to be repaid, or any other
liability arising under any such transaction discharged,
within G months from the conclusion of that meeting
"(126)
However, a relevant company is not allowed to enter into
any transaction if the aggregate of the relevant amounts
exceeds £20,000 even if one of the above two conditions
is satisfied* 127' .
3.3.8. Competing with the company.
Competing with the company is another situation which
Tfiay give rise to a conflict between a director's
interests and his duty to his company. Competing with a
company can be done by two ways: i) Direct competition
between a director and his company; and, ii) Common
directorship.
A fiduciary is not allowed to compete with his
beneficiaries without their consent. This norm is found
in the law of partnership* * 28 ) . It is surprising to
find that this rule does not apply to directors of a
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company. For example, in London & Mashona1 and
E xp I oration Co v. New Mashona1 and Exploration' 1 23 ) f it
was held that a director was not prohibited from acting
as a director of a rival company' 130) .
It has been argued that "this view is becoming
increasingly impossible to support"'131' . It was held
that because of the duty of fidelity which stems from
the relationship of master and servant, the servant was
not allowed to engage in a work competing with that of
his master even in his spare time'132' . Since the duty
of fidelity, imposes upon the servants, includes lesser
obligations than those imposed by the duty of good faith
owed by directors' 133> , why sHou.(db "3 ci. not be
pri'vertted from competing with his company?' 1 3 4 ) .
However, the existing case law in the U.K, does not
consider competing wi th the company as a breach of
fiduciary duty by directors. The company cannot,
accordingly, obtain an interdict to restrain its
director from doing so. In respect of this point, a
director's fiduciary obligations are narrower than those
of' a partner who is obliged to account to his fellow
partners for a profit made out of carrying on or being
interested in a rival business'135'. Lord B1anesburgh
in Bell v. Lever Bros.'1 36' , expressed the view that a
director could join the board of a rival company. To
this view Lord Denning gave his reply in Sco 11ish
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Cooperative Wholesale Society Ltd v. Meyer(13 7) . His
Lordship said:
This may have been so at that t iiue. But it is
at risk now of an application under S.210 C CA
1948, S.459 CA 19851 if he subordinates the
interests of the one company to those of the
other".
However, the permission to compete with the company is
not an absolute or an unlimited one. This permission or
immunity "extends merely to having interest in directing
a rival company"' 1381 . Furthermore, such an immunity
can be abandoned by inserting a term in the director's
service contract which prohibits a director from
engaging in any other business without the consent of
his company. For example, in Thomas Marshal 1
(Exporters) Ltd v. Guinle'139* , the court held that the
defendant director (who competed with his company by
serving in a rival company) was in breach of his duty of
fidelity and good faith and in breach of the terms of
his service contract'140* .
It is to be noted that a director is not allowed to use
his company's assets, good will, customer lists or trade
secrets for the benefit of the rival company. And he is
accountable for a profit made out of using these
assets' 14 1).
In addition, in Hiva c Ltd v. Park Royal Scientific
Investments Ltd'142* , it was held that a director was
restrained from using skilIs, which his original company
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invested resources in providing him with, for the
benefit of a rival company.
3.3.9. The use of corporate information.
A director is not allowed to use information which has
been generated by his company for his own benefit. If
he does so, he will be liable to account for a profit
made to the company and to compensate the company for
any loss suffered by it'143> . Thus, a director's duty
in relation to information belonging to his company is
to use it for the benefit of the company only. The use
of the corporate information by a director for his
personal benefit places him in a state of conflict
between his duty to the company and his personal
interests; a state which is prohibited under the Common
Law as we 1 1 as under the Statute.
The information in this context should be confidential
and unpublished in order to hold its user liable to
account. Thus, the liability to account may be based
on ■ the ground that the information was given to the
director confidentially, i.e, in a way prohibiting him
from using it except for the benefit of the
company' 14 4) . This information should also be obtained
by a director while carrying out his functions as a
director or "in consequence of being a director"' '^ 5) r
in order to hold that director liable to account.
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Liability may be imposed on a director even if lie uses
this information after his resignation from the company
provided that "while a director he had that use in
contemplation in circumstances 1 iable to give rise to a
conflict of interest"'1*6).
Liability was imposed on a director for misuse of
corporate information in Industrial Development
Consultants Ltd v. Coo 1ey' l< 7) . Im that case, the
defendant director (Cooley) was employed by the
plaintiff (the company) to secure a contract to build a
depot for the Eastern Gas Board. The Gas Board was
unwi 1 1 ing to enter into that contract with the
plaintiff. The defendant was invited, as an individual,
by the Gas Board, to work on the project. He obtained
his resignation from the plaintiff company by
misrepresenting that he was ill. Ultimately, he
accepted the post with the Gas Board. On a claim
against him by the company, the court held that he had
al lowed his interests to conflict with his duty to the
company. He was held liable to account for the benefit
he gained. Roskill J. said:
Information which came to [Cooley] while he
was managing director and which was of concern
to the plaintiffs and relevant to the
plaintiffs to know, wa s info rrna t i on wh i ch it
was his duty to pass on to the
piaintiffs"<l48).
It is clear that Roskil 1 J. based his judgment on the
ground that Cooley had obtained information which was of
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concern to the company and relevant to it to know, and
deployed this information for his own personal
advantage' l49) . However, the decision in the Coo Iey
case can be based on the ground that the defendant had
exploited a corporate opportunity. But Roskill J. chose
the misuse of information as a ground for his judgment
because there was a little chance for the company to
secure that opportunity due to the Gas Board's
unwi11ingness to dea1 with it. Roskill J. said:
It is unlikely that C the company] would have
got [the opportunity] for [itself] had the
defendant complied with his duty to [it]" but
"if the defendant is not required to account
he will have made a large profit as a result
of having deliberately put himself into a
position in which his duty to the [company]
who was employing him and his personal
interest conf1ict"' 150).
Info rrna t i on as property
If a director misuses information generated by the
company, can it be said that he misuses the company's
property?. There was a debate over this question in
Boar dman v. Phipp s<151). In that case the solicitor to
the trust obtained information in respect of t he
potential development of the activities of the company
in which the trust held shares. The sol i c i tor was held LvsV>\-<e.
to account for the profit made as a result of using this
information. At the trial Wilberforce J. said:
This [information] ( so far as the expression
can be used ) [is] essentially the. property of
the t rus t"( l5 2 > .
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In the Court of Appeal , Lord Denning M.R, said :
Likewise with information or knowledge which
[the defendant] has been employed by his
principal to collect or discover, or which he
has otherwise acquired, for the use of his
principal, then again if turns it to his own
use, so as to make a profit by means of it for
himself, he is accountable, . . . , for such
information or knowledge is the property of
his principal , just as much as an invention
is'153).
Similarly, in the House of Lords, Viscount Di 1 home ,
Lord Hodson and Lord Guest, agreed that information
obtained by an agent while acting for the principal
could be regarded as property belonging to the
principal. This understanding was affirmed by Lord
Cohen but his Lordship expressed the issue somewhat
differently. His Lordship said:
Information is, of course, not property in the
strict sense of that word and . . . it does
not necessarily follow that because an agent
acquires information and opportunity while
acting in a fiduciary capacity he is
accountable to his principals for any profit
that comes his way as the result of the use he
makes of that information and opportunity.
His liability to account must depend on the
facts of the case"'154).
Fnom the judgments quoted above, it is to be concluded
that as a general rule the judges considered information
as property.
In his dissenting judgment Lord Upjohn agreed that
information is a property but only in a limited cases or
under certain conditions. His Lordship said:
In general , information is not a property at
all. It is norma 1 1y open to a 1 1 who have eyes
- 1 1 G-
to read and ears to hear. The true test
determine in what circumstances




The real rule, is in my view, that knowledge
learnt by a trustee in the course of his
duties as such is not in the least property of
the trust and in general may be used by him
for his own benefit . . . unless it is
confidential information which is given to him
(1) in circumstances which, regardless of his
position as a trustee, would make it a breach
of confidence for him to communicate to anyone
for it has been given to him expressly or
impliedly as confidential, or (2) in a
fiduciary capacity, and its use would place
him in a position where his duty and his
interest might possibly conflict"(l56).
Thus, Lord Upjohn does not consider information as
property as a general rule. In his view, information is
property only under conditions stated in his judgment.
Moreover, his Lordship qualified the second exceptional
case (i.e. where information was obtained in a fiduciary
capacity and its use would place the fiduciary in a
situation of conflict of interest) by the condition that
the use of the information should be capable of injuring
the trust. In his Lordship's words he said:
"... you have to look and see whether the
knowledge acquired was capable of being used
for his Ci.e, a trustee] own benefit to injure
the trust"' 15 7).
To sum up, a director who uses information belonging to
the company, or information which is relevant and
important to the company to know, may be held 1iable to
account for a profit made out of that use and to
-117-
compensate the company for any loss suffered by it. Such
a liability can be based on the rule that prohibits the
making of a secret profit. Liability may also be based
on the ground that the defendant has been given this
information confidentially, and the use of it amounts
to a breach of confidence'158). Liability may also be
based on the ground that information is a property
belonging to the company1 1511 . Finally, liability may
be based on the wider equitable rule that a fiduciary
must not place himself in a position in which his duty
to his principal conflicts with his personal
interests'160) .
It is said' 161) that since the essential point is that a
fiduciary must not be allowed to make a personal profit
out of his fiduciary position, any debate over whether
information is a property or not fcer>ds to obscure that
essential point a n d does not offer a ny new solution or
rule. One is inclined to support this view because the
real question is whether A who is a director uses his
fiduciary position to make a personal profit or places
himself in a conflicting situation or not. Accordingly,
whether the information obtained by a fiduciary is
property or not, if the use of ' t places t h a t
fiduciary in a situation of conflict of interest , he




Where there is a service contract between a company and
its director, this contract, normally, contains an
express provision prohibiting the director from using or
disclosing confidential information belonging to the
company for purposes other than those of the
company1162) . Such a prohibition is effective even
after the termination of the employment. In the absence
of such a contract or in the absence of such a provision
a director is under an implied duty not to disclose such
information or to use it for his own benefit in the
course of his employment. He is also not allowed to use
or to disclose trade secrets even after the termination
of his employment1 163) . Thus, in Faceenda Chicken Ltd
v. Fowler<164) f it was held that information of a highly
confidential nature could never be disclosed by an
employee during his employment or even after his
resignation. A second class of information was also
identified by the court. That class was information
which must be dealt with as confidential due to either
its obvious confidential nature or to the fact that the
employee was informed that it is a confidential
information. An employee can be prevented from using or
disclosing information of the second class during the
course of his employment by his employer. But an
employer cannot stop his employee using or disclosing
this class of information after t h e t e rrn ina t i on of his
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employment unless there is an express provision in the
employee's service contract giving the employer the
right to prevent the employee from doing so.
If the information lost its confidential nature and
became open to the public, a company would be unable to
protect this information by preventing its employee from
using it. No action for a breach of confidence can be
brought against the user of this information'165).
If a company proves that a specific category of
information is confidential and that using or disclosing
this information will cause harm to it, the company will
be able to restrain its director from using that
information for his own benefit'166)
It is argued'1671 that the question of confidentiality,
in the conflict of interests context, is irrelevant. A
director is bound to use the information, whether
confidential or not, for the benefit of his company if
he obtains it while acting as a director provided that
this information relates, or may possibly relate to the
company's affairs. The use of such information by a
director for his own benefit or to achieve his personal
goals makes him 1 iable to account for a prof it made out
of that use. "It is the use that is made of the
information that comes to a director in his capacity as
such that matters, whether it is confidential or
not"'l6 8' . Having regard to the general rule that a
director may not place himself in a position in which
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his duty to the company conflicts with his own
interests, and may not make a profit out of his
directorial position, one is inclined to agree with the
above argument. But, even where there is no conflict, a
director who uses or discloses confidential information
(in breach of express or implied prohibition in the
contract of employment) acts in breach of confidence.
Confidentiality in such a case, seems to be, the nucleus
of the matter. Similarly, in the case where the
information is confidential in its nature, a director
may not use it for his own benefit and he is bound to
give the opportunity of making use of it to the
company' 159) ( even in the absence of any possibility of
conflict of interests"70' .
The court may issue an interdict against the one to whom
information is confidentially communicated to prevent
him from making use of it for improper or unauthorised
purpose' 17 1) . A third party who is aware of the
confidential nature of the information which he has
received from the person to whom this information has
been confidentially communicated by the plaintiff may be
prevented by an interdict from making use of such
information'172'.
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3.3.10. Inaider Dealing: The use of confidential
inf orma t ion to deal in a coiTipany 1 s securities.
A profit can be made by dealing in a company's
securities . This is called "insider dealing". Thus,
insider dealing can be defined as dealing in a company's
securities, options or debentures1 1 73 ' , by the use or
misuse'1741, of "unpublished price sensitive
information"' 1751 , belonging to the company' 1 7 6 ' . The
statute prohibits insider dealing'177'. However, the
existence or the absence of a fiduciary duty is
irrelevant to the issue in question'178'.
History of insider dealing
Before the enactment of the Companies Act 1980, insider
dealing was governed by such rules as the no—conflict
rule and the no—profit rule. In addition, before 1980
there were Se1f-Regula tory Organisations which regulated
insider dealing such as the Council for the Stock
Exchange and the Panel on Take-overs and mergers'179'.
But those were not enough to restrain insider dealing
because in most cases the company was not the one who
sustained loss by insider dealing. The real losers are
the investors; so, the company has no motive to sue the
dealers in its securities'180'. Part V of the Comparii es
Act 1980 contained provisions prohibiting the use of
unpublished price sensitive information by an insider in
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relation to a company's securities. Since 1980 insider
dealing has been considered as a criminal offence rather
than a breach of fiduciary duty. Insider dealing is
punishable by criminal penalties only. Seven years
imprisonment is the maximum for a conviction on
indictment according to SS.49(1 ) , 171(b) of the Criminal
Justice Act 1988. The maximum 1imit of sentence for a
summary conviction is six months. But the court has the
option to impose a fine in lieu of or in addition to an
impr i soninent sen tence .
The provisions prohibiting insider dealing have been
adopted by the Insider Dealing Act 1985 as amended by
the Financial Services Act 198G . Insider dealing in
England and Wales is to be prosecuted "by, or with
the consent of, the Secretary of State or the Director
of Public Prosections" ' 1 8 l > . ir, Scotland, Proceedings
for an offence of insider dealing are under the control
of the Lord Advocate.
According to S.l(l) of the Insider Dealing Act 1985 the
prohibition under this Act applies only to
individuals' 1821 . Thus, the prohibition cannot be
applied to companies or corporate bodies such as local
authorities' 183) . However, a company cannot be used as
a shield behind which insider deal ing is to be committed
by directors. That is , a device by which a director,
for example, deals in his company's securities through
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another company formed for this purpose is caught by the
embargo against insider dealing.
_C1 asses of insiders
Insiders can be divided into two classes:
(1) Primary insiders: a primary insider is any person
who possesses "price sensitive information" and deals
either "in the securities of a company with which he is
'connected', or in the securities of some other company,
with which he is connected with is about to transact or
not , whichever is the case"11!4'.
Connection with a company may arise in one of two ways:
i) an individual who deals in the company's securities
is a director of the company or of a related company;
ii) an individual who deals in the company's securities
is an officer (other than a director) or an employee who
occupies a position, in a company or a related company,
which might reasonably be expected to give him access to
unpublished price sensitive information about the
securities of the company or the related company, and
which he would reasonably be expected not to disclose
except for the proper performance of his function1 1 8 5' .
In other words a dealer could be an officer or an
employee ( other than a director ) who is able, due to
his position, to obtain such information about the
securities of his company.
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(2) Secondary insiders ( Tippees ): A tippee is an
outsider who deals either in the securities of a company
by the use of a "price sensitive information" which he
"knowingly obtained"'18 5' , from a connected person or,
in the securities of any other company with which "the
inf ormant 1 s company is con tempi a ting a
transaction"'1871. However, to hold a tippee liable,
the pursuer must prove the fol lowing' 188) ;
i ) that the tippee knows that the informant is a
connected person; and
ii) that he knows or reasonably believes that the
information being offered arises by virtue of the
connection of the informant with the company; and
iii) that he knows or reasonably believes that because
of the informant's position, it would be reasonable to
expect him not to disclose the information "except for
the proper performance of the functions attaching to
that position"'!83' .
So, it is quite difficult to prosecute a tippee due to
the necessity of satisfying the above three
requirements. Thus, in R v . Ke 111e & Thorneywor' 1 3 0 ' ,
it was held that no offence was committed because the
prosecution was unable to adduce an evidence showing
that the defendant knew that this information was
confidentia1' l 3 l > .
In r~c'J-
Inside inf orma t ion
Information must satisfy the following conditions in
order to hold the dealer liable:
i) It must be held by virtue of the connection with the
company*l92). Thus, a director who acquires information
from an outsider ( unless the outsider is a connected
person, i.e, prohibited from using it to deal in the
company's securities) is not prohibited from using it to
deal in the company's securities' 19 3) ,
ii) It is information that it would be reasonable to
expect a person so connected, not to disclose except for
the proper performance of his function''341. This
condition imposes an objective test on the insider. A
director who discloses information to a third party
which it is i"i o t proper for him to disclose, is liable
under the legal provisions governing insider dealing,
iii ) The information must be unpublished and price-
sensitive' 1 95 l . The phrase "unpublished price-sensitive
information" has been defined in section 10 of the
Insider Dealing Act 1985 as:
"... information which—
(a) relates to specific matters relating or
of concern (directly or indirectly) to that
company, that is to say, is not of a general
nature relating or of concern to that company,
and
(b) is not general ly known to those persons
who are accustomed or would be likely to deal
in those securities but which would if it were
general ly known to them be 1 ikely material ly
to affect the price of those securities".
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Information must tie of a specific nature but not of a
general nature in relation to specific matters. Thus,
the problem that arises here is how to distinguish
between specific and general information <196) .
Depending on another element of the above definition, it
is said that the difference between those two kinds of
information is as between "day—to—day knowledge" and
know 1 edge which will shift or affect the price of the
securities if it is revealed to the market( 1 9 7 ' .
Accordingly, information will be of a specific nature if
of fUe secu/uKes
it affects the market price.. If revealing information
does not affect the market price of the securities it
will possess the quality of being "general".
Consequently, using information which can be described
as "specific" in purchasing or sel ling a company's
securities amounts to an offence or illegal act. It is
also argued that information is "general" if it can be
"obtained from an examination of the company's
continuous records"' 198) . Know ledge of sale of a
particular subsidiary can be described as specific
information' 199 > .
If information is general ly known to persons who are
a c c u s t omed or would be likely to deal in securities, it
will not be a specific information. Thus, to hold the
dealer in securities liable for using inf ormation, this
information must not be known to persons who are wi11ing
to deal in the securities. Finally, information mus t
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affect the market price of the securities. Info rma tion
about the change of investment policy of a certain
company which indicates that it is going to move from a
general to a specialist investment trust has been held
to be a price sensitive information' 2 0 0 ' .
iv) In case of related company, information must relate
"to any transaction (actual or contemplated) involving
both the first and the other company, or involving one
of them and securities of the other, or to the fact that
any such transaction is no longer contemplated"'201 ' .
It is to be noted that the liability for insider dealing
is not a strict one. The reason is that a primary
insider must know that the information which he
possesses is "unpublished price sensitive information".
A secondary insider must knowingly obtain this
information in order to hold him liable for using it.
Insider dealing is a criminal offence and the knowledge
of wrongfulness of the act is an essential element in
every offence'2021.
I respect of a sub—tippee, it is said that he "is
probably outside the present scope of judicial
interpretation of the Rule"' 2 0 3' . However, it could be
argued that sub—tippees are caught by S.I(3)(a) of the
Insider Dealing Act 1985. This section provides that it
is to be applied to an individual where "he has
information which he knowingly obtained (directly or
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indirectly) from another individual it would
seem that the word "indirectly" can be construed to
embrace situations in which an individual obtains
information from another individual who acquires this
information from an insider. That is, situations in
which a sub—tippee is involved or in which he is the
d e f ender.
Insider dealing has been recognised as unfair and
damaging to the investors' confidence in the integrity
of the share market. To create a successful market, an
equal access of information for al1 potential investors
is necessary. In the absence of such an equality in the
market, that market will be seen as unfair and this will
Keve a devastating effect on investors' confidence' 2 0 4 )
The unfairness of insider dealing stems from the fact
that the one who possesses confidential information
takes no risk'^ o 5) . Such a person does not compete with
other investors on equal terms' 206) . In other words,
insider dealing legislation is necessary to prevent
insiders from "stealing a march on the market by reason
of- their possession of information which other market
actors did not have, and more importantly, could not
get"' 2 0 7 > . On the other hand, proscribing insider
dealing has been criticised by may commentators who
would a 1 1 ow insider dealing. It has been argued that:
(1) due to the inadequacy of the existing provisions for
compensations, such as salaries, bonus and special bonus
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for innovations, insider dealing is the best incentive
ccropensation device for entrepreneurs' 2 0 8 ) . (2) Insider
dealing is the best force to direct the market prices in
the correct way toward levels which reflect the value of
the secret or confidential and unpublished
in f o rma tion'209 ) , ( 3 ) In terms of ma rket efficiency
insider dealing may sustain confidence in the share
market because insiders can be seen as "leading
indicators" in the market. The initiative of those
"leading indicators" will be followed by the other
market actors. In addition, the great performance of
insiders which is represented by their huge gain wi 1 1
lead the other actors in the market to respond to the
insiders' investment activities' 210) .
In fact, those who are supporting the view of
proscribing insider dealing stressing the need for a
timely disclosure of information to the market. That
is, information should be released by the company to the
market at the earliest opportunity "because only then
will the traded price of the stocks reflect the true
facts"'211).
Sanctions imposed on insider dea 1 er s
The law imposes criminal sanctions against insider
dealing. The sanctions are imprisonment and/or criminal
fines. There is a debate over whether a criminal
penalty is a proper one to deter insider dealing
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practices. It is argued* 2 12) that despite the fact that
criminal sanctions are commendable; they are
misdirected. In practice, criminal penalties against
insider dealing fail to achieve their goals of
deterrence and, in fact, these penalties have led to
unjust results. In support of the above argument it is
said* 213 I that the main problem which faces the
authorities is the burden of proof. In criminal cases a
high standard of proof is required. The authorities
must prove that there is a link between the insider and
the information that he used*2l4). To prove such a link
the authorities stated that the only way is to have the
testimony of persons who are involved in the scheme.
However, despite the fact that it is possible to
identify the persons who are involved, it is difficult,
in paretics, to prove that critical 1 ink*215> .
Criminal sanctions have little deterrent effect.
Insiders can deal in securities without any fear of
detection. This result stems from the difficulty in
enforcing criminal pena 1 ties' 2 16) . if iv, many cases
criminal penalties are unenforceable, then an insider
will have little reason to refrain from dealing in
securities no matter how harsh the penalty'217' .
A criminal sanctions system imposed on insider traders
may give rise to unfair results*218' . Thus, it is an
unfair system because while it is possible to prosecute
opportunists, the system fails to detect and punish the
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more sophisticated rings of criminals due to the
difficulties in proving the link between the trader and
the information'219).
Because of those criticisms, it is argued'220) that a
civil penalty system is mo re c onvenient to police
insider trading effectively. A civil penalty system is
more effective because it will eliminate the problem
presented by the criminal burden of proof 2 21 ) . By
eliminating the problem of burden of proof a wide range
of traders who deal in companies' securities can be
prosecuted. Consequently, a civil penalty system is
also a fair one. It is also argued' 2 2 2) that if the
legislators believe that insider dealing is an economic
crime, then a f ine as an economic penal ty is the most
convenient one. Imprisonment has a harsh impact on a
trader's life especially if he has a family and owes a
huge sum of money to other persons' 2 2 3 ) . Despite the
fact that a civil penalty system may reduce the
criminal burden of proof, one is of the view that a
criminal penalty system is more effective to deter
insider dealing. (1) The imprisonment penalty, it would
seem, is very effective deterrent. An insider,
hopeful ly, wi 1 1 think a lot afcowt such a harsh penal ty
before deciding to deal in securities. An insider may
think about the devastating effects of this penalty on
his personal life, his family and his reputation. And
consequently, he, hopefully, will abandon t h e idea of
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carrying out such a crime* 224) . ( 2 ) In the opinion of
those who ask for the application of civil penalties
only, fines are the most appropriate penal ties* 225 ) .
But one sees that fines are criminal penal ties which
require the application of criminal law. Civil
penalties can be represented by holding the wrongdoer
liable for damages. Those damages must be given to the
injured party. (3) Since insider dealing is capable of
damaging the confidence of the public in the fairness of
the share market, and because the losers are not the
companies but the investors, and because individuals
have no cause of action against insider traders for
losses they sustained, it is submitted that a criminal
penalty system is more convenient than the civil one.
Since it is not easy to recognise the injured parties in
insider dealing cases to distribute civil remedies
amongst them if a civil penalty system is to be applied,
a criminal penalty system remains more effective and
more reasonable. It is also submitted that the
difficulties in prosecuting insider dealers, due to the
high standard of proof required by the present law, do
not justify using a civil penalty system instead of a
c rimin a 1 one.
Finally, it may not be out of place to refer to the EEC
Directive on insider dealing which should be implemented
by Member States by the 1st of June 1992. The Directive
has ignored the requirement of confidentiality which is
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found in S.l(l) (b) of the Insider Dealing Act 1985.
Art.1(1) of the Directive provides:
1 Inside information' sha 1 1 mean information
which has not been made public of a precise
nature relating to one or several issuers of
transferable securities or to one or several
transferable securities which, if it were made
public would be likely to have a significant
effect on the price of the. transferable
security or securities in question.
Thus, information for the purposes of insider dealing
under the Directive must be precise, non-public and
price —sensitive. Confidentiality of the information
will be irrelevant.
The Directive also expand the class of person who may be
caught by its provisions. Art.2(1) states three sets of
relationships out of which a person can possess inside
information. It provides:
Each Member State sha 1 1 prohibit any person
who :
— by virtue of his membership of the
administrative management or supervisory
bodies of the issuer,
— by virtue of his holding in the capital of
the issuer, or
— because he has access to such information by
virtue of the exercise of his employment,
profession or duties,
possesses inside information from taking
advantage of that information with full
knowledge of the facts by acquiring or
disposing of for his own account or for the
account of a third party, either directly or
indirectly, transferable securities of the
issuer or issuers to which the information
relates.
The third set of relationships needs not be a
relationship with a company. Any person possesses
inside information "by virtue of the exercise of his
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employment, profession or duties" may be held liable if
he deals with transferable securities.
Art. 4 of the Directive provides a definition for
secondary insiders. Secondary insider according to Art.
4 embraces any person,
who with full knowledge of the facts possesses
inside information the direct or indirect of
which could not be other than a person
referred to in Article 2 < 2 2 6 > .
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3.3.11. Exploiting corporate opportunities.
Corporate opportunity lias been considered as a corporate
asset which is not available to be appropriated by
directors' 22 7 ) . j n Cook v. Peeks<228), the directors of
company A formed another company B and deflected a
contract in which company A was interested to company B
which they owned personally. The court held that the
directors must maintain the contract with company A
since the contract belonged to it. The court added that
the contract had come to the directors in their capacity
as directors of company A and by virtue of their
position.
A director, who exploits a corporate opportunity
belonging to his company or in which his company is
interested, violates his fiduciary duty that he owes to
his company. A director in such a case places himself
in a position in which his duty to the company conf1icts
with his personal interests. A director may make a
profit by exploiting a corporate opportunity and thus he
is also caught by the no—profit rule and must account to
the company for a profit made. In Regal (Hastings) Ltd
v. Gu1 1iver< 2 2 9 ) ( the House of Lords held that the
former directors of Regal were accountable for the
profit made on the ground that they obtained these
shares "by reason and only by reason of the fact that
they were directors of Regal and in the course of
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execution of that office . . . "(230). The House of
Lords made it clear that liability would be imposed on
directors once it was established
(i) that what the directors did was so
related to the affairs of the company that it
can properly be said to have been done in the
course of their management and in utilisation
of their opportunities and special knowledge
as directors; and (ii) that what they did
resulted in a profit to themseIves"'23!'.
The directors of Regal had exploited a corporate
opportunity and made a personal profit. The corporate
opportunity which the company had been deprived of was
that of the purchase of al1 the shares in the subsidiary
company'232). The House of Lords rejected the defence
that the company was unable to take up the opportunity
due to financial difficulties. However, holding a
director liable to account for a profit made, regardless
of the fact that the company is unable to finance that
opportunity, extends only to cases in which the
opportunity relates to the company's affairs. In
addition, the exploitation should amount to a breach of
duty of loyalty and honesty owed by a director to his
company'2333 . Thus, in cases where the opportunity does
not relate to the company's activities and the company
is unable to exploit it, a director must be held free to
exploit it for his own benefit'2343 .
In Industrial Development Consultant Ltd v. Cooley<235) f
the court held that the defendant had allowed his
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interests to conflict with his duty to the company
because he exploited an opportunity that belonged to the
company. Consequently, the court held him liable to
account for the benefits he gained* 236 ) , Similarly, in
Canadian Aero Services Ltd v. Q'Malley*237), the
inflexible rules were applied. The court held that the
defendant had breached his fiduciary duty by diverting a
corporate opportunity for his own benefit*238).
Some cases dealing with the corporate opportunity have
been presented. It has been shown that the no-conflict
rule and the no-profit rule had been rigidly applied in
those cases. One must, now, examine the tests of
corporate opportunity.
Corporate opportunity doctrine.
The question in this context is: What is the corporate
opportunity which is not available to be exploited by
directors?. An answer to this question requires an
examination of the corpora te opportunity tests.
However, it is argued*239) that there is no necessity to
develop a corporate opportunity doctrine to deal with
cases that fall within the scope of the no-profit rule
such as the Peeks case* 240) and the Rega I case* 24 1 ) .
The reason is that those cases are governed by the no-
profit rule itself. But the necessity for a corporate
opportunity doctrine arises in cases in which a director
exploits an opportunity which relates to the company's
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activities while the knowledge about that opportunity
acquired by the director in his capacity as an
individual 24 2 ) . A clear example of this situation is
the Coo 1ey case'2 4 3) t where the defendant received the
information about the opportunity in his private
capacity, rather than in his capacity as a director. It
would also seem that a corporate opportunity doctrine is
necessary to deal with cases in which a fiduciary has
not used his company's assets to develop a specific
opportunity. The reason is that the one who uses his
company's assets is liable under the rule that
prohibiting the appropriation of the principal's
proper ty.
Brudney and Clark'244> argue that a corporate
opportunity doctrine is required for three, reasons: (1)
That a corporate opportunity as against fiduciaries, is
considered as a corporate assets. Since a corporate
fiduciary, such as a director, is prohibited from
usurping corporate assets, he is also not allowed to
exploit a corporate opportunity without the consent of
his company; (2) that a corporate opportunity doctrine
prohibiting a fiduciary from exploiting an opportunity
belonging to his company reduces the cost of
individually contracting for a fiduciary's loyalty; and,
(3) that investors in companies will be harmed if a
fiduciary is permitted to appropriate a corporate
opportunity for his own benefit.
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In general, a corporate opportunity doctrine is needed
to protect companies' interests and the interests of
shareholders or investors. It is also needed to
eliminate the costs of contracting with fiduciaries for
their loyalty. Finally, such a doctrine is necessary to
embrace cases that fall beyond the scope of the
established common law rules such as the no —corif I i c t
rule and the no-profit rule.
1) The capacity test or the capacity approach
I n the Rega I case( 2 4 5 ) f Lord Russe 11 of Kill oweri said
that the directors were liable to account for the profit
made because they acquired the opportunity in their
capacity as directors and in the course of the execution
of their office1 24 6 ) . it is clear that his Lordship
laid emphasis on the issue of capacity. Thus, a
corporate opportunity, according to the capacity test is
the one the exploiting of which by a director in his
capacity as a director, exposes him to liability to
account for the profit made. However, it would seem
very clear that this definition is a defective one
because it does not concentrate on the nature of the
opportunity but on the position occupied by or the
capacity of its exploiter.
The capacity test has also been applied by Roskill J. in
Industrial Development Consultants v. Cooley( 247) , The
judge said that at the time the defendant received the
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information about the contract with the Gas Board, he
had only one capacity which was as a managing director.
This information was important and of concern to the
company. The defendant's duty as a director was to
pass on this information to the company because of the
fiduciary relationship between him and the company'218'.
By this judgment Roskill J. rejected two defences:
First, that the defendant received the information about
the opportunity in his private capacity. Second, that
there was no fiduciary duty imposed upon the defendant
to pass on this information to the company. Thus,
Roskill J. 's decision seems a clear application of the
inflexible rule that proscribing a fiduciary from using
his position to make a personal profit. But the judge
laid emphasis on two important points: First, the
importance of the information to the company. The judge
said that the information was important and of concern
to the company. Accordingly, it would seem that this
decision takes the issue far beyond the capacity test to
the interest and necessity test. And in fact, the
for
interest test can avoid A the judge the difficulties of
determining the capacity of the defendant when he
acquired the information about the opportunity. Second,
the duty of the defendant to pass on information to the
company. It is argued'249) that this issue cannot be a
ground for a liability judgment unless the defender
makes a personal profit. That is, a failure, on the
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part of the defender, to pass on information to the
company cannot stand alone as a ground for a liability
judgment. It is also argued'250) that the ambit of the
fiduciary duties will be extended in a dramatic way if a
director is held liable for a breach of fiduciary duties
simply because he has failed to pass on information to
his company regardless of the absence or the presence of
a profit element. Imposing liability on a director for
failure to pass on information to his company,
regardless of the absence of a profit element, means
imposing an affirmative duty on him. That is, a duty to
act or to advance the interest of his company so long as
the company is interested in that information, and
notwithstanding that the director has obtained the
information in his private capacity. The fiduciary
duties are negative in nature, i.e, they have only
become operative once the director begins to act'251 ' .
Because of this nature one is not happy to see directors
under a very wide range of fiduciary duties including an
affirmative duty to pass on information (which has been
obtained in a private capacity and in the absence of a
profit element) to their companies. The shortcomings of
a theory imposing such a duty are seen in the
difficulties which the courts will be faced with when
they move to decide the measure of recovery, especially
in cases where the company has suffered no loss' 2 5 2 ) .
In addition, imposing an affirmative duty on directors
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may expose them to 1iabi1ity in cases of common
directorships which is permissible under the current
British Law. Suppose that A who is a director of B
company and C company acquired information in his
capacity as an individual. Can he disclose this
information to either B or C without the risk of having
to account to the other ?. Thus, imposing an
affirmative duty on directors to pass on information to
their companies (even if the infromation was obtained by
by them in their private capacity) may bear dramatic
consequences on them' 253 ' . However, in the Coo 1ey
case'254) f the court held that the defendant placed
himself in a conflicting situation. This is despite the
fact that the defendant was invited (by the Gas Board,
to work in the project) in his private capacity. So,
one finds no justification for Roskill J.'s holding that
at the time the defendant received the information, he
had only one capacity which was of a managing director.
In fact, it seems that there was no necessity to discuss
the issue of capacity in the Coo 1ey case. The defendant
was employed by his company to secure for it a contract
to build a depot for the Gas Board. The defendant
accordingly was under a specific duty to persuade the
Gas Board to enter into that contract with the plaintiff
company. By taking that contract to himself the
defendant placed himself in a position in which his
personal interest conflicts with his duty to the
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company. Thus, in one's opinion a business opportunity
should not be exploited by a director in cases where
that director is under a specific duty to act in respect
of a specific issue as a representative -of the company.
In the presence of such a specific duty an
uncompromising rigid rule should be applied, and a
director should not be allowed to use whatever defence
to justify his exploitation of his company's opportunity
for his own benefit.
The capacity test has been criticised by many judges and
c ommeritators. In Canadian Aero Services Ltd v.
O'Ma I 1ey' 2 5 5 ) t Laskin J. noted that several factors
should be taken into account in cases involving
corporate opportunity. These factors include the nature
and the ripeness of the opportunity, the office held by
the director and the relationship between him and the
opportunity, the amount of knowledge obtained by him
about the opportunity and the circumstances in which
that knowledge had been obtained. Laskin J. was not
satisfied with the capacity test because of its
inflexibility. He also said that this test
"strait jackets" the development of the law in this
field.
Weinrib( 2 56 ' has criticised the capacity test on two
grounds: (1) it "encourages counsel to attempt to
bifurcate a single personality into different
personae" < 2 5 7 ) t and (2) it ignores the crucial point
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which is the existence of a fiduciary obligation and the
scope of the discretion that can be exercised by
directors. This crucial point is more important than
the capacity of the profiteer because "once the former
is determined so that the contract of the supposed
fiduciary either falls within it or stands outside it,
the latter becomes superfluous"* 2 5 8 ) . The capacity test
presupposes the existence of the fiduciary obligation
and asks whether this obligation has been violated or
not. Weinrib argues that the test should ask whether
there is a fiduciary obligation or not rather than
presupposing its existence* 253' .
Professor Beck*260) has tried to explain the meaning of
the statement given by Lord Russell in the Rega 1 case
which is read as follows : "in the course of the
execution of that office"*261) . He said that "Lord
Russel1's judgment cannot be read to require
participation in company business as essential for a
finding that the director profited by reason of his
fiduciary position"* 26 2 ) . He argues that the capacity
test is a narrow one and it becomes narrower if it
requires evidence that the defendant made profit while
he was carrying out a corporate business* 263 ) . a
director is a fiduciary, and if his principal's
interests are in need of protection, he should further
these interest. Thus, Beck argues that whenever the
interests of the company are in need for protection, the
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director should further these interests. If he failed
to do so, the court should make him liable to account
for a profit made. The fact that a defender made profit
out of exploiting an opportunity the information about
which was obtained in a private capacity should be held
irrelevant(264).
2) The dualistic test i.e, the combination of the
capacity test and the nature of the opportunity e lenient
The court in Island Export Finance Ltd v. Umunna( 2 6 5 ) ,
adopted a bipartite test. That is, a combination of the
capacity test and the nature of the opportunity
itself< 26 6 ) . Umunna, the defehdant director of the
plaintiff company obtained, for a company he owned, two
orders from the Cameroon postal authorities after he had
resigned from the plaintiff company. The plaintiff
company al1eged that he breached his fiduciary duty and
made improper use of its confidential information. The
company sought to make him liable to account for the
profits derived from those two orders. Hutchinson J.
held that Umunna was not liable to account on the
grounds that:
(a) The hope of obtaining further orders .
could not in any realistic sense be said to be
a maturing business opportunity. (b) Neither
when Mr Umunna resigned nor when he succeeded
in obtaining the [orders! was the plaintiff
actively pursuing the matter. (c) It cannot,
in any true sense, be said that , at the time
he resigned, Mr Umunna had in contemplation
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the exploration of the Cameroons postal box
business ... It cannot possibly be said that
his resignation was prompted or influenced by
a wish to acquire for himself the opportunity
sought by the company"' 2671 .
Thus, it is clear that the judge employed the capacity
test when he held that the defendant was not motivated
by the desire to exploit the opportunity at the time he
resigned. The judge also had taken the nature and the
ripeness of the opportunity into his account. This is
clear from his speech when he said that the opportunity
was not "a maturing business opportunity"< 2 6 8 ) .
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of the relevant exception by the company or by a
subsidiary of the company or, where the proposed
transaction or arrangement is to be made for a
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arrangement is to be made for a director of its
holding company or a person connected with such a
director, by that holding company or any of its
subsidiaries.
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(a) for the director for whom the proposed
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any person connected with that director; or
(b) where the proposed transaction or arrangement
is to be made for a person connected with a
director of a company, for that director or any
person connected with him;
and an arrangement also fal Is within this
subsection if it relates to a transaction which
does so.
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transaction is to be treated as having been entered
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It should be noted that the figure in this context
substituted by CA 1989, S.138 (b). Previously the
figure was £2,500.
96) See Farrar's Company Law, 2nd ed, C1988] at p.348.
97) S.333 CA 1985.
98) See the definition of "relevant company" in S.331(6)
CA 1985.
99) S.333(a) CA 1985.
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holding company, . . . ".
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1 OS) S.331(3) defines a quasi — loan as follows:
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otherwise than in pursuance of an agreement, a sum
for another (the borrower) or agrees to reimburse,
or reimburse otherwise than in pursuance of an
agreement, expenditure incurred by another party for
another (the borrower)—
(a) on terms that the borrower (or a person on his
behalf) will reimburse the creditor; or
(b) in circumstances giving rise to a liability on
the borrower to reimburse the creditor".
107) See Farrar's Company Law, 2nd ed, C1988], p.349.
108) There is nothing in S.330(a) to indicate that
private companies which are not relevant companies
are prohibited from making quasi—loans to their
directors.
109) S.330(3)(a) and (b) CA 1985.
110) S.332(1)(a) and (b) CA 1985. Figure in square
brackets subs titu t ed by CA 1989, S.138 (a).
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111) S.338(3)(a) and (b) CA 1985.
112) S.338(3)(b) CA 1985.
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114) S.338(4) CA 1985.
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S.331(6) CA 1985.
116) S.330(4) CA 1985
117) S.335(1) CA 1985 provides: "section 330(4) does not
prohibit a company from entering into a transaction
for a person if the aggregate of the relevant
amounts does not exceed [£10,0001 ". Figure in
square brackets substituted by Companies (Fair
Dealing by Directors) (Increase in Financial
Limits) Order 1990, SI 1990 No 1393. Previously
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Conso1idation Legislation 1987 at p.288.
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prohibits entering into guarantee or providing any
security in connection with a loan. S.330(3)
prohibits the making of quasi-loans by the company
to its directors. S.330(4) prohibits entering into
a credit transaction.
122) See Farrar1s Company Law, 2nd ed, C1988 1 , p.352.
123) See S.330(2)(b), (3)(c) and (4)(b) CA 1985.
124) Farrar1s Company Law, 2nd ed, [1988], p.352.
125) S.337(3)(a) CA 1985.
126) S.337(3)(b) CA 1935.
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128) Partnership Act 1890, S.30.
129) C1891] W.N. 165.
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131) Gower L. Principles of Modern Company Law, [1979],
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132) Hivac Ltd v. Park Royal Scientific Instuments Ltd
[ 1946] Ch. 169" (CA) .
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137) [1959] A.C. 324.
138) Pennington R. Directors' Personal Liability,
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personally and directly with his company after his
resignation from his office provided that he is not
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CHAPTER 4
THE INFLEXIBILITY AND THE RELAXATION OF THE FAIR DEALING
RULES.
4.1. Introduction
Both the no—conflict and the no—profit rules, as applied
in the United Kingdom are rigid ones. Their rigidity
can be realised by examining the courts' attitude
towards the various defences which have been raised by
defender fiduciaries in many cases. In this chapter it
■and
will be shown that the common law A the legislation have
tried to relax the inflexibility of the fair dealing
rules. The judicial tendency to relax the fair dealing
rules will be examined in detail.
4.2. Features of the Inflexibility.
4.2.1. Bases of liability: The mere possibility of
conflict and the mere fact that a profit has been made.
In many cases, the judicial intervention was justified
on the ground that there was a possibility of conflict
of interest and/or that a profit had been made.
I n Aberdeen Railway Company v. Blaikie Bros' ' ' , Lord
Cranworth L.C held that the defender director was not
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allowed to contract with himself on behalf of the
company or with a firm in which he was a partner. This
is because in such a case a director places himself in a
conflicting situation. His Lordship said that a company
can only act by agents. These agents have duties of a
fiduciary nature which they are obliged to discharge
towards their principals. His Lordship stated:
C I ] t is a rule of universal application, that
no one, having such duties to discharge, shall
be allowed to enter into engagements in which
he has, or can have, a personal interest
conflicting, or which possibly may conflict,
with the interests of those whom he is bound
to protect! 2 ) .
Thus, in that case , the mere possibility of conflict
was sufficient to guarantee the intervention of the
court. It was sufficient to hold the defender liable
and to set aside the contract. So, there was no
necessity to prove the existence of an actual conflict.
The mere fact that a profit had been made was enough to
justify the application of the rigid rules in some
cases. For example, in Parker v. Mckenna(3> , the
directors of the bank were entrusted with the duty of
selling shares. They bought some of those shares for
themselves and made profit by re-selling them. The
court held that they had to account for the profit made.
The Lord Chancel lor said:
The court wil 1 not inquire, and is not in a
position to ascertain, whether the bank has or
has not lost by the acts of the directors.
All that the court has to do is to examine
whether a profit has been made by an agent,
- 1 67-
without the knowledge of his principal, in the
course of and execution of his agency' 1 ' .
Similarly, in Regal (Hastings) v. Gul 1iver'5' , Lord
Russell stated that the defendants were liable "if,
while standing in a fiduciary relationship to Regal they
have by reason and in the course of that fiduciary
relationship made a prof it"'6' . His Lordship emphasised
that "The liability arises from the mere fact of a
profit having, in the stated circumstances, been
made"< 7 > .
So, whenever a director made a profit out of his
position, he might be held liable to account for it even
if there was no conflict of interest and duty.
4.2.2. Ho remunerations for a trustee's care and
t roub1e s.
The strictness of the rules was also emphasised by Lord
Talbot L.C in Rob i n son v. Rett' ° ' . In that case his
Lordship refused to allow an alIowanee to the defendant
for his care and the work done for the trust estate.
His Lordship said:
It is an established rule that a trustee,
executor, or administrator, shall have no
allowance for his care and trouble: the reason
of which seems to be , for that on those
pretences, if allowed, the trust estate might
be loaded, and rendered of little value'9) .
It is clear that the rigid rules were applied strictly
in that case. The refusal to allow an a 1 lowance to the
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defendant for his care and trouble is one of the
features of the inflexibility .
4.2.3. Bona fides is no defence.
In many cases' 1"' , directors had tried to defend
themselves by claiming that they were acting bona fide
in the best interests of their companies. In Ex parte
Lacey' 1 * > , Lord E1 don said that the courts were unable
to examine the bona fides of the parties. Similarly, in
the Reg a 1 ' 12) case, Lord Rus sell said that "The
profiteer, however honest and well-intentioned, cannot
escape the risk of being called upon to account"' ' 3 ) .
In Phipps v. Boardman''41, it was held that the
defendants had put themselves in a special fiduciary
position. This position enabled them to buy the shares
and consequently they made a personal profit. The
defendants were made liable to account for the profit
made and it was irrelevant that they had acted honestly
and in a manner beneficial to the trust' ' 5 1 . So, the
courts contended that they were incapable of determining
questions of bona fides' l 6 > .
In sum, a fiduciary, whether a director or an officer,
cannot escape liability by showing that lie was acting in
good faith when he made a personal profit. The
rejection of such a defence represents one of the
features of the rigidity of the fair dealing rules.
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4.2.4. Company 'a financial inability is nu defence.
Applying the inflexible rules deprives directors from
usurping corporate opportunities for their own benefit
on the plea of company's financial inability. The
company in the Rega1 case* 17 > , was unable to finance the
transaction. The directors tried to use this fact as a
defence. This defence hag- been rejected by the House of
Lords. Lord Rus sell said that the liability to account
for a profit made, "in no way depends on
consideration as whether the profit would or should
otherwise have gone to the plaintiff . . ."(18) . His
Lordship rejected this defence by analogy to the
decision in Keech v. Stanford' 19 > , in which the lessor
refused to renew the lease to the infant where upon the
trustee renewed for himself. The court laid down the
inflexible rule that the trustee might not have the
lease, but must hold it on trust for the infant
regardless of the facts that the lessor had refused to
renew it to the infant and that the trustee had acted in
good faith. It is argued that the company is entitled
to its directors' individual loyalty. Thus, a director
may not exploit a corporate opportunity even if his
company is financially unable to exploit it because "the
company is entitled to freedom from competition by those
charged by the promotion of its interest"'201.
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In the Canadian case Weber Feeds Ltd v. Weber' 21 1 , the
court held that the company's financial inability was
irrelevant and did not have any bearing on the question
of breach of fiduciary duty.
The reason behind articulating such a rigid rule which
deprives a director from depending on his company's
financial inability as a defence is a prophylactic one.
That is, it is intended to remove all kinds of
t ernp t a t i on . Swan J . , in I rving Trus t Co . v .
Deutsch'22), pUt it in this way:
The defendants' argument that fiduciary
principles can have no application where the
corporation is unable to undertake the venture
is not convincing. If directors are permitted
to justify their conduct on such a theory
there will be a temptation to refrain from
exerting their strongest efforts on behalf of
the corporation since, if it does not meet the
obligations, an opportunity of profit will be
open to them personal ly<23) „
Dr. Prentice* 24 ) has agreed with Swan J. and said that
if the company's financial inability is accepted as a
defence, directors will be tempted to refrain from
exerting their best effort on behalf of the company as
this would afford them an opportunity to gain profit
which might be at the company's expense. It is also
argued*255 that a rule of uncompromising rigidity
denying the defence of financial inability is based upon
public policy rather than upon the resulting harm to the
company. It is thought that public policy can be served
effectively when temptation is removed. Clark* 26'
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argues that some types of allegations are "implausible".
If a director believes that a specific business
opportunity is lucrative, why does he not "convince a
bank or other investor of this fact in order to obtain
financing for the corporation to take it?"<27) .
Allowing the defence of financial inability reduces the
directors' incentive to solve corporate financing and
other problems' 281 . It has been argued'29' that a
director is required to make a genuine effort to enable
the company to acquire any profitable opportunity.
However, a director's duty may not be extended to
lending personal funds. But it is said'30) that he is
required, at least, to repay any debts owed to the
company before making any attempt to exploit the
opportunity for his own benefit. The fact that the
defendant owed the company a large sum of money in the
I rv i rig case'31 ) f was one of the most important reasons
which led the court to reject the defence of financial
inability'32) .
4.2.5. Third party's unwillingness to deal with the
company is no defence.
If a third party is unwilling to deal with the company,
can a director take the opportunity himself?. The rigid
application of the fair dealing rules deprives a
director from exploiting a corporate opportunity in such
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a case. In Keech v. Stanford' 33 )t the court held the
trustee liable because he had taken the lease for
himself despite the fact that the lessor had refused to
renew that lease to the infant beneficiary. Similarly,
i n Industrial Development Consultants Ltd v. Cooley< 3 4 > t
the unwi 1 1 ingness of the Gas Board to dea 1 wi th the
company had not been accepted as a defence available to
the defendant. However, Roskill J. recognised the
anomalous consequences of this decision and said that
the plaintiffs will gain a benefit "which . . . it is
unlikely they would have got for themselves had the
defendant complied with his duty to them"'35' . But the
judge pointed out that it was the defendant's duty to
persuade the Gas Board to contract with the plaintiff
company. The judge said:
It is a curious position under which he whose
duty it would have been to seek to persuade
them to change their minds should now say that
the plaintiff suffered no loss because, he
would never have succeeded in persuading them
to change their mind' 36' .
Dr. Prentice argues'37' that there is a sound policy
reason for rejecting such a defence. That reason is to
stop any temptation which may lead directors to refrain
from exerting their best effort to further their
companies' interests.
Ra j a k' 3 ® ' said that Ro sk ill J. , in the Coo 1ey case,
adopted the view that there was a fiduciary relationship
between the defendant and the company. That
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relationship sterns from the relationship between a
director and his company.
In Abbey Glen Property Corp. v. Stumborg(39), directors
of company A approached company B on behalf of company A
to join the latter company in a venture to acquire and
develop land in a specific area. Company B expressed
its unwillingness to deal with company A. But it was
willing to deal with the directors of company A.
Directors of company A formed a new company owned by
them which, eventually, took the intended land. Company
A alleged that its directors had breached their
fiduciary duties. The court held that the defendants
were liable in spite of the refusal of company B to deal
with the plaintiff company.
It is said' 40 ' that it is undesirable to consider the
unwillingness of the third party as an affirmative
defence due to the difficulties of verification of
unwillingness. Allowing such a defence may also
encourage directors to induce the unwillingness.
However, an absolute rejection of such a kind of defence
seems unreasonab1e.
4.2.6. The ultra vires transactions.
No conflict of interest and duty will arise in cases
where it is illegal for a company to take a specific
opportunity. Accordingly, a director can exploit that
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opportunity without the risk of being held accountable
for a profit which he may make'41 ' . A director is not
required to seek the approval of the company to take
such an opportunity. Similarly, where the inability of
the company to take an opportunity resulting from its
insolvency, it seems that a director is not precluded
from taking advantage of that opportunity. But the
situation is different in cases where the opportunity is
ultra vires the c ornpany. In such cases it is aa i d< 4 2 )
that a conflict of interest and duty may exist if a
director exploits an u1t r a vires opportunity. So, a
director cannot defend himself by claiming that the
opportunity which he has exploited is ultra vires the
company. The reason lying behind this embargo is that
the objects clause of a company can be amended so as to
enable the company to take any profitable opportunity.
Rejecting the defence of u1tra vires represents another
feature of the rigidity of the fair dealing rules. Such
a rejection should not be commended since many
opportunities will go unexploited because of the
difficulties in amending a company's objects clause in a
short period of time. However, since the ultra vires
doctrine, in relation to bona fide third parties, has
been abolished in the United Kingdom443) t an argument
that it should be a defence is no longer worthwhile.
New S. 35 of the Companies Act 1985 provides that a
company's capacity is not limited by its memorandum.
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Thus, a company, now, has the capacity to take advantage
of any fruitful opportunity< 44' .
4.2.7. Exploiting an opportunity by a director after his
resignation from his office.
In Industrial Development Consultants v. Cooley(451, the
defendant director pleaded that he entered into the
contract with the third party after his resignation from
his office of directorship. The court rejected this
defence on the ground that the opportunity came to the
defendant's knowledge while he was occupying a
director's position. Furthermore, it was found that the
resignation of the defendant in that case was prompted
by the desire to obtain for himself the contract with
the third party. In the Canadian case Canadian Aero
Services Ltd. v. Q'MaIley(46> , the same defence was
pleaded by the defendants. It was found that the
plaintiff company had devoted itself for that
opportunity which was captured by former directors.
Thus, La skin J. rejected this defence and said that a
director is qualified from
usurping for himself ... a maturing business
opportunity which his company is actively
pursuing; he is also precluded from so acting
even after his resignation where the
resignation is fairly be said to have been
prompted or influenced by a wish to acquire
for himself the opportunity sought by the
company; or where it was his position with the
company rather than a fresh initiative that
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led him to the opportunity which he later
acquired'47).
On the other hand, in Island Export Finance Ltd. v.
Umunna' 4 s ) f the court found that the resignation was not
prompted by the desire to acquire the opportunity.
Hutchison J. said that exploiting the opportunity by the
defendant director
was certainly not his motive for resignation,
and it cannot possibly be said that his
resignation was prompted or influenced by a
wish to acquire for himself the opportunity
sought by the company' 43 1 .
Thus, the court accepted the defence that the
exploitation was achieved after the resignation.
However, it should be noted that the special facts of
each case are crucial while the time of exploitation is
less important. In other words, rejecting or accepting
a defence of such a kind depends on the circumstances of
each case. The intention of the defender and the
motives that led to resignation are decisive and very
important. Thus, an absolute rejection of the defence
of resignation without making an inquiry into the
motives of the defende rs would be unwise an would
constitute another feature of the rigid
application of the fair dealing rules.
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4.2.8. Change in shareholders and unjustified enrichment
as defences
The original shareholders at the time of the breach may
leave the company and new shareholders may replace them
at the time of the action against the directors. The
question here is this: Does this change form a defence
in the hands of the directors against the company"s
al legation?. Can it be said that the new shareholders
will have gained a windfall profit if recovery has been
allowed ?. In the RegaI< 5 0) case, it could be argued
that the new directors and/or the new shareholders had
gained a windfall profit (i.e. they had been unjustly
enriched by holding the previous directors liable to
account for the profit made). Professor Gower describes
their action as "unmeri torious"< 5 1 > . Lord Porter said
that the recovery in the RegaI case resulted in the new
shareholders obtaining an "unexpected windfa 1 1 " <52> .
But his Lordship concluded that that fact was immaterial
and the inflexible rule must be applied. Professor
Pennington said that the real losers, in the Rega1 case,
were the previous shareholders while the new
shareholders had, in fact, lost nothing'53•. Therefore,
the unfairness of the House of Lords' judgment lies in
the fact that the new shareholders are themselves the
persons who have bought the defendants' shares in the
subsidiary company. The profit which had been made by
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the previous directors was provided by the new
purchasers. When those purchasers acquired the shares
and the control of Regal , "they knew of, and must
therefore have implicitly assented to, the profit which
the directors had made"' 54 ' .
However, the directors were held liable to account in
the Rega1 case. Their liability had not been affected
by the change in the shareholders.
In Abbey Glen Property Corp v. Stumborg' 5 5 1 , the company
alleged that its directors had breached their fiduciary
duties regarding certain land transactions. The
defendant directors tried to defend themselves by
claiming that the shareholders at the time of the
a 1 1eged breach had left the company and new shareholders
had replaced them at the time of the action. The
majority of the Appellate Division held that the change
in the shareholders was irrelevant. The right to an
accounting was an asset to the company. Clement J. put
it in this way:
A change in shareholders in itself cannot
diminish the rigour of the obligation to
account to the company which remains unchanged
in its character of a corporate entity'56' .
The minority of the Appellate Division held that the new
shareholders would be unjustly enriched by receipt of a
benefit for which they had not bargained. Clement J.
reacted against the minority's judgment and said that if
the principle of the unjust enrichment had been applied
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in the way suggested by the minority of the court's
members
then in logic the consequences would vary with
the proportion of the new shareholders in the
company. If . . . one half were new
shareholders, the defence would be half way
successful, the company would receive an
accounting for only one-half of its equitable
interest, and the fiduciary would keep the
rest. The remedy of restitution would fail in
part or in whole, as it would here if the
defence were to succeed. With the failure of
the remedy the principle itself is
compromised<5 7 > .
Thus, the application of the rigid rules gives rise to
an unjust enrichment aspect (58). The application of
the corporate entity doctrine has enabled new
shareholders to acquire an unexpected windfall. It is
the company who will recover the profit according to the
corporate entity doctrine. The benefit which wi 1 1 be
obtained by the new shareholders, as a result of
recovery, will be obtained indirectly. That is, by
having the value of their shares increased. However,
rejecting the defence of change in shareholders seems to
be another feature of the rigid application of the fair
dealing rules.
4.2.9. No injury sustained by the company is no defence.
A company may sustain no loss as a result of the
directors' gain. This fact was rejected by courts as a
defence in the hands of directors. In Farker v.
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McKenna(5 9 ' , the directors of a bank, who were entrusted
with the duty of selling shares, bought some of those
shares themselves. They then sold those shares and made
profit. The Lord Chancellor stated that:
The court will not inquire, and is not in a
position to ascertain whether the bank has or
has not lost by the acts of the directors'60'.
It is clear from his Lordship's statement that injury to
the principal is irrelevant. A very clear decision in
respect of this particular point was submitted by James
L.J in the same case'6!'. His Lordship said:
It appears to me very important, that we
should concur in laying down again and again
the general principle that in this court no
agent in the course of his agency, . . . , can
be allowed to make any profit without the
knowledge and consent of his principal ; that
that rule is an inflexible rule, and must be
applied inexorably by this court, which is not
entitled, in my judgment, to receive evidence
as to whether the principal did or did
not suffer any injury in fact by reason of the
dealing of the agent; for the safety of
mankind requires that no agent aha 1 1 be able
to put his principal to such an inquiry as
that'62).
This decision confirmed all the strictness of the fair
dealing rules. The fact that the principal suffered no
loss was entirely irrelevant according to that decision.
In Regal (Hastings) v. Gulliver' 6 3 ' , Lord Russe1 1
rejected the defendants' argument that the company had
suffered no loss'64' . Similarly, this defence was
rejected by the court in Keech v. Stanford'65' and in
Canadian Aero Services Ltd v. O'Mai ley'6 6). sQ, the
fact that the defender director had made profit was the
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A
heart of the matter while injury to the trust had no
bearing on the question of liability. It would seem
that this holding represents one of the rigid
features of the application of the fair dealing rules.
4.2.10. The fact that the exploited opportunity is not
identical to the one offered to the company may not be
a defence.
In Canadian Aero Services Ltd. v. Q'Mal ley'6 7 > , the
directors had devoted effort and planning in respect of
a particular corporate opportunity as representatives of
the plaintiff company (Canaero). Subsequently, they
deflected that opportunity to another company (Terra)
which they owned personally. The allegation against
them was that they breached their fiduciary duties. The
directors had unsuccessfully tried to defend themselves
by showing that the opportunity which was exploited by
Terra was not identical to that in which Canaero was
interested. This defence was rejected by Laskin J. as
irrelevant. The judge said:
I do not regard it as necessary to look for
substantial resemblances. Their presence
would be a factor to be considered on the
issue of breach of fiduciary duty but they are
not a sine qua non. [The opportunity which
was exploited by Terra was one] -in line with
[Canaero]'s general pursuits . . . . < 6 8 > .
It seems that unless there is a substantial difference
between the exploited opportunity and the opportunity
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offered to the company, the courts wi 1 1 not accept a
defence based on such a ground.
4.2.11. The bona fide rejection of an opportunity by the
board of directors as a defence.
The board of directors may bona fide reject an
opportunity on behalf of the company. Does such a
rejection constitute an effective defence in the hands
of the directors who exploited the rejected
opportunity?. Unfortunately, such a defence was
rejected by the courts. Such a rejection confirms the
strict application of the fair dealing rules.
In the Rega I case, for example, the directors' good
faith had not been accepted as a defence. Accordingly,
a director cannot take a corporate opportunity for
himself even if it has been rejected by the company.
This is so unless the company allows him to exploit that
opportunity'6^).
On the contrary, this defence had been accepted by the
court in the Canadian case Peso-Silver Mines Ltd v.
Cropper'70). In this case the board of directors, bona
fide, rejected the opportunity which was offered to the
company. The rejection was upon two grounds: First,
that the company was in a difficult financial situation.
Second, that the company had enough land. After it had
been rejected by the company, the opportunity was
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exploited by three of the directors. The court had not
held them liable to account for the profit made because:
(1) they were acting bona fide in the interest of the
company when they rejected the opportunity on its
behalf; (2) after it had been rejected by the company,
the opportunity ceased to be a corporate one and,
consequently, it was open to be taken by the directors.
This decision has been widely criticised. First, it is
said' ? l ) that it requires the court to determine bona
fides which is difficult to determine; second, this
decision was in clear contradiction with the finding in
the Rega I case, in which the court held that the issue
op bona fides had no bearing on the question of
1iabi1ity<72) ; third, the directors who exploited the
opportunity in question were themselves those who
rejected it on behalf of the company. They might be
tempted, to reject that opportunity on behalf of the
company by the desire to exploit it themselves; fourth,
allowing directors to exploit an opportunity which had
been rejected by their company may tempt them not to
exercise their best effort to further their company's
interests' 7 3) ; fifth, even if the opportunity has ceased
to be a corporate one as a result of the board's
rejection of it, a conflict of interest and duty may
exist if that opportunity has been exploited by
directors. Consequently, such an exploitation justifies
a rigid application of the no-conflict rule'741.
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The criticisms of the decision in the Peso case* 7 5 ) t
confirmed all the strictness of the fair dealing rules.
Morris J. 's dissenting judgment in the Peso case*76> ,
asked for the fair dealing rules to be applied rigidly.
He said that the defendants had acquired the information
about the opportunity in the course of the execution of
their duties as directors and consequently they should
be made liable to account for the profit made.
However, one is inclined to agree with Professor Gower
who expressed his view over this issue. He said that it
is difficult to say that there is a conflict of interest
and duty in cases where it is impossible for the company
to avail itself of the opportunity, and where the
directors are not in a position to compete with the
company* 77 l . In the Peso case it was found that it was
impossible for the company to avail itself of the
offered opportunity. In the Rega1 case* 7'1 , the
opportunity had not been rejected by the board of
directors. In fact, Regal was willing to take up that
opportunity, but it could not do that due to lack of
funds. So, it seems that the House of Lords realised
the fact that it was possible for the company to avail
itself of the opportunity had the directors tried to
raise its funds*79'.
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4.3. THE RELAXATION OF THE FAIR DEALING RULES
4.3.1. The Common Law and the Statutory role in relaxing
the Fair Dealing Rules.
The disadvantages of the fair dealing ruIes
(1) Where a director is the sole source of a particular
transaction, preventing him from dealing with the
company may deprive the company of a worthwhile
transaction' 80 ' .
(2) In terms of cost and time, dealing with an insider
may cost the company less than dealing with an outsider.
The reason is that, the insider is, usually, a well
known person to the company and it is easy to contact
him. Negotiation with an outsider, certainly, needs
more time than negotiation with an insider'81'.
(3) A director is, usually, appointed to develop
relationships between his company and other companies.
Thus, it is highly likely that he may have a contact
with the other companies due to his position as such,
and the possibility of conflict arises from the
outset'8 8 ' .
The rigid application of the fair dealing rules may be
regarded as unworkable in real business life and
against the best interests of companies. Because of
these reasons and because of those disadvantages the
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rules have L>eeii relaxed in two ways: ( i ) Shareholders'
approval and ratification'83) ; (ii) Waiver.
4.3.1.1. Ratification
A director who has an interest in a contract with his
company must make a full disclosure of that interest and
its nature to the company in general meeting. If the
company approves that contract a director will not be in
breach of his fiduciary duties. It is argued'84' that
the effects of the approval are that it cures directors'
breach of duty and releases them from liability. These
effects were confirmed by the decision in Rega 1
(Hastings) Ltd v. Gulliver'35). Lord Russe11 said:
[The defendants! could, had they wished, have
protected themselves by a resolution . . . of
Regal shareholders in general meeting. In
default of such approval liability to account
must rernain'8 6) .
The direct result of ratification is the prevention of
the minority shareholders from suing the wrongdoers
unless they can bring their action within one of the
exceptions to the rules in Foss v. Harbottle'87).
Shareholders' consent can be obtained in advance, i.e,
before a director's act takes place. This is the so
called "approval"'88' . On the other hand, the consent
can be given in f orm of ratification after the
occurrence of the breach. However, ratification is
ineffective in cases where a director's act amounts to a
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fraud on the minority'89' . Thus, a difficult question
arises in this context which is: How to distinguish
between ratifiable and non-ratifiable breaches?'90> .
Do shareholders have the power to approve or to ratify
an act which gives away assets belonging to the
company?. It is well established that any act deprives
a company from any part of its assets could not be
approved or ratified by shareholders. In Cook v.
Peeks' 91 > , the directors appropriated to themselves a
contract belonged to the company. The court held that
this act was not ratifiable. In Menier v. Hopper's
Telegraph Works'92* , the directors obtained for
themselves the benefit of a contract in which their
company was interested. The court held that the
shareholders had no power to ratify such an act. In
Park v. Daily News'93) r the court restrained the
directors from distributing the proceeds of a sold
asset, which was belonging to the company, among its
employees. It held that this act was u 1 tra vires the
company and could not be ratified'94).
According to the cases mentioned above, it could be said
that the appropriation of a company's assets cannot be
approved or ratified by the shareholders. The reason
behind this embargo seems to be to protect the minority
shareholders. Thus, it is submitted that if
shareholders unanimously approve the directors' action,
directors will not be held accountable. Th i s is, of
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course, unless the directors' action is capable of
injuring the rights of the company's creditors.
Lord Russell, in the Rega 1 case's 5 ' , said that the
directors could have escaped liability by seeking an
approval from the majority shareholders. In that case
the directors bought shares in the subsidiary company
and sold them. Can it be said that those shares
belonging in equity to the company?. Professor Beck
argues that if the directors "had not sold the shares,
they would have been constructive trustees of them for
the company and would have been required to transfer
them to it"'9S> . If it was correct that the directors
in the Rega1 case would be constructive trustees for the
shares, a contradiction between Lord Russell 's dicta and
the courts' decisions, which made the appropriation of
the company's assets non-ratifiable, would arise'97> .
But, it is agreed that the directors in the Rega 1 case
owe no duty to acquire the shares for the company. This
view had been expressed by Lord Macrni 1 lan(9S) , Lord
Wright'99' and Lord Porter'100)( in the Rega1 case
itself. The judges relied solely on the no-profit rule
in holding the directors liable to account for the
profit made. They did not rely on the no-conflict rule
because the directors owed no duty to the company to
acquire the shares for it. In the absence of such a
duty one could say that the shares did not belong to the
company (i.e. they were not part of the company's
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property). Consequently, the directors had not
mi sappropria ted a company's assets to therase1ves' 101),
Thus, it seems that the decision given by Lord Russel 1
is a correct one. That is, directors of Regal company
were able to escape liability by obtaining the majority
shareholders' approval.
Is it possible to draw a distinction between ratifiable
and non-rat i f i ab 1 e acts on the basis of good faith?.
The directors' act in the Reg a I case was held to be
ratifiable'102) r wh ile their act wa s held to be no t
ratifiable in Cook v. Peeks< l 0 3 ) . The directors in the
former case were acting bona fide while in the latter
they were acting ma 1 a fide. Depending on the above two
cases it is said1l04' that it is possible to distinguish
between ratifiable and non-ratifiab1e breaches on the
basis of good faith. However, the distinction on such a
basis is not without difficulties due to the courts'
reluctance to investigate the defendants' bona
fides<105).
Despite the fact that the courts in some cases decided
that injury to the trust was i r r e 1 evan t' l °6 > , to the
question of accountability, one is of the opinion that a
distinction between ratifiable and non-ratifiable
breaches can be made depending on whether the company
sustains loss or not' 1 071 . Shareholders should be given
the power to approve or to ratify the directors' act if
the company sustained no harm. If the directors' act
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exposes the company to loss such an act should not be
ratified. However, this approach is wide enough to
embrace cases in which directors' act amounts to a fraud
on the minority and accordingly such an act, it is
submitted, cannot be ratifiable. The advantages of this
approach are that: (1) It avoids for us the
difficulties of judging bon a fides. (2) It exempts us
from entering into a discussion over whether information
is a property or not in cases of corporate opportunity.
Ratification can be made, in many cases, by ordinary
resolution of the general meeting. Can an interested
director uses his vote qua shareholder to ratify his
breach of duty? One finds no obligatory rule in Britain
depriving an interested director from voting in such a
case' ID® ) . Howeve r, s ome sort of indication can be
found in the case law. The directors in Hogg v.
Cramphorn' l o 9) t were ordered not to vote the shares they
had improperly issued to themselves, while in North West
Transportation v. Beatty' l l 0 ) f the director wa s all owed
to' use his vote qua shareholder to ratify a contract
with his company in which he was interested. Sir
Richard Bags 1 1y said:
[Every] shareholder has a perfect right to
vote upon any such question, al though he may
have a personal interest in the subject matter
opposed to or different from the general or
particular interests of the company'11''.
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However, it is suggested that interested directors
should not be allowed to use their votes to ratify or to
approve their own acts. Such a prohibition provides
effective measures to protect minority shareholders,
particularly, in cases where interested directors
control the majority vote in the general meeting. The
decision in Cook v. Peeks* ll^ 1 , may guarantee the
fairness of a transaction to some extent, even if
interested directors are al 1 owed t o vo te. But in cases
that involve the use of corporate information that
decision may fail to protect the minority shareholders.
The reason is that it is not clear whether information
is property or not' 1 13 ' . If information is not
property, using it may not invoke the decision in Cook
v. Peeks' 114) . It is to be noted that according to the
new S.322A (1) of the Companies Act 1 9 8 5' l i 5 ' , if a
director enters into a transaction with his company, in
excess of any limitation on his powers under the
company1s constitution, the transaction will be voidable
at the instance of the company. In addition, whether or
not the transaction is avoided, the director concerned
is liable:
a) to account to the company for any gain
which he has made directly or indirectly by
the transaction, and
b) to indemnify the company for any loss or
damage resulting from the transaction'116).
It is clear from the wording of the section (quoted
above) that ratifying such a transaction does not
release the director from the liability to account for
the profit he has made or to indemnify the company for
the loss it has suffered as a result of that
transaction. If the transaction (to which a director is
a party) is u1tra vires the company, then, it can only
be ratified by a special resolution. The quorum at the
meeting may cause difficulty if interested diV^clors
are prevented from using their vote at the general
meeting to approve their acts. Suppose that there are
only three shareholder^ two of them are interested in
a transaction with the company, and the quorum is two.
The quorum in such a case wi 1 1 never exist if the
interested directors / shareholders are not to be
counted for the quorum purposes' 1 1 7 ' . A solution for
this problem can be found in Art. 97 of Table A 1985
which provides:
Where proposals are under consideration
concerning the appointment of two or more
directors to offices or employment with the
company or any body corporate in which the
company is interested the proposals may be
divided and considered in relation to each
director separately and (provided he is not
for another reason precluded from voting) each
of the directors concerned shall be entitled
to vote and be counted in the quorum in
respect of each resolution except that
concerning his own appointment.
One finds no reason depriving us from applying this
solution to cases which involve corporate opportunities.
An interested director A should be allowed to use his
vote to ratify an act done by another interested
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director B. But B himself should be deprived from using
his vote to ratify his own act. This solution, it is to
be noted, can be applied provided that there is no fraud
on the minority.
4.3.1.2. Waiver
A company can waive, in advance, the rules protecting
it, such as the no-conflict rule and the no-profit rule.
Waiver allows directors to retain the profit made by
them out of their position without making a full
disclosure to the company in general meeting. The
company can achieve this purpose by adopting an
exclusion clause in its articles of association. Art.85
of Table A1 1 I S ) contains an exclusion clause which is
available to be adopted by companies to relieve their
directors, to some extent, from liability. Art.85 reads
as foilows:
Subject to the provisions of the Act, and
provided that he has disclosed to the
directors the nature and the extent of any
material interest of his, a director
notwithstanding his office —
(a) may be a party to, or otherwise
interested in, any transaction or
arrangement with the company or in which the
company is otherwise interested;
(b) may be a director or other officer of, or
employed by, or a party to any transaction or
arrangement with, or otherwise interested in,
any body corporate promoted by the company or
in which the company is otherwise interested;
and
(c) shall not, by reason of his office, be
accountable to the company for any belief it
which he derives from any such office or
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employment or from any such transaction or
arrangement or from any interest in any such
body corporate and no such transaction or
arrangement shall be liable to be avoided on
the ground of any such interest or benefit.
Thus, Art.85 allows a director to contract with his
company or to have an interest in a contract with it
without being accountable for any profit or benefit so
derived. But, since the waiver by the company is
against the shareholders' interest' 119' , Art.85 itself
and S.317 CA 1985 require an interested director to
disclose his interest to the board of directors. S.317
cannot be abrogated by the articles of association.
Thus, in the absence of the company's approval, a
director cannot, for example, enter into a contract with
his company unless two conditions are satisfied: (1)
That his company's articles contain an exclusion clause
similar to that in Art.85, and (2) that he has disclosed
his interest to the board of directors according to
S.317*120) . A disclosure to a comulittee of the board
was held to be ineffective'121).
The Purpose of S.317
S.317 provides:
(1) It is the duty of a director of a company
who is in any way, whether directly or
indirectly, interested in a contract or
proposed contract with the company to declare
the nature of his interest at a meeting of the
directors of the company.
(9) Nothing in this section prejudices the
operation of any rule of law restricting
directors of a company from having an interest
in contract with the company.
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It seems that the purpose of this section is, only, to
impose a statutory duty on directors to disclose their
interest in a contract with their companies to the board
of directors. Failure to do so exposes an interested
director to a f i n e < 1 2 2 > . It is agreed'1231 that, such a
failure brings the common law principle that prohibits a
director from having an interest in a contract with his
company into operation' 1 24 ' . This is so,
notwithstanding that the company's articles contain an
exclusion clause. In other words, failure to disclose
an interest to the board according to S.317 (as well as
according to Art.85 if adopted by a company) makes a
director's contract with the company voidable at the
instance of the company but not void, and any profits
made are recoverable. On the other hand, compliance
with S.317 does not make the contract valid unless the
company's articles of association contain an exclusion
clause similar to that in Ar t.85. In the absence of an
exclusion clause the company has the right, at Common
Law, to rescind the contract even if the interested
director has complied with S.317(125). Thus, S.317 is
not intended to relax the inflexibility of the fair
dealing rules. This is clear from the wording of
SS.317(9) which provides that S.317 does not prejudice
any rule of law restricting directors from having an
interest in contracts with their companies.
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The extent and the aims of disclosure
An interested director must disclose the nature of his
interest and the extent of the benefit which he will
make as a result of the contract with the company' 12 6) .
However, S.317 requires an interested director to
disclose only the nature of his personal interest in the
contract or arrangement. Thus, a director is not
required to disclose matters affecting his fiduciary
position such as wrongful conduct'1271 . Nor he is
required to disclose all activities which are irrelevant
to his personal interest in contract' 128) t op all the
material facts' 129) .
The extent of disclosure is, in fact, limited to some
extent by SS.317(3) which provides that a general notice
given by the interested director to the board of
directors that:
a) he is a member of a specified company
and is to be regarded as interested in any
contract which may . . . be made with that
company . . .; or
b) he is to be regarded as interested in any
contract which may after the date of the
notice be made with a specific person who is
connected with him , is deemed a
sufficient declaration of interest in relation
to a n y such interest.
The purposes of disclosure are that it gives a company's
creditors the opportunity to inspect documents required
to be public, such as register of members, directors and
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secretaries or filed wi th the registrar ( e.g. annual
return, directors' report and memorandum and articles of
association' 130) . it also gives directors or other
officers the chance to escape liability for a breach of
fiduciary duties' 13 1), and to retain the profit or the
benefits they may gain from contracting with their
c oifipan i e s .
Art.85 of Table A v. S.31Q of the Comp an ies Act 1985:
Unclean relationship
Art.85 includes an exclusion clause. It is said' 132 1
that the purpose of this Article is to limit the effects
of the decision of the House of Lords in Rega1
(Hastings) v. Gulliver' 133) t which is deemed to be a
harsh decision on directors.
The relationship between Art.85 and S.310<134) t is
unclear'135' . S.310 makes void:
any provision, whether contained in a
company's articles or in any contract with the
company or otherwise, for exempting any
officer of the company . . ,. from, or
indemnifying him against, any liability which
by virtue of any rule of law would otherwise
attach to him in respect of any negl igence,
default, breach of duty or breach of trust of
which he may be guilty in relation to the
company.
Gore-Browne' 1 36 ' argues that S.310 relates to liability
arising from a breach of duty, i.e, to the consequences
of a breach of fiduciary duty. Thus, it makes void any
provision exempting a director from liability for a
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breach of duty , but it permits the modification or the
abrogation of that duty. Accordingly no conflict
between S.310 and Art.85 may arise. Gore—Browne
qualified his view by saying that the articles or any
provision in a director's service contract cannot exempt
a director from any duty based on a mandatory rule of
statute or general law(137) . Professor Gower < 13 8)
shares the same view with Gore—Browne, but he imposes a
different qualification on that view. He says that a
company's articles or a director's service contract
cannot relieve him of his duty to act in good faith or
of his duty of ski 1 1 and care, nor can it exempt him
from liability for a breach of these duties. Such a
breaches are banned by S.310. In Gower's opinion a
c ompany's articles can modify a director's scope of
duty; but subject to the general principle that no
clause can protect directors against the consequences of
their own fraud* l 39 ' . Thus, a company's articles may,
for example, allow a director who is acting in good
faith to retain the profit made by him even if he places
himself in a position where his duty and his interest
conflict. But in order to consider the articles valid,
Gower says, they should be very similar to Art.85.
Birds* 140) has argued that the duties which are imposed
on directors by the general law cannot be excluded by
the articles by virtue of S.310. A director's duty to
use his power for proper purpose can be excluded by the
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articles because this duty does not stern from the
general law but from the articles themselves. He added
that it is possible to modify directors' duties by a
company's articles by requiring them to disclose their
interest to the board of directors instead of making
such a disclosure to the shareholders in general
meeting. In such a case, directors are exempted from
liability to account for a profit made by them' 1 4 1 ) .
However, Birds concluded that the Articles of Table A
including Art.35 are valid because of their appearance
in a statute. That is, in his view Art.85 is valid as
an exception to the general prohibition imposed by
S.310.
Professor Pennington'142) argues that a company's
articles and a director's service contract cannot exempt
a director from his fiduciary duties and the duty of
skil 1 and care which are imposed on him by law. The
duties imposed by the general law can be increased by
articles but cannot be diminished. Accordingly, in
Pennington's opinion, S.310 prevails in case of
contradiction with the company's articles.
Baker'143) argues that S.310 makes void any clause in a
company's articles exonerating a director from liability
for a breach of duty. It does not also prevent
liability from arising even if the duty is excluded by
the articles of association. In other words, even if a
company's articles adopted Art.35, a director would be
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liable if he breached his duties. Baker also argues
that S.310 does not make void an article which replaces
a director's duty to disclose his interest to the
company in general meeting with a duty to disclose that
interest to the board of directors provided that "the
exclusion of the general equitable principle is made
conditionally upon compliance with the duty to disclose
the interest to the board"*144) .
Finally, it has been said that "the general consensus
appears to be that Art.85 is permissible as it is
designed to prevent the no—conflict duty arising and
does not relieve an individual from liability for breach
of that duty"(14 5) .
It is clear from the wording of S. 310 that it is very
wide. It covers both exoneration and indemnification
cases. Thus, in Viscount of the Royal Court of Jersey
v, She I ton* 14 6) , it was held that an article exonerating
a director from liability or indemnifying him out of the
company's fund would violate S.310 despite its validity
under the Jersey law. It also seems that S.310 is wide
enough to cover articles which are intended to exempt
directors from liability for breach of duties of skill
and care or to indemnify them out of the company's fund
in relation to that breach*147).
However, it could be argued that there is no conflict
between Art.85 of Table A and S.310. The following
reasons can be adduced to support this argument:
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(1) Art.85 starts with the words "Subject to the
provisions of the Act . . . " . These words can be
understood as proscribing any application of Art.85 in
contradiction to any provision in the Act including
S.310 < 14 8 > . Since Art.85 is made subject to the
provisions of the Act, adopting it by a company's
articles does not mean that a director is exempted from
liability for a breach of duty because such exemption
goes against the explicit prohibition irnposed by s.310.
(2) Art.85 has a specified scope of application. It
only permits a director to be a party to a transaction
or otherwise to be interested in any transaction or
arrangement with the company or in which the company is
interested or to be a director or a party to any
transaction or arrangement or otherwise interested in,
"any body corporate promoted by the company or in which
the company is otherwise interested"' I43) . Despite this
specified scope Art.85 operates only, to a limited
extent, i.e. in cases where there is no breach of duty.
It cannot be said that whenever a director enters into a
transaction or arrangement with his company or has an
interest in his company's transaction with a third
party, he is in breach of his duties. In cases where
the contract is fair, if the company, for example, buys
assets from its director at the current market price, no
conflict of duty and interest may arise. Accordingly
there wi 1 1 be no breach of a duty in the part of the
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director*150'. But if a director, for example, breaches
his duty by entering into a contract with his company.
Art.85 does not operate because its operation will be
against S.310 which Art.85 is made subject to and
consequently void*151'.
(3) Shareholders, in general meeting, can ratify a
director's contract with the company or the contract in
which a director has an interest. Adopting Art.85 means
that the shareholders delegate their power to ratify
such a contract to the board of directors. Art.85
states that " . . . provided that he has disclosed to
the directors the nature and the extent of any material
interest of his . . .". Thus, if a director discloses
his interest to the board of directors in the manner
specified in Art. 85, then any profit he might make in
such a fashion is no longer secret. But this exemption
is qualified, as mentioned above, by a clear condition
that the director's act must not amount to a breach of
duty which will invoke S.310*152'.
One is drawn to conclude, from the above discussion of
Art.85 and S.310, that Art.85 represents a statutory
tendency to relax the rigid application of the fair
dealing rules. A director can enter into a transaction
with his company and keep the profit made if his
company's articles of association adopt Art.85 provided
that a full disclosure of the nature and the extent of
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his interest has been made to the board of directors and
that no violation of S.310 has been committed.
There was a debate over whether S.310 rendered void
policies of professional indernni ty insurrance effected
by a company on behalf of its directors. The position
was unlcear unti1 the enactment of the Companies Act
1989. The new S.310(3) (a) of the Companies Act
1985<153) provides that a company is entitled to
purchase or to maintain for any officer insurance
against liability arises under S.310(1). S.310(3) (b)
entitles a company to indemnify any officer against any
liability incurred by him as a result of being a
successful defendant in civil or criminal proceedings or
a successful petitioner for relief under S.144 or S.727
of the Companies Act 1980. The section, however, does
not make directors' liability insurance policies valid
for all purposes. Some liabilities cannot be insured
against because to al low insurance in relation to them
would be contrary to public policy. Thus, for example,
no valid insurance can be made against liabilities which
arise from, tortious acts which involve dishonesty or a
crime, wrongful trading and criminal fines' 154) .
Finally, the Companies Act 1985 has intervened to relax
the inflexibility of the fair dealing rules by giving
the court a discretionary power to relieve directors
from liability for a breach of duty in certain cases.
S.727 provides:
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(1) If in any proceedings for negligence,
default, breach of duty or breach of trust
against an officer of a company . . . it
appears to the court hearing the case that
that officer . . . is or may be liable in
respect of the negligence, default, breach of
duty or breach of trust, but that he has acted
honestly and reasonably, and that having
regard to all the circumstances of the case
he ought fairly to be excused for the
negligence, default, breach of duty or breach
of trust, that the court may relieve him
either who 1 1y or partly, from his liability on
such terms as it thinks fit.
It is clear from the wording of S.727 that the defender
must establish that he has acted honestly and reasonably
and, that having regard to all the circumstances, he
"ought fairly to be excused". Gore—Browne states that
while it is possible to prove the first two conditions,
it is not easy at al1 to prove the third one which is an
issue for the discretion of the court in each case'1551.
Gore—Browne has also stated that S.727 does not apply to
a director's duties to the company under legislation
other than the Companies Acts* 156) . A director cannot
plead S.727 as a defence against a claim of wrongful
trading' 157) f nor can he claim relief under it where he
is in a possession of the company's assets as
constructive trustee'15 8) . However, the section was
applied in many cases. For example, a director who
acted bona fide and sought a legal advice to the effect
that the transaction was ultra vires was relieved of
liability incurred as a result of carrying out that
transaction' 159) .
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4.3.2. The Judicial Tendency to Relax the Inflexibility
of the Fair Dealing Rules.
The case law has played a noteworthy role in relaxing
the fair dealing rules. It will be shown that there is
a strong tendency to relax those rules.
4.3.2.1. Allowing remuneration for care and work done by
a defender director.
The policy of granting remuneration to defendants was
accepted by Fox L.J. in Q'Sul1ivan v. Management Agency
and Music Ltd* 160) t where his Lordship said that it
would be "unduly severe" to apply "a hard and fast rule
that the beneficiary can demand the whole profit without
an allowance for the work without which it could not
have been created"* 161 ) . Similarly, in Plvipps v.
Boardiiian* 16 2) t the defendants were allowed remuneration
for the work done. Thus, the Phip p s case, despite the
fact that the majority of the court had held that
confidential information belonged to the trust and so
the liability was imposed on the defendants, represents
the starting point of a way to relax the inflexible fair
dealing rules* *63) .
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4.3.2.2. The interpretation of the phrase "possibly may
conf1ic t"
An important indicator of the desirability of relaxing
the fair dealing rules appears in Lord Upjohn's
dissenting judgment in Phipps v. Boardmarh 16*) . His
Lordship examined the meaning of the phrase "possibly
may conflict", which appeared in Lord Cranworth's
judgment in the B1 aikie case(lS5) t and said:
In my view it means that the reasonable man
looking at the relevant facts and
circumstances of the particular case would
think that there was a real sensible
possibility of conflict; not that you could
imagine some situations arising which might,
in some conceivable possibility in events not
contemplated as a real sensible possibility by
any reasonable person result in a
conf1ict< 16 6) .
His Lordship was inclined to lessen the rigidity of the
no—conflict rule by requiring a proof of the existence
of a "real sensible possibility of conflict".
Therefore, the mere possibility of conflict of interests
was not enough in his Lordship's opinion, to hold the
defendant liable to account for the profit made1 '67) .
4.3.2.3. The issue of bona fides
Despite the fact that the courts have decided, in many
cases, t ha t the question of bona fides is irrelevant and
has no bearing on the question of liability for breach
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of fiduciary duty<168) f it has been given some attention
in many cases. For ex amp 1 e in Holder v. Ho ] der * 169) ,
Danckwerts L.J. rejected Lord Eldon's reasoning in the
Ex parte Lacey case11?01 , that the fair dealing rules
should be applied rigidly due to the impossibility to
prove bona f ides, i.e, to ascertain whether the trustee
is acting in good faith or not. Danckwerts L.J. said
that the Chancery judges are daily engaged in
determining the knowledge and the intentions of the
parties.
In the Rega1 case'Dl ) itself, the finding of bona fides
by the trial judges was not over turned( l 7 2 ) ; in the
Phipps case' 173) t the finding of bona fides had not been
di sturbed' 17 4)
It couId a 1 so be cone 1uded from Lord Roskill's speech in
Industrial Development Consultants Ltd v. Cooley' 17 5 > ,
that his Lordship was willing to take into account the
question of bona fides. He applied the inflexible rules
and said
I have less reluctance in reaching that
conclusion . . . since I know that what
happened was enabled to happen because a
release was obtained . . . by the dishonest
and untrue misrepresentations . . . (176) .
In Cook v. Peeks< l7 7 ) f the absence of good faith on the
part of the defendants had led the court to hold that
their act was not ratifiable.
The issue of bona fides should be taken into account at
least in cases of granting remunerations or rewards for
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the work done. In both the Ph i pp s case* 178) and the
O'SuI Iivan easel 179) , there is an approach which invites
the courts to consider the justice of the case including
the parties' tona fides. That is, there is an
invitation not to apply the fair dealing rules in their
rigidity. This approach is clear in some other cases,
such as the Canadian Aero Services Ltd v. O'Ma 1 1ey(ISO) t
and Island Export Finance Ltd v. Uinunna1 l 8 l ) ( where the
judges laid emphasis on the issue of the defendants'
motives and intentions which led them to resign from
their office as directors. In the 0'Ma 1 Iey case1 18 2) f
Laskin J. noted that it was not appropriate to apply the
no—conflict and the accountability principles in the
Reg a 1 case in their rigidity as they were applied to
trustees! 183) . The judge sees the the Phi pps case1 l 8 * >
and the Coo I ey case! 185) , as involving "an updating of
the equitable principle whose roots lie in
loyalty, good faith and avoidance of a conflict of duty
and self-interest"'186) . Thus, it would seem that
Laskin J. would have favoured a flexible application of
the fair dealing rules. And he considered the issue of
bona fides as an important factor to deal with the
question of 1iabi1ity'187).
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4.3.2.4. Tlit: bun a fide rejection of an opportunity
The accepted rule now is that a director can exploit an
opportunity for himself if the company has considered it
and bona fide decided not to take i t< ' 8 8 ) . Thus, in
Peso Silver Mines Ltd v. Cropper' 18 9) t the board of
directors bona fide rejected an opportunity on behalf of
the company. After that they took the opportunity
themselves. The company alleged that its directors had
breached their fiduciary duties and should account for
the profit made. The court held that the directors were
not liable because they were acting bona fide in the
interest of the company when they rejected the
opportunity* 130) . Thus, contrary to the finding in the
Rega 1 case* 191 > , a bona fide rejection by the company
opened the opportunity to be taken by the directors.
Consequently, no—conflict of interest and duty may arise
in such a case* '38) . This decision represents a clear
judicial tendency to relax the rigid application of the
fair dealing rules. A similar decision is f ound in the
Australian case Queensland Mines Ltd. v. Hudson*193) F
where the Privy Council held that the defendant had
fully discussed the situation with the board who
resolved not to take the opportunity and so, he was not
liable to account for the profit derived from a personal
exploitation of the opportunity.
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However, Brudney and CI ark' 1 9 4 ' , suggest that different
types of rules should be applied depending on the type
of the company in question. In respect of public
c oiupanies , strict rules should be applied. Full time
executives should be prevented from exploiting any
active business opportunity (i.e. any business
opportunity in respect of which a director is required
or entitled to participate in making a decision). On
the other hand a passive business opportunity can be
taken by a full time executive. A passive investment of
savings "may be defined as one the making of which does
not require or entitle the investor to participate in
decision making with respect to operations of the entity
in which investment is made"1 l95) . An outside director
is prohibited only from taking an opportunity by the use
of the company's resources including its
information' 1961 . Strict rules or categorical rules
should be applied to public companies due to the
convenient managerial compensation plans and their
widely scattered shareholders. And shareholders of
public companies are more like the beneficiaries of
trusts who effectively delegate full decision making
power over operating matters to directors'197' . In
addition, strict rules are more convenient to govern
cases which involve public companies because the duties
of those companies' directors, normally, require them to
devote most of their time to further their companies'
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interests. Furthermore public companies' business is
wide enough to embrace any new opportunity* 198) . In
relation to private companies, shareholders have the
greater ability to select managers and to discuss or
negotiate special arrangements with each other. The
fields of the private companies' business are not wide
enough to absorb a wide range of new opportunities.
Because of the those facts and because of the frequent
inadequacy of compensation plans, private companies, it
has been suggested* 139) f should be free to reconcile
this problem between the parties as a matter of
con tract.
A liberal approach, has been suggested by Wo 1fson* 200' ,
indicating that there is no need to find any rule to
govern the issue of corporate opportunity. Wrongdoers
wi11 be identified in the market and wi11 be removed by
the shareholders. They will be identified in the market
because the value of their companies' shares will be
adversely affected by their improper acts.
4.3.2.5. Injury to the company and unjust enrichment.
In both Parker v. Mckenna120' ' and Regal (Hastings) v.
Gu 1 1 iver* 20 2 ) t the court held that injury to the
principal is irrelevant to the question of liability for
a breach of directors' fiduciary duties* 2 0 3 ' . However,
it is argued* 2 0 4 ' that the objects of the inflexible
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rules are twofold: (1) The prevention of unjust
enrichment; and (2) the prevention of the mere
possibility of conflict of interests. It is justifiable
to apply the rigid rules in cases where the defender had
acted dishonestly even if he has not enriched himself at
the expense of his company. But it is not easy to
justify such an application in cases where the defender
has acted in good faith and honestly in the best
interest of the company, and has not been enriched at
its expense. Applying the rigid rules in such a case
will result in a "rigorous equity"'205' , and a variance
between the two objects of the fair dealing rules will
exis t * 2 o 6 ) .
Indeed, the question of injury to the principal and the
issue of unjust enrichment have been given some regard
by many judges and commentators. Professor Gower has
described the plaintiffs' action in the Rega 1 case as
"unmeritorious"* 207) t because the purchasers of Regal
company who agreed to pay the price of the shares had
gained an "undeserved windfa 1 1 " <202) by recovering the
profit made by the former directors'209'.
The minority of the Appellate division in Abbey G1 en
Property Corp. v. Stumborg' 2 10) Id that the new
shareholders would be unjustly enriched by receipt of a
benefit for which they had not bargained' 2111 . They
were not shareholders at the time the breach occurred,
so, they sustained no loss.
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Lord Upjohn in tlie Ph i yps case held that there Was lio
"real sensible possibility" of conflict because of the
fact that the defendants had not been unjustly enriched
at the expense of the trust'2121 . Jones'213' argues
that the fiduciary duty of the defendant in the Ph i pps
case'21" , had ended when they failed to persuade the
shareholders to appoint one of them a director in the
company. Thus, the decision in that case can be
justified only on the ground that the policy of the
cases required that both Mr. Boardman and Mr. Phi pps
(the defendants) should be made accountable. This
policy, Jones argues, is questionable for two reasons:
( 1 ) T evnp tat ion is always available in trust cases. So,
why should not the defendant be given a chance to prove
that they resisted temptation?; and (2) there is a
strong public interest in finding trustees, and it is in
the interest of the public to be fair with them' 2151 .
Lord Brougham in Hami1t on v , Wrigh t'216' pointed out
that injury to the trust is the basis of the rule , and
the act must have at least a tendency to do so'2111. In
Hey ting v. Dupont' 2131 , the court held that the
defendants were not accountable. One of the grounds on
which the decision was based was that the company had
sustained no loss.
It is plain from the above discussion that there is a
real tendency to relax the inflexible rules by requiring
a proof that the company had suffered loss. It would
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seem that there is a desire to deny recovery in cases
where the pursuer might gain an unexpected windfal1.
4 . 3.2.G. Financial inability of the company
In Hey ting v. Dupont'2191 , the company was unable to
exploit a specific opportunity due to lack of funds.
Each one of the two directors formed a company to
exploit that opportunity. Cross-actions were brought by
the two directors in their capacity as shareholders on
behalf of the company to restrain each other from
exploiting that opportunity. The court held that no
director can be sued by the company for the profit made
as a result of exploiting the business opportunity. One
of the reasons for such a holding was that the company
was financially unable to exploit the offered
opportunity.
It is clear that the decision in that case is
inconsistent with that in the RegaI case*220) . it
represents a plain deviation from the policy of applying
the fair dealing rules rigidly.
It has been argued*221) that financial inability should
not be accepted as a defe n ce against allegations of
breach of fiduciary duty because a director can obtain a
loan for the company to enable it to finance the offered
opportunity. Against this argument it can be said that
obtaining a loan for the company may put it in future
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troubles. A company may not be able to repay that loan
and the due interest in future. So, such a loan may
lead the company to insolvency. Moreover, a director
may expose himself to liability if he obtains a loan for
the company in circumstances in which the company is
unable to repay that loan. In cases where the
constitution of the company imposes a debt limit, a
director will be liable to compensate the company for
any loss suffered if he exceeds or violates that limit.
In addition it is not always easy for a director to
obtain loans for his company. He may not find a lender
in cases where the company is in failing circumstances.
And directors are under no duty to lend money to their
companies in order to enable those companies to exploit
new opportunities.
An argument, which says that it is easy for directors to
claim the appearance of their companies' financial
inability, seems unsatisfactory. It is agreed* 222 > that
it is not satisfactory because the courts, in many
cases* 223) t have accepted the bona fide rejection of an
opportunity as a defence despite the fact that it is
easy for directors to induce the rejection by deciding
that a specific opportunity is not sound or appropriate.
Professor Beck* 224 )argues that the best approach for the
courts to take is to require a director to show that he
took every reasonable step to enable the company to take
the opportunity including a showing of reasonable effort
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to raise the necessary funds . If a director proved
those facts he should be allowed to exploit the
opportunity himself. Rivers(225' argues, and it is
submitted that this is the best approach, that if
financial inability is clearly established, it should be
accepted as a defence in the hands of directors. This
approach seems to be a reasonable and a practicable
one< 2 26 ) .
4.3.2.7. Third party's unwillingness to deal with the
company
A further indication of the judicial tendency to relax
the fair dealing rules is the acceptance of the refusal
of the third party or his unwillingness to deal with the
company as a defence.
It is argued*227) that there was a critical difference
be tween the Rega I case' 2 2 3 ) and the Peso case' 2 2 9 ) on
the one hand and the Coo 1ey case' 2 3 0 ) on the other hand.
That difference lies in the fact that in the former two
cases the plaintiff company was the party in the
position to accept or to refuse the available
opportunity. In the Coo 1ey case'23 1 ) the third party
was the one who was in the position to accept or to
refuse the dealing with the plaintiff company. This
difference, it is argued, should be taken into account
by the court. Rajak' 2 3 2 ) is inclined to say that the
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unwi11ingness of the third party to deal with the
company might be capable of rebutting the presumption
that there is a fiduciary relationship between the
defender and the pursuer. He also said that the
decision in Keech v. St a n f ord* 2 3 3 ) f in which the court
refused to accept the lessor's refusal to deal with the
infant as a defence, is questionable because that
decision does not form an "absolute" or an "inflexible"
rule(23<l . However, since the defendant, in the Coo 1ey
case* 2 3 5 ) t was acting in bad faith, Rajak concluded that
the court's decision has been correct 1y given. The
reason is that it is not reasonable to allow Mr. Coo ley
to enjoy the fruit of his dishonesty.
It would seem that if the refusal of the third party or
his unwi 1 1 ingness to deal with the company has been
clearly proven and that the defender has played no role
in inducing unwillingness, the offered opportunity will
have ceased to be a corporate one. Consequently, it
should be open to be exploited by a director. By
allowing a director to take an opportunity under those
conditions, the society as a whole will get the benefit
since such an opportunity will not go unexploited. In
addition, the company will lose nothing* 2 36 ) .
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v. Bulfield, C19883 B.C.L.C 104 at p.l20 , per
Vinelott J.. According to this analysis there is no
contradiction between S.310 CA 1985 and Art.85 of
Table A.
146) [19863 1 W.L.R. 985.
147) Instone argues that the Greene Committee suggested
the predecessor of S.310, i.e, S.205 (CA 1948), to
prevent only indemnification of officers out of
their companies' funds: Ins tone R. "The
Modification of Directors Duties— Letter to Editor"
[19813 J.B.L. 171. This argument, in one's opinion
is unacceptable since it ignores the words "for
exempting" which are included in S.310.
14 8) "[W 3 h en a provision is a statute 'sub j e c t to'
another provision requiring something to be done,
the first provision is conditional upon the
provision referred to" (Massey - Harris Co. v.
S trasburg, [19413 4 D.L.R. 620 at p.622 per
Macdona 1 d J. A. , referred to by Saunders J. Words
and Phrases Legally Defined, 3rd ed, vol (4): R-Z
[ 19903, at p.244) . "Subject to" means "Liable,
subordinate, subservient, inferior, obedient to;
governed or affected by; provided that; provided;
answerable for" (Homa n v. Emp1oyers Reinsurance
Corp., 345 MO. 650~ 136 S.W. 2d 289, 302^ referred
to by Black H. Black's Law Diction a r y , 5th ed,
[ 1 979 3 .
149) Art. 85(b) of Table A.
150) See Pennington R. Directors' Personal Liabi1ity,
[ 19873 .
151) It is to be noted that if the company's articles do
not include an exclusion clause similar to that in
Art. 85, the company has the right, at the common
law, to rescind the contract with the director
whether that contract is fair or unfair one. This
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right has been given to the company to avoid any
possibility of conflict of interest and duty: see
Aberdeen Rly. Co. v. Blaikie Bros [18541 1 Macq,
461 (HL K
152) However, it seems that embodying the phrase
"provided that he has disclosed to the directors
the nature and the extent of any material interest
of his" in Art.85, is supererogatory because this
condition is included in S.317 CA 1985: and that
section is an obligatory one, i.e, it cannot be
abrogated by a company's articles of association.
153) S.137 CA 1989.
154) For more details see Turnbull and Edwards,
"Companies Act 1989: Directors' and Officers'
Liability Insurance" [1990] 134 S.J. 768.
155) Gore-Browne On Companies, 44th ed, [1986], para.
2 1.5; See" Re J. "Frank 1 in & Son Ltd. [ 1937] 2 All
E.R. 43.
156) Customs & Excise Commissioners v. Hedon Alpha Ltd
n987T~2 wTL.R. 79~i (CA) .
157) Re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd. [1939] 5
B . C . C . 39$T
15 8) Guiliness p 1 c v. Saunders [1990] All E.R. 653 (HL).
15 9 > Re ClaFidge's Pa t en t~ Aspha 1 t e Co. Ltd. [19 2 1] 1 Ch.
543; see also Re Duomatic Ltd. [1969] 2 Ch. 365.
160) [1985] 3 All e7r7~ 3 5 1.
161) Ibid at p.372.
162) [1967] 2 A.C. 47.
163) Cf . Robinson v. Pett, [ 1734], 3 P. Wins. 249; 24
E.R. 1049 (L.C) where Lord Talbot L.C refused to
allow an all owan ce to the defendant for the work
done by him in favour of the trust estate.
164) [196712 A.C. 47.
165) [ 1854] 1 Macq 461 at pp.471-472.
166) [1967] 2 A.C. 47 at p.124.
167) Cf. Keech v. Stanford, [1726], Se1. Cas. T. King
61; Rob i son v. Pett, [ 1734], 3P. Wms. 249 and
Aberdeen Rly. Co. v. Blaikie Bros, [ 18541 1 Macq
461, in which the mere possibility of conflict was
held to be enough to make the defendants
accountable for the profit made.
168) See for examp1e Rega1 (Has tings) v. Gu1 1iv e r,
[19761 2 A.C. 134; Phipps v. Boa rdman, [ 19 6 7 1 2
A.C. 47.
169) [19681 Ch. 353, at p.398.
170) [18031 8 Ves. Jun 337 at p.345.
171) [19671 2 A.C. 134.
172) [19671 2 A.C. 134, see per Lord Russell at p.144;
Lord Macmi 1 1 an at p. 151; and per Lord Porter at
p.158.
173) [19671 2 A.C. 47.
174) [19671 2 A.C. 47, see per Lord Cohen at p.104; Lord
Hudson at p. 112; and per Lord Gues t at p. 115.
175) [ 19721 2 All E.R. 162.
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176) [1972] 2 All E.R. 162 at p.176. Dr. Prentice
argues that even if Coo 1ey was acting in good
faith, he would be liable to account for the
benefit that he gained because the question of bona
f i des does have no bearing on the existence of the
breach of duty. However, the presence or the
absence of good faith may affect the form of relief
but does not move the existence of the breach of
duty: see Prentice D. "Directors' Fiduciary Duties,
the Corporate Opportunity Doctrine" [1972] 50 Can.
Bar. Rev., 623 at p.636.
177) [1916] 1 A.C. 554 (P.C).
178) [1967] 2 A.C. 47.
179) [1985] 3 All E.R. 351.
180) [1973] 40 D.L.R. (3d) 371 (Supreme Court of Canada
1972 ) .
181) [1985] B.C.L.C. 460; see also Balston v. Headline
Fi_l ters [ 1990] F.S.R. 385.
182) [ 19 73 ] 40 D.L.R. (3d) 371 (Supreme Court of Canada
1972 ) .
183) [1973] 40 D.L.R. (3d) 371 at pp. 382-3.
184) [ 1967] 2 A.C. 47.
185 ) [ 1972 ] 2 All E.R. 162.
186) [1973] 40 D.L.R. (3d) 371 at p.384.
187) Jones argues that unless fiduciaries have acted in
bad faith or have been unjustly enriched they
should not be made liable to account for the profit
made by them: Jones G. "Unjust Enrichment and the
Fiduciary's Duty of Loyalty" [1968] L.Q.R. 472.
188) Sealy L. Cases and Materials in Company Law, 4th
ed, [ 1989 ] .
189) [1966] 58 D.L.R. (2d) 117. This case represents a
clear departure from the principle laid down in the
Rega 1 case [ 1967] 2 A.C. 134.
190) Cartwright J. in the Peso case, ibid, referred to
Lord Greene's hypothesis in the Rega1 case [1967] 2
A.C. 134 in the Court of Appal , and said that the
facts of the Peso case are identical with those of
the hypothetical case given by Lord Greene. Lord
Greene M.R said that it is far beyond a director's
or an agent's duty to hold him liable to account if
he exploits an opportunity after it has been
considered and bona fide rejected by its board of
directors. So, Cartwright J. held that the
defendants in the Pe so case were not liable to
account for the profit made.
19 1) [ 1967] 2 A.C. 134.
192) See per Bu11 J. in the Peso case [1966] 58 D.L.R.
(2d) 117. It is said that there was a difference
between the Rega1 case and the Peso case which had
led to a different judgment in the latter. The
difference is that the company in the Peso case was
continuously receiving offers of properties. Once
on e of those offers rejected the directors could
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take it to thetnse Ives. 11*1 the Rega 1 case the
offered opportunity was wanted, but could not be
obtained by the plaintiff due to lack of funds.
Similarly, in Keech v. Stanford CLC 1726] Sel. Cas.
T. King. 61, 25 E.R 223, 2 Eq Ab. 741, 22 E.R 629,
the infant could not obtain the lease due to the
lessor's refusal to renew it to him: See Beck S.
"The Saga of Peso Silver Mines: Corporate
Opportunity Reconsidered" [19713 49 Can . Bar . Rev
80. However, the board of directors in the Peso
case decided that the company had enough land.
This was one of the reasons which had led the board
of directors to reject the offered opportunity on
behalf of the company. So, it could be argued that
that fact in itself distinguishes the Peso case
from the RegaI case.
193) [19783 52~A.L.J.R. 399 (PC).
194) Brudney V. and Clark R. "A New Look at Corporate
Opportunities" [1980-19813 94 Harv. L. Rev. 997.
195) See Clark R. Co r_porate Law [19863 at p.251.
196) See Clark R. Corporate Law [19863 at p.251.
197) Brudney V. and Clark R. "A New Look at Corporate
Opportunities" [1980-19813 94 Harv. L. Rev. 997 at
pp.1002-1003.
198) Ibid at pp.1033-1004.
199) Ibid; see also Clark R. Corporate Law [ 1986 3 .
Farrar says that this approach is the most
appropriate one to solve the problem of corporate
opportunity: F a b_r a r_' ?!_ Q°l'iP_a,iy Law, 2d ed, [ 1988 3 at
p.363.
200) [19803 34 Miami. L. Rev. 959, referred to by
Farrar's Company Law, ibid.
201) [18743 L.R. 10 Ch. App. 97.
202) [19673 2 A.C. 134.
203) Parker v. Mckenna [18743 L.R 10 Ch. App. 97,
particularly see the Lord Chancellor at p. 118 and
James L.J at pp.124—125; in the Rega1 case see Lord
Russell at p. 144; see also Keech v . S tanf ord [ LC
17263 Sel. Cas. T. K. 61, 25 E.R. 223, 2 Eq Ab 741,
22 E.R 629; the Canadian Aero Services Ltd v.
O'Ma I ley [ 1973 3 40 D.L.R. (3d) 371.
204) Jones G. "Unjust Enrichment and the Fiduciary's
Duty of Loyalty" [19683 L.Q.R. 472.
205) Jones G. "Unjust Enrichment and the Fiduciary's
Duty of Loyalty" [19683 L.Q.R. 472 at p.487.
206) However, Jones, ibid, noted that in some cases, for
ploicy reasons, the court may find it absolutely
necessary to hold a fiduciary liable to account
even if he lias acted in good faith and lias not been
enriched at the expense of his company. Public
po 1 icy may require the removal of al 1 temptation
and the extinguishment of all possibility of
profit. But such a decision should be taken after
giving careful regard to the facts of the case, the
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relevant policy consideration, the nature of the
fiduciary's responsibilities and whether holding
the honest man 1 iable wi1 1 teach the others a good
lesson or not.
207) Gower L. Principles of Modern Company Law, 4th ed
[ 1 979 J a t~ p . 593 .
208) Gower L. Principles of Modern Company Law, 4th ed
C 1979 ] .
209) See per Lord Porter in the Regal case [1967] 2 A.C.
134 at p. 157, where he was disturbed by the fact
that allowing recovery in such a case will result
in a windfall gain for the new shareholders. But
his Lordship concluded that despite the fact that
the new shareholders obtained an unexpected
windfall "[t]he company and its shareholders are
separate entities . . . [and! the principle that a
person occupying a fiduciary relationship shall not
make a profit by reason thereof is of such vital
importance that the possible consequence in the
present case is in fact as it is in 1 aw an
immateria1 consideration".
210) [1978] 85 D.L.R. (3d) 35.
211) See the dissenting judgment of McDermid J.A in
Abbey Glen Property Corp. v. Stumborg , [1978] 85
dTTT. R. (3d) 35 .
2 12) Phipps v. Boardman [1967] 2 A.C. 47 at p. 124; see
also Jones G. "Unjust Enrichment and the
Fiduciary's Duty of Loyalty" [1968] L.Q.R. 472 at
p.487.
213) Ibid.
214) C19671 2 A.C. 47.
215) Russel1 N. and Bernard S. "Breach of Trust— Recent
Development" C 1944-1945] New York L. R. 165 at
p. 183; see also per Lord Hardwi eke in Kn i gh t v.
Earl of Plymouth HI 747] 1 Dick 120 at pp. 126-127.
His Lordship said that accepting a trust office is
a great and hard job , and we sha 1 1 not add new
hazards to that hardship; referred to by Jones G.
"Unjust Enrichment and the Fiduciary's Duty of
Loyalty" [1968] L.Q.R. 472.
216) C1842] 9 C 1, and F 111 at p.124, 8 E.R. 357.
217) Those remarks has been referred to by Lord Guest in
the Phipps case C 1 967] 2 A.C. 47 at p. 115.
218) C 19 6 4 ] 1 W.L.R. 843; [ 1964] 2 All E.R. 273.
219) [1954] 1 W.L.R. 843; [1964] 2 All E.R. 273, in that
case each one of the two shareholders of the
company formed his own company to exploit the
opportunity which the original company failed to
exploit due to lack of funds. Cross— actions were
brought by the two shareholders (directors) on
behalf of the company to restrain each other from
exploiting that opportunity.
220) [ 1967] 2 A.C. 134 .
221) Clark R. Corpora t e Law [1986].
222) Rivers E. "Financial Inability as a Defence under
the Corporate Opportunity Doctrine" [1951] 29 Ky.
L. J. 229.
223) See for example Peso Silver Mines Ltd v. Cropper
[1966] S.C.R 673, 53 D.L.R. (2d) 1.
224) Beck S. "The Saga of Peso Silver Mines: Corporate
Opportunity Reconsidered" [1971] 49 Can. Bar. Rev
30 .
225) Rivers E. "Financial Inability as a Defence under
the Corporate Opportunity Doctrine" [1951] 29 Ky.
L. J. 229.
226) Rivers said that the basis of the inflexible rules
is to be found in the unfairness of a fiduciary
exploiting an opportunity or taking an advantage
when the interest of his company justly calls for
protection. Thus, any rule adopted should achieve
two objects: (1) It should encourage legitimate
business transactions; and (2) it should produce
justice to all parties. Those two objects will not
be violated by allowing a director to exploit the
opportunity which his company is financially unable
to exploit: Rivers E. "Financial Inability as a
Defence under the Corporate Opportunity Doctrine"
[1951] 29 Ky. L. J. 229.
227) Rajak H. "Fiduciary Duty of a Managing Director"
[1972] 35 M.L.R. 655.
223) [1967] 2 A.C. 134.
229) [1966] 58 D.L.R. (2d) 117.
230 ) C 1 972 ] 2 All E.R. 162.
231 ) [ 1972] 2 A1 1 E.R. 162.
232) Rajak H. "Fiduciary Duty of a Managing Director"
[1972] 35 M.L.R. 655.
233) [LC 1726] Se1. Cas. T. King. 61, 25 E.R. 223, 2 Eq
Ab. 741, 22 E.R. 629.
234) Rajak H. "Fiduciary Duty of a Managing Director"
[ 1972] 35 M. L. R. 655. Rajak said that the rule in
Keech v. Stanford must bow to the consent of the
company. Rajak says that the relationship between
Coo ley and his company was an employee-employer one
because Coo 1ey was the managing director of the
company. Such a relationship should be governed by
a contract. That is, Cooley's liability should be
made on a contractual basis: see B o u1 ting v.
A.C.T.T. [1963] 2 Q.B. 606 , particularly see Lord
Upjohn*s judgment, for the proposition that a
managing director may be an employee of the company
and the relationship between him and the company is
an emp1oyee-emp1 oyer one.
If the court adopted the view that the relationship
between Coo 1 ey arid the company is one of employee—
emp1 oyer, liability wouId not be attached to Cooley.
Cooley would not be liable, Rajak said, because ,
assuming that the information is a property, the
circumstances in which the information about the
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contract with the Gas Board coupled with the Gas
Board's refusal to deal with the plaintiff company,
could hardly be said to confer on the information
the status of being the plaintiff's property. In
addition the argument adduced by the plaintiff which
provided that the defendant had used the company's
car and its time was dismissed by the learned judge
as "fiddling". Rajak argues that, the company's
property and time in the Coo 1ey case is irrelevant.
The defendant was able to gain the contract with the
Gas Board even if he did not use the company's car
and time. The situation in the Coo I ey case is
different from that in Reading v. Attorney-General
C 19 5 1 3 A.C. 507, in which the defendant used his
mi 1itary uniform in order to obtain the gain. So,
the use of the property of the employer (His
Majesty's Army) in that case, was relevant to the
question of liability and thus, liability was
imposed on the defendant to account for the bribe
that he obtained.
235) C 1972] 2 All E.R. 162.
236) However, in respect of the Coo 1ey case, one sees
that the defendant was under a specific duty which
was to obtain the contract with the Gas Board to
the plaintiff company. So, he should be deprived
from taking that contract for his own benefit.
-235-
CHAPTER 5
DIRECTORS' DUTY OF HONESTY AND GOOD FAITH
5.1. Introduction
The primary fiduciary duty of a company director is that
of honesty and good faith in the exercise of the powers
vested in him by the company's constitution. Those
powers must be exercised only for the purposes for which
they are conferred. Thus, a director may not use his
power to achieve any collateral, improper or
unauthorised purpose1l> .
In this context, a distinction could be made between
actions which constitute an abuse of power and those
which are u 1 t r a vires the director. A director may be
said to have abused his powers if he has exercised those
powers for purposes other than those for which they were
conferred, i.e, for improper purposes. But a
director's act is ultra vires if he has usurped a power
which he never had* 2) . That is, where he exercises a
power not given to him by the company's articles of
association or its memorandum. The above two actions
can be tested objectively because they are concerned
with objective ma tters. Thai is, the court will look at
the scope of the directos 1 powers and the scope of the
purposes for which those powers are conferred. If it
found that the directors were acting beyond the scope of
their powers, it would hold that their actions were
ultra vires - If it found that they were acting beyond
the scope of the purposes for which their powers were
conferred, it would hold that they had abused their
powers. So, the intention of the directors or their
motives has no bearing on the question of the directors'
duty not to abuse their powers or their duty not to
exceed their powers. It is, however, sbrnitted that it
is not easy at all for the courts to define in advace
the scope of the proper purposes. This issue wi 1 1 be
examined later.
The rule that requires a director to act
bona fide in the best interests of the company is
concerned with the intention of the director. That is,
this rule is concerned with what is going on in the
d i r e c t o r s1 minds, i .e, with their motives.
A director's duty to exercise his powers for proper
purposes has sometimes been dealt with as an alternative
to the duty to act in good faith, while at other times
it has been regarded as something separate from it(3) .
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5.2. Director's Duty to Act Bona Fide in the Interest of
the Company.
In Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd.(*> , Lord Greene MR. laid down
the principle that directors are bound to exercise the
powers conferred upon them
"bona fide in what they consider - not what a
court may consider — is in the interests of
the company and not for any col lateral
purpose".
It is worthwhile considering the facts of that important
case. Article 10 of the company's articles of
association provided that: "The directors may at any
time in their absolute and uncontrolled discretion
refuse to register any transfer of shares". The issued
capital of that company consisted of 8002 ordinary
shares. There were only two shareholders, who were also
the directors of the company. Each of the two
shareholders held 4001 shares. After the death of one
of the shareholders/ directors, his son, as his
executor, applied to have the testator's shares
registered in his name. The other shareholder/ director
refused to register all the testator's shares in t h e
son's name. But he offered to register 2001 shares in
the name of the executor and to buy 2000 at a fixed
price. The executor applied to the court to have all of
his father's shares registered in his name. Lord Greene
MR said that article 10 gave the directors an absolute
O Q— COO
power to refuse to register any transfer of shares: a
point which was clear from the wording of article 10
itself. And apart from the implicit limitation, which
is imposed by law, that a fiduciary power must be
exercised bona fide in the interest of the company,
there is nothing in "principle or in authority" to
impose a limitation on the directors' power in the
present case. Thus, his Lordship found that the
defendant had acted bona fide in the interest of the
company and that there was nothing to show that this
power had been exercised in a contrary manner. The
plaintiff claimed that the defendant had not exercised
his power, under article 10 not bona fide in the
interest of the company but for a collateral purpose;
which was to preserve his dominating position in the
company. Lord Greene MR said that in the absence of
evidence which might support this claim, the affidavit
evidence was unsatisfactory evidence of the motives of
directors in exercising their powers. Accordingly he
dismissed the plaintiff's appeal. The principle
articulated by Lord Greene MR was described by Berger J.
in Teck Corporation Ltd. v. Millar's* as follows:
The law says that the directors of a company,
in exercising their powers, must act bona fide
in what they consider to be the best interest
of the company . . . But their purpose must be
one countenanced by the law. They cannot




In Re W & M Roith Ltd.^7) t the director, who had no
pension arrangement with the company, fel 1 ill. The
company altered its memorandum specifically in order to
take power to pay a widow's pension. Ultimately, the
director entered into a service agreement with it in
order to provide a generous pension for his widow in the
event of his death. The court found that the director
had not entered the agreement bona fide in the interests
of the company. So, he was in breach of a director's
fiduciary duty. The court, however, held that the
agreement was uI t r a vires and, consequently, not binding
on the company. In Re We I fab Engineers18 1 , it was held
that the directors who sold the company as a going
concern, when it was in financial difficulties, would
not be in breach of their fiduciary duties if they
failed to gain a higher price by breaking up the
business. They were not in breach of their duties
because they were acting honestly and in good faith.
The principle laid down by Lord Greene MR. consists of
several factors which give rise to several questions
which need to be answered. First, how to test 'bona
fides'?. Second, what is the meaning of the phrase 'in
the interests of the company'?. Third, what is the
meaning of the words 'collateral purpose'?.
-240-
5.2.1. Tests of bona fides
i) The sub j e e tive t est.
It is clear from the wording of Lord Greene MR. in Re
Smith & Fawcett Ltd. < 9 > , that the adopted test is a
subjective one<'0'. So, if the directors exercised a
specific power, under a belief that this act was in the
best interests of the company, the court would not
consider their act as a breach of duty merely because,
in its own opinion, this particular act was not in the
interests of the company' 1 ' > .
The court will not exercise a supervisory role over
directors' decisions. Lord Wilberforce said in Howa r d
Smith Ltd. v. Ampo1 Petroleum L t d' 1 2) ;
There is no appeal on merits from management
decisions to courts of law: nor will courts of
law assume to act as a kind of supervisory
board over decisions within the powers of
management honestly arrived at.
Similarly, Latham CJ. said in Richard Brady Franks Ltd.
v. Price'i3) : "it is not for a court to determine
whether or not the action of the directors was wise"
The onus of proving subjective bad faith is on the
pursuer. So, if the articles failed to define the scope
of the directors' discretion in exercising their powers,
it will be very difficult for the plaintiff to prove
ma 1 a fides on the part of the directors'14*. Subject to
the articles of association , the court will insist that
it is the directors themselves (and not some delegate),
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who should decide how the powers conferred upon them are
best used in the best interests of the company'. The
subjective test deals with the intentions a nd t h e
motives of the directors. That is, it deals with what
is going on in the minds of the directors. It is
submitted that, because the intentions and the motives
of the directors exist deep inside them as human beings,
they cannot be examined easily. Because of the
difficulty in examining the intentions and the motives,
directors may escape liability despite their mala fides.
Consequently, the effectiveness of the rule, which
imposes (on directors) a duty to act bona fide in the
best interests of the company may be reduced'16).
ii) The objective test.
Despite the subjective nature of the issue of bona
fides , the court can still interfere if no r e a s onable
director could possibly have decided that a particular
exercise of power was in the best interests of the
company'1 7 ) . In such a case the court is applying an
objective test'l5), i.e, the reasonableness test. But
one believes that applying an objective test to the
directors' duty of good faith is not an easy task. The
reason is that directorship is not a profession' 19 ' . It
does not require the one who wants to undertake the
functions of a director to obtain an advanced education
or a special training. A director might be a lawyer, an
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architect, or a farmer . . . etc. So, who is the
reasonable director ? . Is he the reasonable lawyer, or
the reasonable architect or the reasonable farmer
etc ? .
It is submitted, however, that the main test of
directors' bona fides is the subjective test. The
reason is that the issue of bona fides is, as mentioned
above, of a subjective nature which cannot be, usually,
tested objectively. The role of the objective test in
this field is a complementary one. That is , the
objective test operates only in cases where the
directors' act is as odd as to justify its application.
In other words, in cases where no reasonable director
could possibly have considered the act done as in the
best interests of the company.
iii) Th e test of fairness.
Where there are different classes of shareholders, the
courts have said that it is not easy to apply the test
of acting in the interests of the company. Bona fides
in such a case can be tested by examining whether the
directors have acted with equal fairness between the
competing interests of the different classes of
shareholders. In the Australian case Mills v.
Mil Is'2 o > , the defendant director was an ordinary
shareholder in the company. He procured a resolution of
the board under which accumulated profits were
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distributed among the shareholders by way of fully—paid
bonus shares. As a result, the ordinary shareholders
gained enhanced voting powers against the existing
preference shareholders. The good faith of the board
was not challenged in this case, but questions were
raised about the position of the director who gained
personal ly from the transaction. The court held that
the director was not in breach of his fiduciary duties.
Latham CJ. said' 21 ' :
Where there are preference arid ordinary shares
a particular decision may be of such a
character that it must necessarily affect
adversely the interests of one class of
shareholders and benefit the interests of
another class. In such a case it is difficult
to apply the test of acting in the interests
of the company. The question which arises is
sometimes not the question of the interests of
the company at al1, but a question of what is
fair as between different classes of
shareholders. . . . A director who holds one
or both classes of such shares is not, in my
opinion, required by the law to live in an
unrealistic region of detached altruism and to
act in a vague mood of ideal abstraction from
obvious facts which must be present to the
mind of any honest and intelligent man when he
exercises his powers as a director.
If directors are acting bona fide in the interests of
the company, they "are not chargeable with do 1 us ma 1 us
or breach of trust merely because in promoting the
interest of the company they were also promoting their
own"'22).
In sum, as between different classes of shareho1ders, a
director must act fairly, while towards the company a
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director must act bona fide in the interests of the
company.
5.2.2. The phrase: "in the interests of the company".
It would seem that this phrase is not a clear one. That
is, it may not have the same meaning in al1 cases which
deal with directors' duties. However, it should be
emphasised that the general rule is that fiduciary
duties of a company's director are owed to the company
alone and not to any other person or persons. But, the
law has recognised some exceptions to that rule. The
first exception is that a director may, in some
situations, owe fiduciary duties to shareholders as
individual s< 23 > . A director must have regard to the
interest of the company's employees. This is clear from
the wording of S.309 CA 1985. 3.309(1) provides:
The matters to which the directors of a
company are to have regard in the performance
of their functions include the interests of
the company's employees in general , as we 1 1 as
the interests of its members.
However, it would seem that the director's duty to the
company will prevail in case of conflict with his duty
to the company's employees. That is because the
director's duty is owed to the company and to the
company alone. On the other hand, it would seem that
S.309(1) is unable to provide an effective statutory
rule to protect the interests of the company's
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employees. The reason is that S.309(E) emphasises the
general rule that a director's duty is owed to the
company alone. S.309(2) provides:
Accordingly, the duty imposed by this section
on the directors of a company is owed by them
to the company (and the company alone) and is
enforceable in the same way as any other
fiduciary duty owed to a company by its
directors.
Because the directors' duty, imposed by S.309(1), is
owed to the company, and a breach of that duty
consi tutes a wrong done to the company, the rule in
Foss v. HarbottIe(24)wjii come into play and the
enforcement of the directors' duty will be at the
discretion of the company. If the company, represented
by the ma jorit y shareholders, fails to proceed, a
shareholder, in general, will be unable to bring a
derivative action. A shareholder, however, can bring a
derivative action if he proves that the wrongdoers are:
(1) in control of the company and consequently, prevent
it from suing in its own name and, (2) that the
wrongdoers' act falls within the scope of the "fraud on
the minority" exception to the rule in Foss v
Harbott 1 e' 2 5 ) . An employee, of course, has no locus
standi to bring such an action.
Going back to the phrase "in the interests of the
company", this phrase is capable of bearing several
meanings. That is, it may refer to several th/'j^/3 or
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it can be interpreted in several ways. One sha 1 1
p r e s ent those interpretations in order to reac h a
satisfactory definition for that phrase.
i) The phrase in question may refer to the interests of
the corporate body as a separate entity. In
Cha r terbridge Corp. Lt d V. L1oyds Bank Ltd.<26) t it was
alleged that the legal charge given by Castleford Co. to
the defendant bank as a security for the due performance
of its obligations under a guarantee, was ultra vires,
because its directors had not bona fide intended to
further its interests. The argument that the directors
did not give separate consideration to the benefit of
Castleford Co. was rejected by Pennycuick J. as an
unduly narrow test because the directors' act might be
beneficial to the company. The judge also rejected the
argument, that it was sufficient that the directors of
Castleford Co. looked to the benefit of the group as a
whole, because the directors of a particular company
were not allowed to sacrifice the interests of that
company for the benefit of the group' 2 7 ) . Since each
company in the group is a separate entity it is very
likely that each company has separate creditors. The
proper approach, in the absence of actual distinct
consideration, the judge said,
must be whether an intel1igent and honest man
in the position of a director of the company
concerned, could, in the whole of the existing
circumstances, have reasonably believed that
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the transactions were for the benefit of the
company*28).
ii) The phrase "in the interest of the company" or "for
the benefit of the company as a whole"* 23 ' may refer to
the shareholders as a general body. In Greenhalgh v.
Arderne Cinemas Ltd.*30> , the company's articles gave
pre-emptive rights to existing members to buy the shares
of any member who wished to sel1. The managing director
procured the passing of a special resolution, allowing
him to sell to an outsider; which in effect negatived
the pre-emptive rights of the existing members. One of
the members sought a declaration that the resolution was
void as a fraud on the minority. The court refused to
give the declaration. Evershed MR. said that the
question in this case was whether the resolution had
been passed bona fide in the interest of the company as
a whole or not. He then gave a definition of the
phrase "in the interest of the company as a whole". He
said;
[It] does not mean the company as a commercial
entity, distinct from the corporators: it
means the corporators as a general body* 3l ) .
Defining the "interests of the company" by reference to
the interests of its members, is vJSGS-d - by S. 3 09( 1 )
CA 1985 which requires a director to consider the
interests of the company's members.
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iii) It is said that the phrase in question may refer
not only to the interests of the present members but
also to the interests of future members' 32 1 . In the
Savoy case' 3 3) , Counce1 for the company said that
directors "should balance a long—term [interests of the
company] against short—term interests of present
members". It has been said' 34 > that Megarry J. took a
similar view in Gaiman v. National Association for
Mental Health' 35) . I r, that case article 7 of the
articles of association of the Mental Health Association
provided that: "A member . . . sha11 forthwith cease to
be a member:— (B) if he is requested by resolution of
the counci 1 to resign . . . " . The counci 1 requested
the resignation of 302 members. Eight of them brought
an action against the council. One of the contentions
was that the council had been in breach of its fiduciary
duty to the association and, in not considering the
interests of the members who had been requested to
resign, had abused its powers. The court held that the
council had exercised its powers in the bona fide belief
that its action was in the association's best interests.
Megarry J. said that the power given by article 7 was a
direct power to deprive a member of his membership. The
purpose for which this power was given was to further
the interests of the association. The association is an
artificial legal entity, said Megarry J., and it is not
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easy to determine its interests without paying attention
to the interests of its members. Megarry J. added:
The interests of some particular section or
sections of the company cannot be equated with
those of the company, and I would accept the
interests of both present arid future members
of the company, as a whole, as being a helpful
expression of a human equiva1 ent< 36' .
It would seem that the judge accepted the view that the
company's interests includes the interests of the future
members. He described the interests of both the present
and the future members, as a whole, as being "a helpful
expression of a human equivalent" to the interest of the
association as an artificial legal entity.
In Dawson International pic, v. Coats Patens pled 37 ) t
Lord Cu1 1 en said that there appeared to be no reason why
S.309 CA 1985 should not be deemed to require a director
to have regard to the interests of both present and
future members.
With respect, I am not satisfied with the view that the
phrase "in the interest of the company as a whole"
requires directors to take into account the interests of
the future members of the company unless the interests
of the future members means the future interests of the
company as a going concern. The reasons are that: (1)
The general rule is that director's duties are owed to
the company and to the company alone. A director must
have regard to the interests of the company. The
interests of the company, it is submitted, include the
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interests of the current members<38> . Directors must
not ignore the interests of the present members and act
on the basis of what is in the interest of the company
as a corporate entity'39*. And , indeed, it is not easy
to determine what is in the best interests of the
company without paying due regard to the interests of
the current members of the company because a company is
an artificial legal entity*40* . This, however, does
not mean that directors must comply with the directions
of the shareholders or must act in accordance with the
desires of the shareholders as individuals' 41> . It would
seem that the word "members" includes only the present
members and cannot be expanded to embrace future
members. A future member of a company is unknown. He
"may be, almost literally, anyone in the world"'43).
Thus, his interests are unspecified. So, how can a
director take into account such interests?. Future
members, are members of the community as a whole, arid it
is submitted, that a director owes no fiduciary duty to
further the interests of the community. (2) The view
that a director must have regard to the interests of the
company's future members is, it is agreed'43* , incapable
of applying in the case of non-profit-making companies.
The reason is that, it is submitted, the interests of
the future members means and should only mean the
interests of the company as a going concern. In the
case of profit—making companies the interests of the
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current members, as investors, coincides, in fact, with
the long—term interests of the company. But in the case
of a non-profit making company, both the present and the
future members have no financial interests. Thus, what
might be in the interests of the company might not be
the same in relation to the members. In other words,
the interests of the members is not always identical to
the interests of the company. Megarry J.'S decision in
the Gaiman case, however, went, directly, against this
view because the association in that case was a non¬
profit making one. The judge accepted that the
interests of the company includes the interests of both
the present and the future members. (3) A future
member, for example a potential investor, has no locus
standi to sue a director who fails to consider the
interests of the future members. He cannot bring a
derivative action on behalf of the company, nor can he
bring a personal action against the directors on the
ground that his personal rights have been infringed.
So, in the absence of statutory means to enforce the
directors' duty towards future members, it will be
futile to argue that companies' directors owe a duty to
consider the interests of future members. (4) The
subject of the Gaiman case' ^ ' was not the directors'
duty to consider the interests of future members. The
question in that case was whether the counci 1 had been
in breach of its fiduciary duty in not considering the
-252-
interests of the present members who had been requested
by the council to resign. So, the issue of the
interests of future members was irrelevant to the
substance of that case. It would seem that Megarry J.'s
remarks, in relation to that issue, were obiter. (5)
There are no decisions which support the view that a
company's interests include the interests of future
members. An analogy to auditors can be drawn in this
context. In Caparo Industries pic v. Dickman and
others' 45 > , the court held that, due to the lack of
proximity between the auditors and potential investors,
the former owed no duty of care to the latter. The
facts of Caparo case were simple. f\r\ auditor's report
on the company's accounts was inaccurate. In re 1iance
on the audited accounts, the plaintiffs, who were
shareholders in the company, made a successful take-over
bid for the company. They sustained loss. They alleged
that the auditors had been negligent in auditing the
accounts. The Majority of the Court of Appeal held that
the auditors owed a duty of care to the present
shareholders, due to the presence of both the
foreseeabi1ity and the proximity elements between the
auditors and the shareholders. But, it held that no
duty of care was owed by the auditors to potential
investors on the grounds that: (1) There was no
sufficient proximity between the two parties, and, (2)
it would not be just and reasonable to impose a duty on
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the auditor to non-shareholding investors. The court
gave this decision despite the fact that it was
reasonably foreseeable that potential investors might
rely on the auditor's report in considering whether and
how to deal in the company's shares. In the House of
Lords, it was held that in certifying a company's
accounts for the purpose of the Companies Act 1985, an
auditor owed no duty of care to a potential investor,
whether or not he was already a shareholder of the
company. The House of Lords held that foreseeabi1 i ty,
no matter how high, that a potential investor might rely
on the audited accounts did not suffice to found a duty
of care, since there was no sufficien t relationship of
proximity between an auditor and a potential
investor* < 6' . If the potential investor is an
identified person, the situation might be different. In
Morgan CruitJe v. Hi 1 1 Samuel Bank* 4 7 > , the pi ai n tiff,
who was an identified take—over bidder, alleged that the
directors, among others, were negligent when they gave
an inaccurate pre-bid financial statements and profit
forecast of their company and were aware that he (the
plaintiff) would rely on that forecast. fit the trail
the judge held that the directors owed no duty of care
to a known take-over bidder to ensure that the pre—bid
financial statements and profit forecast were accurate,
because these documents were prepared for the purpose
of advising the shareholders of the target company
whether to accept the bid and not for the guidance of
the bidder and, accordingly, there did not exist
sufficient proximity between the directors and the take¬
over bidder to give rise to a duty of care. The
plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeal held that if
the take-over bidder is an identified person and the
defendant directors intended him to rely on the pre-bid
financial sata tements and profit forecast for the
purpose of deciding whether to make an increased bid,
and the take—over bidder did so rely on those statements
and the profit forecast, a relationship of proximity
between the two parties wuold exist. This relationship
would be sufficient to give rise to a duty of care(<!) .
It would seem that the position of directors vis a vis
future members of the company, is similar to that of
auditors. So, the same rule should be applied to
directors. That is, directors owe no duties to future
members, and consequently, they are not required to
consider the interests of future members because of the
absence of a sufficient relationship of proximity
between directors and potential investors.
The interests of the shareholders or the members
include, of course, the interests of the directors if
they themselves are shareholders. So, the law does not
require directors to take into account the interests of
the shareholders and to ignore their own interests as
shareholders. This situation has been dealt with in the
Australian case Mills v. Mi I 1s(4 9 > .
In relation to the meaning of the phrase "in the
interests of the company as a whole", two questions
remain to be answered: (1) Does a director of a company,
which is a member of a group of companies, owe a duty to
consider the interests of the group ?. (2) Does the
phrase include the interests of the company's creditors,
consumers or even the interests of the community as a
who 1e ? .
As regards the first question, it is submitted that the
primary duty of a director is to consider the interests
of the company of which he is a director. In
Charterbridge Corpn. v. Lloyds Bank Ltd.<50), Pennycuick
J. remarked, obiter, that a director must not be led by
the interests of the group as a whole if this might harm
the interests of the company of which he is a director.
It would seem that, since each company in the group
might have separate creditors, this approach is a sound
one. That is, creditors of the subsidiary company might
not be themselves the creditors of the parent company.
Thus, sacrifying the interests of the subsidiary
company, for the benefit of the parent company, may harm
the interests of the former's creditors. However,
Pennycuick J. said that a director wi1 I not be in breach
of duty to his company if he considers the interests of
the group in a case in which such a consideration has no
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negative effect on the interests of his own company.
S i m i larly , in Ferganion Press Ltd. v. Maxwe 1 1 ' 5 ' > , the
same judge held that it was not the duty of the
directors of the subsidiary company to consider the
interests of the holding company at the expense of the
subsidiary. Th is decision, in fact, conf i rins the
general rule that a director's duty is owed to the
company and not to any section of the members' 52 ) .
In respect of the second question, it is agreed that a
director must pay regard to the interests of the
company's creditors1 53) . This view can be supported by
Pennycuick J. 's judgement in the Charterbridge case' 54) (
when he remarked, obi ter , that a director of the the
company, which is a member of a group of companies, must
not be guided by the interests of the group if this
might be detrimental to the interests of the company of
which he is a director, particularly where the company
has separate creditors'55' .
There are some writers who argue that directors' duties
must be expanded to embrace a duty to have regard to the
interests of society. This argument is based on the
ground that companies occupy a pre-eminent position in
the economy of the community and, consequently, they are
required to act for the public good'55> .
On the other hand, it is said'57> that the interests of
consumers and those of the community as a whole are
legally irrelevant. In the Savoy case. Sir Mi 1ner
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Hoi land, the inspector who was appointed by the Board of
Trade to investigate the affairs of the Savoy Hotel
Limited and the Berkeley Hotel Company Limited, stated
that the interests of the nation "would not seem to me
to form part of a true legal definition of the interests
of the company" <58) _ it lias also been said' 59) that t h e
notion of companies' social responsibilities has found
little favour with legislators anywhere in western
countries. Despite the fact that one is satisfied with
the view that no interests outside those of the current
members of the company and those of the creditors can be
legitimately considered by the directors, the directors
may find it in the interests of the company as a going
concern to have regard to the interests of the consumers
of the company's product and to those of the community
as a who 1e.
A company's articles may exonerate a director from his
duty not to place himself in a situation in which his
interests conflict with his duty to the company. A
clear exarnple is where the articles allow a director to
contract with his company. This exoneration does not
extend to the director's duty of good faith. That is, a
director wi 1 1 remain subject to the rule that he must
act in the best interests of the company' 60) . Ii_i
addition, a director who fails to exercise his powers
bona fide in the best interests of the company cannot
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plead the curiaeiit of the general meeting as a defence to
an action for breach of duty<61).
5.3. Directors' Duty To Exercise Their Powers For proper
Purposes
The exercise of power by a director, bona fide, in the
interests of the company, does not prevent the court
from intervening if that power is exercised for an
improper purpose. Thus, a director, in addition to his
duty to act b on a fide in the interests of the company,
must exercise his powers for the purposes for which
those powers are conferred. If it is found that the
powers are exercised for an improper purpose, the
transaction may be set aside; notwithstanding the
directors' honest belief that they were acting in the
interests of the company'6 2) .
5.3.1. One duty or two ?
The question which may arise in this context is whether
the director's duty to act for proper purposes
constitutes a distinct one from the duty to act bona
fide in the interests of the company?.
Buckley J. held in Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd(63) , that the
statement of Lord Greene MR in Re Smith St Fawcett
Ltd.<64) f quoted above, ilidicates that company's
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directors are under two duties: (1) The duty to act bona
fide in the interests of the company and, (3) the duty
to act for a proper purpose. So, in that case, Buckley
J. said that even if the directors acted in good faith
in what they considered the best interests of the
company, it was not permissible for them to issue shares
in order to defeat an attempt to secure control of the
company, or to remain in office.
To the contrary, Berger J. in Teck Corporation Ltd v.
Hi 1 1ar(6 51 , said that if the directors honestly believed
that they were acting in the interests of the company
and there were reasonable grounds for that belief, the
purpose for which they acted would not be improper.
Thus, Berger J. stressed that the only test against
which the directors' acts must be examined is the
subjective test'66'. This view, fortunately, has been
rejected by Lord Wilberforce in Howard Smith Ltd v.
Ampo 1 Petroleum Ltd*67) . His Lordship emphasised that
good faith is not enough and the purpose for which the
directors act must be objectively proper. It is
submitted that both the subjective and the objective
elements should be considered. That is, a director must
act in good faith and for the proper purpose. Paying
regard only to the subjective element may lead to an
undesired result. This result has been noted by PIowman
J. in Parke v. Daily News Ltd <6S). He said that bona
fides cannot be the sole test, otherwise you might have
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a mad person conducting the business of the company, and
giving away its money or property with both hands in a
perfectly bona fide but completely irrational manner.
On the other hand, consideration of only the objective
element requires one to ignore, completely, the business
judgment rule: a dangerous qualification of the
directors' discretion. And it is well known that
directors are aware of their companies' interests more
than any one else. Thus, a subjective element should
also be taken into account in dealing with directors'
performance of their duties and the exercise of their
powers. While it is not easy to apply an objective
test in relation to bona fides (because bona fides is of
a subjective nature) the objective nature of the proper
purpose requirement facilitates the application of the
objective test. And, in fact, due to the objective
nature of the proper purpose issue, the application of
the objective test would seem convenient.
5.3.2. The Proper Purpose Doctrine
It has already been mentioned that a director must
exercise his powers to achieve the purposes for which
those powers are conferred. If he exercises his power
for improper purpose (i.e, for purposes which are
outside the objects of his company as stated in the
company's memorandum or in its articles of association)
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the court may intervene. In Re Cameron's Coalbrook
Steam Coal, & Swansea & Lougher RIy. Co.<69) t Turner LJ.
saidi70):
in the exercise of the powers given to
them . . . Cthe directors] must, as I
conceive, keep within the proper limits.
Powers given to them for one purpose cannot,
in my opinion, be used by them for another and
different purpose. To permit such proceedings
on the part of directors of companies would be
to sanction not the use but the abuse of their
powers. It would be to give effect and
validity to an illegal exercise of a legal
power.
Again, a director is bound to exercise the powers given
to him for the purposes for which these powers are
conferred. It is not, however, possible to determine
or to enumerate the proper purposes. In other words it
is not possible to lay down, in advance, the limits
beyond which directors are prohibited from exercising
their powers. Lord Wi1berforce referred to this issue
in Howard Smith Ltd v. Amp o 1 Petroleum L t d . < 7 1 ' , and
said:
To define in advance exact limits beyond which
directors must not pass is, in their
Lordships' view, impossible. This clearly
cannot be done by enumeration, since the
variety of situations facing directors of
different types of company in different
situations cannot be anticipated.
5.3.3. The Proper and Improper Purposes
Since it is not possible to draw a line beyond which a
director's act can be described as for improper purpose,
the duty of the court is to examine the special
circumstances of each case. So, in each case the court
will probe the directors' motives and the particular
purpose which the directors intend to achieve by
exercising their powers. Directors' powers can be
exercised to achieve one or more proper purpose. Thus,
the defining, by the court, of a single proper purpose,
for which the power may be exercised and describing a I 1
other purposes as improper is not the sound approach.
I n Howard Smith L t d. v. Ampo1 Petroleum Lt d . ' 7 2 ) ( the
court concluded that it is :
too narrow an approach to say that the only
valid purpose for which shares may be issued
is to raise capital for the company.
The soundest approach has been expressed by Lord
Wilberforce in the same case<73> . His Lordship said:
In their Lordships' opinion it is necessary to
start with a consideration of the power whose
exercise is in question, in this case a power
to issue shares. Having ascertained, on a
fair view, the nature of this power, and
having defined as can best be done in the
light of modern conditions the, or some,
limits within which it may be exercised, it is
then necessary for the court, if a particular
exercise of it is chal lenged, to examine the
substantial purpose for which it was
exercised, and to reach a conclusion whether
that purpose was proper or not. In doing so
it will necessarily give credit to the bona
fide opinion of the directors, if such is
found to exist, and will respect their
judgment as to matters of management; having
done this, the ultimate conclusion has to be
as to the side of the fairly broad line on
which the case falls.
5.3.4. Mixed Purposes
Directors may exercise their powers to achieve more than
one purpose. It is quite possible to find that some of
those purposes are proper while other purposes are
improper. In such a case the court may not set aside
the directors' exercise of power if it finds that the
substantia 1< 74) purpose is a proper one. In other
words, it will uphold the exercise of power, even if an
incidental purpose has been achieved, providing that the
proper purpose is the substantial or primary purpose.
If, for example, the substantial purpose is a proper
one, directors' act will not be invalidated simply
because they personally obtain some incidental
benef i t * 7 5 > . In McCanie (London) Ltd. v. Cook & V/a 11 s
Ltd.<76)( the court held that if the substantial purpose
for which the power was exercised was improper, then the
directors' decision would not be saved by the fact that
a subsidiary proper purpose was also achieved. However,
it is said* 7? ' that it is impossible for the court to
distinguish between the substantial and the
insubstantial purposes. Accordingly, it is argued*78'
that in cases of "mixed motives", the exercise of power
should be invalidated by any improper purpose, whether
111at purpose is is primary, i.e substantial, or
secondary. This view has been supported by the argument
that a director who exercised his powers to achieve any
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purpose not contemp 1 a ted by the company's memorandum or
the articles of association, would be in breach of his
fiduciary duties, irrespective of whether the purpose
was a substantial or an insubstantial purpose. This
approach, it is s ubrn itted, is an inflexible on e and so
undesirable. It is agreed that this approach "gives
little credit to the judiciary's ability to weigh up the
case before them"<79). In addition, it is unreasonable
to set aside the directors' exercise of power wherever
it is found that that exercise has achieved some
incidental purposes, which might be of little
significance in comparison with the benefit obtained by
the company as a result of that exercise. There was an
attempt made by Viscount Fin lay J. in Hind 1 e v. John
Co 11 on Ltnd'SO) f to lay down a test by which the
substantial purpose can be examined. He said:
Where the question is one of abuse of powers,
the state of mind of those who acted, and the
motive on which they acted, are all important
and you may go into the question of what their
intention was, collecting from the surrounding
circumstances all the material which genuinely
throw 1ight upon that question of the state of
mind of the directors so as to show whether
they were honestly acting in discharge of
their powers in the interests of the company
or were acting from some bye—motive, possibly
of personal advantage, or for any other
r e a son< 8l > .
However, it would appear that the High Court of
Australia has preferred a narrower approach in
V»'hi tehouse v. Carlton Hotel Pty Ltd( 8 2). The ma j or i ty
of the Luurt Said:
In this court, the preponderant view has
tended to he that the allotment will he
invalidated only if the irnperrni ssib 1 e purpose
or accombination of impermissible purposes can
be seen to have been dominant .... The
cases in which that view has been indicated
have not, however, required a determination of
the question whether the impermissible purpose
must be the substantial object or moving cause
or whether it may suffice to invalidate the
al 1 otment that it be one of a number of such
objects or causes. As a matter of logic and
principle, the preferable view would seem to
be that, regardless of whether the
impermissible purpose was the dominant one or
but one of a number of significantly
contributing causes, the a 1 1o tmen t will be
invalidated if the impermissible purpose was
causative in the sense that, but for its
presence, 'the power would not have been
exercised'<!3' .
5.3.5. The Proper Purpose Doctrine and share al lotment
The proper purpose doctrine plays a major role in the
field of share allotments. Generally, directors have
the power to allot shares'8' 1 . This power, is in fact,
restricted by S.8CK1) CA 1985. The section provides
that the directors are not allowed to exercise the power
to al lot shares unless they are authorised to do so by
the company in general meeting or by the articles of
association. So, if directors are not authorised to
al lot shares by the company's articles they have to seek
an authorisation by the company in general meeting to
allot shares. However, the power to allot shares must
be exercised for proper purposes. Economic, social , and
political considerations may be taken into account by
directors to decide whether an allotment of shares
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should be made or not'851 Berger J. in Te ck
Corporation Ltd. v. Millar*36>, stated that directors
are entitled to consider the reputation, policies, and
the experience of those who are wi11ing to take over the
company. Berger J. also said:
the directors ought to be al lowed to
consider who is seeking control and why. If
they believe that there will be substantial
damage to the company's interests if the
company is taken over, then the exercise of
their powers to defeat those seeking a
majority will not necessarily be categorised
as improper* 8?) .
Purpose of Issuing Shares
In the early cases the purpose of issuing shares was
only to raise the company's capital when it was
required. So, the courts held that to issue shares for
any other purpose would be invalid. In Punt v. Syrnons &
Co. Ltd* 8 s ) , the directors had issued new shares to five
additional members in order to secure the passing of a
special resolution. Byrne J. said that the primary
purpose for which the power to issue shares might be
exercised was to raise the capital . The judge found
that in the present case this power was not bona fide
exercised to achieve that purpose or to benefit the
company. On the contrary he was satisfied that the
directors used that power to secure the necessary
statutory majority for passing a special resolution.
Accordingly, he held that their exercise of power could
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not be allowed to stand. Similarly, in Fiercy v. Mills
& Co. Ltd* 39 ) f the court held that issuing shares for
the purpose of depriving the existing majority
shareholders of their voting control was invalid.
If the purpose is found to be improper, the b o n a fides
of directors will not validate their acts. In Hogg v.
Cramphorn Ltd.< 3 0 > , the directors had issued shares with
special voting rights to the trustees in order to upset
a particular take—over bid. The court found that the
directors were acting in good faith but the purpose
which they achieved was improper. Buckley J. said:
[The directors'] primary purpose was to ensure
the control of the company by Cthem] and those
whom they could confidently regard as their
supporters' 31 ' .
Allotment of shares will be invalid if its purpose is to
destroy an existing majority. In Howard Smith v. Arnpo 1
Petroleum Ltd'3^) , A Co. and S Co. made two rival bids
for M Co. M's board of directors rejected A's bid. A
Co. and B Co. who held the majority shares in M Co.
proposed to reject all offers for their shares. M's
directors preferred S Co.'s bid and so they issued a
large number of shares to S Co. which had the effect of
displacing the A/B Co. controlling holding. The learned
judge found that the directors had intended to destroy
the existing majority. The Privy Council upheld that
judgment and held that such exercise of power by the
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directors was a misuse of fiduciary powers arid should be
set aside'93).
In addition it was held that issuing shares by directors
for the purpose of benefiting themselves financially is
invalid' 94) . However, this does not mean that in the
absence of any element of self interest the issue of
shares is valid. The Privy Council in the Howard Smith
case'9 5) stated:
Self interest is only one, though no doubt the
commonest instance of improper motive; and,
before one can say that a fiduciary power has
been exercised for the purpose for which it
was conferred, a wider investigation may have
to be made' 96 ) ,
However, the principle which states that the power to
issue shares must be exercised only for the purpose of
raising a company's capital , has been correctly
criticised in many cases. For example, in the Howard
Smith c a s e'9 7) , Lord Wilberforce said:
It was too narrow an approach to say that the
only valid purpose for which shares may be
issued is to raise capital for the company.
The discretion is not in terms 1imi ted in this
way; the law should not impose such a
limitation on directors' powers'98) .
In some Commonwealth cases, the courts upheld the
directors' exercise of power to issue shares although
their purpose was not to raise capital for the company.
In Harlowe's Nominees Pty Ltd v. Woodside Oi1 Co. '99),
an issue of shares which was intended to secure the
financial stability of the company was held to be valid
despite the fact that it had the effect of defeating an
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attempt to secure control of the company. In Teck Corp.
Ltd v. Mil la r' 100) t the directors allotted shares to a
single allottee to enable the company to enter into the
best possible contract which the directors bona fide
considered as beneficial to the company. The court
upheld the directors' act despite the fact that it had
the effect of changing a take—over bidder's majority
holding into a minority'101> .
As is mentioned above, where there is more than one
purpose the court will examine the substantial or the
primary purpose. If it finds that the primary purpose
is legitimate, the directors' action will not be
invalidated even if an additional subsidiary purpose has
been achieved.
If it is found that the directors exercise their power
to issue shares for improper purpose, can the company
ratify their action in general meeting ?. According to
the decisions in Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd. (102) f and
Bamford v. Barnford< 10 3)
F the company is entitled to
ratify such an action by an ordinary resolution in
general meeting. This, of course, will prevent the
minority shareholders from bringing a derivative suit on
behalf of the company against the directors. But, if
the directors' action amounts to a fraud on the
mi nor i ty' 1 0 4 l , an action in respect of which can be
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CHAPTER 6
DIRECTORS' DUTIES OF SKILL AND CARE
6.1. Introduction
Directors owe fiduciary duties to their companies. They
may also owe their companies a duty of care and skil 1 at
common law. The test of determining the existence and
scope of the duty of care has gone through different
stages of development over a short period of time. This
chapter is divided into two main parts: (I) The
development of the law of negligence until Ca pa ro
Industries pic v. Dickman* 1 > . (II) Directors' duties of
skill and care and the effects of the development of the
law of negligence on those duties.
6.2. The Development of the Law of Negligence until
Caparo Industries pic v. Dickman.
6.2.1. The Position Before and After Donoghue v.
Stevenson'2)
Before 1932 there was no general rule defining the
relationships, between pursuers and defenders, that
give rise to a duty of care. In other words, there was
no general rule upon which the courts might rely in
-278-
order to determine the existence of a duty of care in
all circumstances'^) . in giving their decisions, on a
case before them, the courts relied on recognisable
categories of situations as guides to the existence of a
duty of care. This approach can be cal led the "duty-
si tuation"' < ' approach, according to which, a duty of
care could be held to exist "only where the case [could]
be referred to some particular species which hatdl been
examined and classified"< 5' .
The leading case of Donoghue v. Stevenson'6) t
represented a milestone in the field of negligence law.
The majority of the House of Lords swept away the "duty-
situation" approach, and moved towards establishing a
single general principle against which the existence of
a duty of care could be tested. The majority of Lords
emphasised the impossibility of cataloguing the
relationships between pursuers and defenders in which a
duty of care might arise'7'. The most important
judgment in the Donoghue case, is Lord Atkin's. His
Lordship laid down the first single general principle,
in the history of the law of negligence, in Britain, in
relation to the existence of a duty of care. The object
of this principle, which is known as the "neighbourhood"
or "foreseeabi1ity" principle, is to determine the
existence and the scope of a duty of care in a given
case without testing it in the light of previously
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decided cases. Lord Atkin explained this novel
principle as follows:
You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or
omissions which you can reasonably foresee
would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who
then, in law, is my neighbour? The answer
seems to be persons who are so closely and
directly affected by my act that I ought
reasonably to have them in contemplation as
being so affected when I am directing my mind
to the acts or omissions which are called in
quest ion18 > .
Although the "neighbourhood" principle was widely
applied to cases of physical damage, it was not free
from criticisms. It was considered as being inadequate
to determine, solely, the existence of a duty of care in
cases involving non—physical injuries (e.g, where the
loss suffered was pure economic loss)'91 . The courts
were, in fact, willing to restrict the "neighbourhood"
principle by introducing the so called "public policy"
or "public interest" or the "demands of society"' '0' .
The purpose of introducing those elements is to limit
the scope of liability or to negate the liability
altogether. Fo1icy factors had been clearly expressed
by Lord Morris in Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd v. Home
Office' ll). His Lordship said:
I doubt whether it isto say, in
cases where the court is asked whether in a
particular situation a duty existed, that the
court is called on to make a decision as to
policy. Policy need not be invoked where
reason and good sense wi 1 1 at once point the
way. If the test whether in some particular
situation a duty of care arises may in some
cases have to be whether it is fair and
reasonable that it should so arise the court
must shrink from being the arbiter''2'.
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Likewise, Lord Keith, in Peabody Donation Fund v. Sir L.
Parkinson & Co. ( 1 3 ' , said that for a duty of care to
arise it must be "fair and reasonable" to impose the
duty on the defendant in a case before the court.
The most important and comprehensive attempt to state a
test for a duty of care was reached by Lord WiIberforce
in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council ( 14). His
Lordship introduced a single general test to determine
the existence and scope of a duty of care in all
circumstances and made an explicit reference to policy
considerations. His Lordship said:
in order to establ ish that a duty of
care arises in a particular situation, it is
not necessary to bring the facts of that
situation within those of previous situations
in which a duty of care has been held to
exist. Rather the question has to be
approached in two stages. First one has to
ask whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer
and the person who has suffered damage, there
is a sufficient relationship of proximity or
neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable
contemplation of former, carelessness on his
part may be likely to cause damage to the
latter, in which case a prima facie duty of
care arises. Secondly, if the first question
is answered affirmatively, it is necessary to
consider whether there are any considerations
which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit
the scope of the duty or the class of person
to whom it is owed or the damages to which a
breach of it may give rise*151.
The Privy Council remarked, in Yuen Kun-Yeu v. Att.-Gen.
of Hong Kong' * 6 > , that the first stage of Lord
Wi 1berforce's test conceals two separate elements:
"foreceeabi1ity of the harm" and "a close and direct
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relationship of proximity" between the parties*171.
Lord Wilberforce1s test was a flexible one. It had been
applied to many cases and the courts relied upon its
flexibility to determine new areas of liability*18'.
The decision in the Anns case represented another
development in the field of the law of negligence. It
imposed liability in cases of, and allowed damages for,
a pure economic loss*18'. It is to be noted, however,
that many judges have taken a hostile attitude towards
the idea of imposing liability in cases of pure economic
loss; but more so towards articulating a single general
rule to determine the existence and scope of a duty of
care .
More significantly, the House of Lords "have emphasised
the inability of any single general principle to provide
a practical test which can be applied to every situation
to determine whether a duty of care is owed and, if so,
what is its scope"* 20 ) .
Thus, for example, in Yuen Kun-Yeu v. Att.—Gen, of Hong
Kong* 8l ) ( Lord Keith remarked:
their Lordships consider that for the
future it should be recognised that the two-
stage test in Anns is not to be regarded as in
all circumstances a suitable guide to the
existence of a duty of care'22).
Also, in Hill v. Chie f Constable of We s t York shir e' 8 3) r
Lord Keith, again, gave a clear signal that the courts
were wi1 ling to move away from any single general
principle of liability and return to a "Categories-
o r» <-■»
— COG —
based" or a "duty-situation" approach. His Lordship
advocated that foreseeability is not, in itself, capable
of creating a sufficient relationship of proximity. His
Lordship added that in order to establish the
relationship of proximity,
"some further ingredient is invariably needed
and all the circumstances of the case
must be careful ly considered and analysed in
order to ascertain whether such an ingredient
is present. The nature of the ingredient will
be found to vary in a number of different
categories of decided cases' 24) .
Similarly, i n Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman< 2 5 ) f
Brennan J. said:
It is preferable in my view, that the law
should develop novel categories of negligence
incrementally and by analogy with established
categories, rather than by a massive extension
of a prime facia duty of care restrained only
by indefinable 'considerations which ought to
negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of
the duty or the class of person to whom it is
owed'<26) .
6.2.2. The Position After the Caparo'27)case
More recently, the House of Lords in Caparo Industries
pic v. Dickman'28) t adopted the old approach (i.e. the
"duty-situation" approach), thus, abandoning the modern
approach, which examines the existence of a duty of care
against a single general principle of liability. The
facts of the Capa ro case were as follows: The auditors
carried out an audit which they were required to prepare
within the terms of S.23G and S.237 CA 1985. The
plaintiffs made a successful take-over bid for the
company in question. They relied on the auditors'
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report which turned out to be inaccurate and misleading.
The plaintiffs brought an action against the auditors
al leging that they had made the bid in rel iance on the
auditors' misleading reports and, consequently, they
suffered financial loss. Th e majority of the Court of
Appeal made a distinction between the position of the
current shareholders who bought additional shares in the
company and that of non-shareholder potential investors.
It held that the auditors owed a duty of care to the
former class but not to the latter. The House of Lords
rejected this distinction and held that in this
particular case the auditors owed no duty of care to
either the present shareholders ov potential investors.
Th e Hou s e stated that: (1) Foreseeabi1ity, no ma 11 e r how
high, that a potential investor might rely on the
audited account, is not enough to found a duty of care.
That is because of lack of proximity between the
parties. (2) A sufficient relationship of proximity
between the parties, in cases involving economic loss
caused by negligent statement or negligent advice,
exists(29) if:
(a) the advisee or the recipient of the statement is an
identified person; (b) the purpose, for which the advice
is given or for which the statement is made, is a known
one. In other words, the advisor is aware of the
purpose of the advice; (c) the advisor or the giver of
the statement is aware (actually or inferentially) that
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the advisee or the recipient of the statement is going
to rely on the advice or the statement given; and, (d)
the advisee or the recipient of the statement relied on
and acted upon the advice or the given statement to his
de t riment <3 0' .
In the Ca pa r o case, the House of Lords held that the
auditors owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs. The
House based its decision on the ground that the purpose
of making an audit in that case was not to assist
shareholders in their role as investors, but to enable
them to exercise their class rights in general meetings.
One may argue, however, that the decision of the Caparo
case is not entirely correct. If the auditors prepared
a profit forecast, why should not, at least, the current
shareholders be entitled to rely on it to make further
investments in the company?. This argument seems more
convincing in cases of rights issues. If a company
issued a prospectus inviting its shareholders to
subscribe for shares by way of a rights issue, why
should not the shareholders be entitled to rely on that
prospectus in order to buy further shares' 31'?.
Accordingly, one is of the opinion that accountants
"must have appreciated that accounts which [they]
prepared might be used for a variety of purposes in
connection with the business of the company"' 321 . In
other words, while it is correct to say that the purpose
of the audited accounts is to enable the shareholders to
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exercise their class rights in general meetings, it is
not correct to say that it is the sole purpose.
Subscription for shares is an important element for the
continuity of the companies' life. In order to prompt
individuals to buy shares, it is important for a company
to tel 1 them something about its financial status.
Audited accounts and the profit forecast are means by
which individuals can be prompted to subscribe for
shares. If the individuals know nothing about a
particular company, how can they have the motive to
invest their money by buying shares in that company?.
So, it would seem that the individuals, whether existing
or potential shareholders, should be entitled to rely on
the audited accounts and the profit forecast. In
addition, the Companies Acts require that annual reports
be sent to preference shareholders although they,
generally, have no voting rights' 3 3) . This fact
emphasises that the annual reports and the audited
accounts might be used for a variety of purposes and not
only for the purpose of enabling shareholders to
exercise their class rights in general meetings.
In cases of negligent accounts, however, directors
could escape liability if they placed reasonable
reliance on the expertise of the accountants and there
were no grounds for suspicion as to the accuracy of
those accounts' 34) .
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What i a to be emp 11 a s i 3 e d in 111 a Capa ro case is the
attitude of the House of Lords towards the idea of
creating a single general principle to test the
existence and scope of a duty of care in all
circumstances. The House took a hostile stand against
this idea. Their Lordships' rejection of any single
principle to determine the existence of a duty of care,
represents the adoption of the old approach (i.e, the
"duty-situation" approach). In his speech in the Caparo
case, Lord Bridge said:
I think the law has now moved in the direction
of attaching greater significance to the more
traditional categorisation of distinct and
recognisable situations as guides to the
existence, the scope and the limits of the
varied duties of care which the law
imposes'35).
The House of Lords, however, affirmed the general
elements of a duty of care which apply in all
circumstances. That is, foreseeabi1ity of harm,
proximity and whether it is "fair, just and reasonable"
to impose the duty'36' . But the House, emphasised the
concealing nature of concepts like "proximity" and
"fairness". Lord Bridge said:
the concepts of proximity and fairness
are not susceptible of any such precise
definition as would be necessary to give them
utility as practical tests, but amount in
effect to little more than convenient labels
to attach to the features of different
specific situations which, on a detailed
examination of all the circumstances, the law
recognises pragmatically as giving rise to a
duty of care of a given scope'3?'.
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The effect of the decision in Ca pa ro on future
litigation is as yet unclear. It is argued* 331 ,
however, that the adoption of the "duty-situation"
approach "may have brought less, not greater, certainty
to the law"* 33 ) . One is inclined to agree with this
view for the foil owing reasons: (1) The flexibility of a
single general principle of liability gives the courts a
wide discretion. "Policy considerations" and "just,
fair and reasonable" are concepts capable of relaxing
the general principle and giving it a flexible nature.
(2) Establishing a single general principle of liability
is a practical approach. The courts can apply this
principle to determine the existence of a duty of care
and its scope in a given case without bringing its facts
within "those of previous situations in which a duty of
care has been held to exist"* 40) . (3) Ir, the long
term, cataloguing the situations in which a duty of care
may arise is a difficult task and an impractical idea.
The courts may find themselves, in the future, faced
with a long list of duty-situations or categories of
negligence. (4) The "duty-situation" approach conceals
a self-destructive nature. This approach is, mainly,
based on the argument that the existence of a duty of
care in a given situation could not be justified unless
it had been declared as such in a previous occasion.
The absurd result is that the first case which was
decided in the field of negligence law, a n d in which a
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duty of care was held to exist, must be wrongly decided.
Tha t is because it was decided without precedent'41' .
In Murphy v. Brentwood District Council<42) ( t heir
Lordships emphasised that any case without precedent is
tantamount to "judicial legislation" and is liable to be
overruled at any time. This judgment, in fact, creates
great uncertainty in the law of negligence. Any case,
according to this judgment, which declares the existence
of a duty of care in any new situation, can be overruled
at any moment, by a subsequent judgment. (5) It would
seem that the "duty-situation" approach restricts the
courts' discretion. If the facts of a case, before the
court, have to be brought within those of previously
decided cases, the court will not be able to go beyond
the borders of those previous cases. In other words,
the courts will not be able to justify any new extension
of negligence beyond the scope of the previously decided
In the post Ca pa r o decision, Al—Nakib Investments
(Jersey) Ltd. & Another v. Longcroft and Others' * 3 > , the
court took a restrictive approach towards the liability
of company's directors to potential investors. In that
case, the defendants were directors of M. Ltd., which
was a subsidiary of C. pic. . The latter issued a
prospectus inviting its shareholders to invest in M. Ltd
by way of a rights issue. The plaintiffs took advantage
of the rights issue and bought shares in M. Ltd.. The
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plaintiffs alleged that a numbe r of s t a t ernen t s in the
prospectus were untrue and misleading. They claimed
damages for negligence. The defendants argued that they
owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs in relation to
the purchase of shares in the market. The court
accepted this argument and based its decision on the
ground that the purpose for which the prospectus was
issued was to encourage subscription to the rights
issue; purchase of shares in the market was not the
"particular transaction" for which the prospectus was
issued. Mervyn Davies J.. said:
CA1 duty of care exists only if X when making
his statement knew or ought to have known that
Y would rely on it for the purpose of such a
transaction as Y did, in fact, enter into< 44' .
The decision of the court in that case is a clear
application of the decision of the House of Lords in the
Caparo case. The court emphasised the purpose of the
directors' act as a crucial ma11 e r.
To the contrary, a less restrictive approach was taken
by the Court of Appeal in Morgan Crucible Co. pic, v.
Hill S aifiuel and Co. Ltd <45). i|-t that case, the
plaintiff company MC announced a take—over bid for
another company FCE. Before declaring the bid the
chairman of MC asked the chairman of FCE to confirm
FCE's profit forecast for the year to January 1986. The
chairman of FCE did not reply. Thus, MC relied on an
unconfirmed profit forecast and made its first bid. Two
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days after the announcement of the bid, the chairman of
FCE sent to the shareholders the first of a series of
circulars. All of these circulars were comparing the
profit record of MC unfavourably with that of FCE and
recommending that the offer be refused. Later on, FCE
issued another circular which contained a very
favourable profit forecast together with a statement
made by the accountants confirming that the forecast had
been compiled in accordance with FCE's stated accounting
policies. The forecast was also coupled with a
statement from a bank indicating that it had been made
after due and careful inquiry. MC relied on this
forecast and increased its bid. The new bid was
accepted by FCE's shareholders. MC claimed that the
accounting policies adopted in the pre—bid financial
statements and the profit forecast were negligently
prepared and were misleading and grossly overstated the
profits of FCE. It also claimed that FCE was worthless
at the time the bid was made and had it known this fact
it would never have made the bid. MC claimed damages in
negligence from the defendants. The accountants of FCE
and its directors were among the defendants. At the
trial, Hoffman J. saw the case as indistinguishable from
the Ca pa r o case. He attached great importance to the
City Code on Take-overs and Mergers. The judge referred
to some of the Code's rules and said that it was clear
from those rules that the purpose of the profit forecast
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and the statements made by the defendants was to advise
shareholders whether to accept the bid or not. Their
purpose was not to assist MC in its role as a bidder or
an investor. Accordingly, Hoffman J. held that the
defendants owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs. The
Court of Appeal took a less restrictive approach. It
took the view that since (1) the defendants intended
the plaintiffs to rely on the pre-bid financial
statements and the profit forecast for the purpose of
deciding whether to make an increased bid; and, (2) the
plaintiffs did so rely on those statements and the
profit forecast and increased their bid, it was plainly
arguable that there was, as between the plaintiffs and
the defendants, a sufficient relationship of proximity
to create a duty of care. The court, however, did not
hold that the defendants owed a duty of care to the
plaintiffs. It only decided that the plaintiffs' claim
was not bound to fail . The Court of Appeal made it
clear that a duty of care could be negated if it was
found that it would not be just and reasonable to impose
it on the defendants. What is important in the decision
of the Court of Appeal in the Morgan case' < 6 ) , is the
flexible approach taken by the court in relation to the
"purpose" requirement. Slade L.J. stated that the City
Code would require further analysis at the trial. His
Lordship added that the court assumes that the Code does
not "explicitly envisage that persons concerned in
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preparing [companies' reports, accounts and profit
forecasts] will owe a duty of care to potential or
actual bidders"*47) . Thus, the Court of Appeal did not
assume that the Code contemplated purposes such as the
assistance of bidders. Rather, it attached great
significance to the intention of the defendants when
they made the statements and the profit forecast. The
defendants were identified bidders. So, the court
stated that "on the assumed facts the defendants
intended that the defence documents should be relied on
for the specific"'481 purpose of deciding "whether or
not to make an increased bid"* 49 > . Slade L.J remarked
that the inducement of the plaintiffs to increase their
bid was "one of the purposes of the defence documents
and the representations contained therein"*50'.
It is worth noting that in the Morgan case, neither the
judge at the trial nor the Court of Appeal gave any
attention to the fact that the chairman of the target
company recommended that the first bid be refused. The
impact of that recommendation was not discussed by
Hoffman J. at the trial or even by the Court of Appeal.
It might be argued, however, that this recommendation
was no more than a manoeuvre made by the chairman of the
target company to induce the plaintiffs to make an
increased bid. But what would be the position if the
shareholders of the target company refused the first
bid?. It could be argued that, had the first offer been
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refused by the shareholders of the target company, this
refusal would have formed an effective defence in favour
of the defendants. In one's opinion, such refusal was
capable of extinguishing that offer. Consequently, it
would seem that after the extinction of that offer the
plaintiff could not be, correctly, described as an
actual or an identified bidder. The bidder, in such a
case, becomes a potential bidder to whom the defendants
owe no duty of care according to the House of Lords
decision in the Caparo case'511.
The law of negl igence has been subjected to another
development. The House of Lords, in Murphy v. Brentwood
District council*52), overruled the decision of Anns v.
Merton Borough Council'53> . In the Murphy case, the
House held that, when carrying out its statutory
functions, a local authority was not liable in
negligence for the cost of remedying defects in a
building resulting from the failure of the local
authority to ensure that the building was erected in
conformity with the applicable standards prescribed by
the building regulations or bye laws unless the loss
suffered was coupled with a physical damage. So
according to the decision of the Murphy case, a pure
economic loss is irrecoverable. It is not, however, the
subject of this chapter to discuss the impact of the
Mu r phy case in detail. Suffice to say, that there is
ground for dissatisfaction with the decision of the
-294-
House of Lords in that case. The reason is that,
economic interests deserve and need protection as much
as personal or physical interests.
6.3. Directors' Duties of Care arid Skill arid the Effects
of the Developments of the Law of Negligence on these
du ties
Generally speaking, a breach of duty of care might arise
from gross negligence, ordinary negligence or even from
inactivity. In discharging his duties a director must
act honestly; "but he must also exercise some degree of
both skill and diligence"* 54) . In the past, it had been
laid down that the degree of negligence, needed to
impose liability on a company's director, was said to be
"culpable" or "gross neg 1 igenee"* 55> . The reason for
this have been said to be histories 1 < 56 ) . Directors
were, mainly, part-time officers. They did not posses
any special skills. Those considerations were taken
into account by the courts in many cases' 57 ' .
Consequently, the courts found it unreasonable to impose
upon those amateur directors an onerous standards of
care and skill. Professor Farrar'581 has said that the
courts' reluctance to investigate the internal
management of the company and to assess the managerial
skills of an individual director was another reason for
not imposing an onerous standard of skil 1 upon
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directors. Wh ile it is correct to say that
shareholders, who appointed amateur directors, must bear
the risk'59) it is agreed'60) r that this argument
ignores the negative effects of corporate collapse on
creditors, employees, and society as a whole'61' . The
courts, however, found a great difficulty in drawing a
line between "gross" negligence and the mere
"negligence". In Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and
Estates Ltd.(62) Neville J. pointed out that such a
distinction could not be made without determining the
extent of the duty which it was alleged to have been
neglected. In Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co.
Ltd' 63 ' , Roraer J. confessed that he found some
difficulty in understanding the difference between those
two types of negligence, except in so far as those
expressions were used for the purpose of distinguishing
between two kinds of duties owed in two separate
situations. In Wilson v. Brett'64), Baron Ro1fe J.
said: "... I could see no difference between
negl igence and gross negl igence — that it was the same
thing, with the addition of a vituperative epithet"'65' .
In the Scottish case of Hunter v. Han ley' 66) t the Lord
President stated:
In relation, however, to professional
negligence, I regard the phrase "gross
negligence" only as indicating so marked a
departure from the normal standard of conduct
of a professional man as to infer a lack of
that ordinary care which a man of ordinary
skill would display'6?).
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Thus, the Lord President saw no distinction between
"gross negligence" and "negligence". It should be
noted, however, that the theory, which distinguished
between "gross negligence" and ordinary negligence, and
which emanated from Roman Law, has been abandoned. It
would seem, however, that the distinction between the
ordinary negligence and gross negligence lies in the
degree of diligence shown by a director rather than in
the type of the duty omitted or breached. That is, a
negligence can be described as "gross" if it may not be
committed even by a highly negligent person. Whereas,
an ordinary negligence is that which may not be
committed by an ordinary man of ordinary skills. There
is also a third degree of negligence which is the vapid
negligence, and which may not be committed by a prudent
man*68).
In relation to directors' duty of care and skill and the
standard of skil 1 , the most important case is Re City
Equitable Fire Insurance Co. Ltd *69). in this case,
Romer J. deduced from the early cases three general
propositions* 70) . These propositions form principles to
govern directors' duty of care and skill. The first
proposition deals with the standard of skill applied to
directors. The second one deals with the degree of
diligence required from a director. Whereas the third
proposition has been laid down to govern cases involving
directors' delegation of functions.
O
— a y / —
The first proposition provides:
A director need not exhibit in the performance
of his duties a greater degree of skill than
may reasonably be expected from a person of
his knowledge and experience'7'1.
The proposition makes it clear that directors are not
liable for "honest mistakes" of judgment'^ 2) , and the
applicable test is a subjective one'73'. So, a
director's knowledge, skills and experience will be
taken into account, and they are in fact crucial
elements. Those considerations confer on the test a
subjective nature. The test is not objective because,
it is submitted that, directorship is not a profession;
directors do not form an "homogeneous category"'7 <' .
Thus, the concept of "reasonable director" cannot be
applied, or more precisely, is not to be found.
However, Professor Gower argues that the test laid down
by Roraer J. "is partly objective (the standard of the
reasonable man), and partly subjective (the reasonable
man is deemed to have the knowledge and experience of
the particular individual)"'75'. With respect, it would
seem that the test is purely subjective since the degree
of skill is judged depending upon the personal knowledge
and experience of the defender rather than the knowledge
and experience of a reasonable man carrying out the same
functions. A test consists of two el emen t s (i.e.
subjective and objective) is found in S.214 of the
Insolvency Act 1 9 8G' 7 5 ' .
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It has been suggested' 7 7 ) that in the presence of a
service contract between a director and his company, an
implied term requiring him to show reasonable skill and
care, "objectively assessed", is likely to be read into
that contract.
A clear application of the first proposition is found
even before the Re City Equitable Fire case. It is
found in Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates
Ljtd< 7 8 > . In that case, the directors of a rubber
company were in complete ignorance of the rubber
industry. Despite this fact, they were held not liable
in negligence for losses resulting from rubber
speculations. If a director, however, possesses some
experience and knowledge, he is obliged to give the
company the advantage of his knowledge. But, if he is a
professional and appointed by the company in his
capacity as such, then, he must exercise the skill and
care which are reasonably be expected from a competent
member of that profession.
The second proposition deals, as mentioned before, with
the degree of diligence required from a director. Romer
J. said:
A director is not bound to give continuous
attention to the affairs of his company. His
duties are of an intermittent nature to be
performed at periodical board meetings, and at
meetings of any commi ttee of the board upon
which he happens to be placed. He is not,
however, bound to attend al 1 such meetings,
though he ought to attend whenever, in the
circumstances, he is reasonably able to do
SO' 7 9 ) .
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The implication of this proposition is that a director's
non-attendance at general meetings cannot form a
sufficient ground for holding him liable for losses
suffered by the company as a result of that non-
attendance. That is because a director is not required
to give continuous attention to his company's business.
A director is, however, obliged to attend board meetings
"whenever, in the circumstances, he is reasonably able
to do so"< 8 o) . Another implication of Romer J.'s second
proposition is that a director who failed to prevent
other directors making unwise or even fraudulent
appropriation of the company's assets, should not be
held liable merely because his failure resulted from his
absence at board meetings' 8 1 ) . I i~i Re Cardiff Savings
Bank, Marquis of Bute's case1321 , the president of the
Bank attended only one board meeting in 38 years.
Despite that, he escaped liability for losses resulting
from irregularities in the bank's operations. The court
observed that the omission to attend board meetings was
not the same as the neglect or omission of duties which
ought to have been performed at any such meeting. In
t h e Re City Equitable Insurance case, the court attached
no blame to one of the directors who was living in
Aberdeen and who found it difficult to attend board
meetings in London. In some other cases, however, the
courts had adopted a tougher stand towards inactive
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directors. For example, in Re Charitable Corp.
Sutton'83) t only five out of some 50 committee men were
actively involved in the running of the company in
question. Those active directors caused the company to
lose a large sum of money. The remaining 45 committee
men were held guilty of gross negligence, because their
inactivity enabled the other five to cause the company
financial losses.
One is, however, prompted to say that, in addition to
the company's interests, there are some other interests
which deserve protection, namely, the interests of a
company's creditors and employees. Those interests can
be better served by asking directors to attend board
meetings and to give a reasonable attention to their
companies' affairs. So, it is agreed with Byrne J. that
a director who accepts a directorship must understand
that this is a position involving "duties which cannot
be shirked by leaving everything to others"'84' . More
recently, in Winkworth v. Edward Baron Development Co.
Ltd.< 8 5) f the House of Lords indicated its lack of
sympathy for directors who plead ignorance of their
duties and fail to exercise the powers vested in them
where their failure caused the creditors to sustain
loss. Nowadays, under S.6 of the Company Directors
Disqualification Act 1986, the court may consider the
inactivity of a director of an insolvent company, a
ground sufficient for disqualifying him'86> . In the
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presence of a service contract between a director and
his company, the former may not be able to avail himself
of the "relaxed regime advocated by the earlier
cases"*87'. Such a contract may explicitly or
implicitly require the director to give his exclusive
attention to his company's business'88 ' .
The third proposition deals, as mentioned above, with
directors' delegation of functions. Romer J. said:
In respect of all duties that, having regard
to the exigencies of business, a n d the
articles of association, may properly be left
to some other official, a director is, in the
absence of grounds for suspicion, justified in
trusting that official to perform such duties
honest 1y(S 9) .
The functions of directors, particularly in large
companies, are numerous. They may not be able to carry
out all those functions themselves, either because of
lack of time or lack of skill. Thus, they are entitled
to delegate some of those functions to others'30' . It
follows that they are entitled to rely on others and to
trust them'31'. However, reliance on delegates cannot
form a defence in a director's hand unless it is a
reasonable one'32' . Delegation of functions may be made
to a committee of the board. It may also be made to
experts. Proper delegation to a committee of the board
may in some circumstances exonerate the directors who
are not on the committee. Thus, in Land Credit Co. of
Ireland v. Lord F e rrnoy'3 3' , a director who properly
re 1 ied on the sub-committee of the board was held not
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liable for the committee's breach of duty. In that
case, the sub— commi t tee of the board used the funds of
the company to buy the company's shares in order to keep
up their price. This operation was cloaked by the sub¬
committee under the veil of loans which were disclosed
to the full board but their purpose was concealed. The
sub-committee breached its duty by concealing the
objectionable nature of the loans. The court found the
sub—committee liable to repay these loans. Whereas,
the director who was not on the sub—committee was
exonerat ed.
The exoneration of directors, in relation to delegation
of functions, is not free f rom qualifications. A
director is justified in trusting his co-directors and
other officers and can rely on them only where the
circumstances of the delegations give him no ground for
suspicion' 9*) . Thus, a director who delegates a
specific function to others, but then keeps an eye on
its performance, cannot al lege and wi 1 1 not be al lowed
to maintain that he did not know what was going on( 951 .
In - the absence of any ground for suspicion a director
who delegates some of his functions to others is not
required to supervise them'96'. Otherwise, the
delegation of functions, as an operation, becomes
meaningless. Thus, in Huckerby v. Elliott'9?) , a
director of a gaming club was held not negligent in
failing to check whether the club had the proper licence
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when the task of obtaining the licence had been
delegated to someone else. Likewise, if a board of
directors appointed an auditor and had no grounds for
suspecting anything wrong, the board would not be liable
in damages for the auditors' negl igence' 93 ' . While
directors are entitled to rely on others in relation to
the delegated functions, they are not entitled to pay no
attention to all documents placed before them*9 9 ' . They
are required to exercise a reasonable amount of care in
relation to documents placed before them. Rower J. in
the Re City Equitable F i re case* 100) t suggested that
directors should have a complete list of their company's
assets before declaring dividends. They ought not to be
guided by the chairman's assurances and the auditors'
belief as to the value of the company's assets. In
relation to cheques, Romer J. suggested*101' that before
signing a cheque a director should satisfy himself that
the board had authorised the signature of that cheque,
or should subsequently obtain a board's resolution
confirming the signature. However, as to the substance
of' a cheque, Rome r J. suggested* 1 0 2) that a director
before whom a cheque was placed for signature could
trust the assurances of relevant officers as to the
purpose for which the payment was required and as to
whether the payment was, subsequently, applied for that
purpose. Signing a blank cheque is, of course, a clear
negligence* 1 0 3 ' .
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To sum up: at common law, directors' duty of care and
skill is judged subjectively. Directors are not
required to give "continuous attention" to their
companies' business; and they are entitled to rely on
delegates provided that such reliance is reasonable and
that there is no ground of suspicion as to the honesty
and the competence of these delegates.
As previously mentioned, the law of negligence has been
subjected to radical changes in recent years. Those
deve1 opments, indeed, affect auditors' and accountants'
liability. Their duties of care and skill have been
increased by the courts' "more rigorous enforcement of
their obligations"*104> in contract as well as in tort.
However, the House of Lords in the Capa ro case tried to
limit the scope of auditors' duties. So far, one can
see that those developments do not affect the general
rules applied to directors' duties of care and skill.
Yet, the enforcement of directors' duties remains a
major problem. A director's duty of care and skill is
owed to the company. So, a breach of that duty wi11 be
a wrong done to the company. Consequently, "the proper
plaintiff in an action in respect of a wrong alleged to
be done to the company . . . is pr iina facie the company
itself"* 105) . The company may decide not to sue
the directors. In this case, the shareholders will not
be able to sue the directors on behalf of the company
unless they bring themselves within one of the
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exceptions to the rule stated above*'"6). it should be
noticed that a breach of duty of care can be ratified by
an ordinary resolution of the general meeting. In
Pav1 ides v. Jensen* I 07) , the directors sold an assets of
the company at an undervalue. A minority shareholder
initiated an action against them alleging that they
breached their duty of skill and care. The court held
that the directors' act was ratif iable by an ordinary
resolution of the general meeting. However, in
addition to the duty of care owed to the company,
directors owe, in some circumstances, a duty of care to
shareholders as individuaIs' *08' .
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Raid in the same case at p. 297—8; for more detail
about the willingness of the judges to limit the
scope of the "neighbourhood" principle by
introducing "policy" considerations elements, see
Symmons C., "The Duty of Care in Negligence:
Recently Expressed Policy Elements (Part I)", [19711
34 M.L.R. 394 and (Part II) [19711 34 M.L.R 528.
13) [19841 3 All E.R. 529 at p.534.
14) [19781 A.C. 728.
15) [19781 A.C. 728 at pp.751-2.
16) [ 19871 2 A1 1 E.R. 705.
17) The Privy Council deduced this critical point from
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Lord Atkin's judgment in the Donoghue case. Lord
A tkin said:
"Who, then, in law, is my neighbour? The
answer seems to be — persons who are so
closely and directly affected by my act
"(C1932] A.C. 562, at p.580).
So, in their Lordships' opinion, in the Yu e n case,
foreseeabi1ity and a mere proximity are insufficient
to give rise to a duty of care. The relationship of
proximity between the parties must be "a close and
direct" one.
18) See for ex amp 1 e Ro ss v. Cau liters (a F i rrn) C 1 9 7 9 ] 3
All E . R . 580 < Ch . D ) : Jun i or Books v . Ve i t che Co .
Ltd . [ 1982] 3 All E.R. 20 1 (H.L) arid Lawton v. BQC
Transhield Ltd [1987] 2 All E.R. G08 (Q.B.D).
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[1990] 2 All E.R. 908.
20) Per Lord Bridge in Caparo Industries pic v. Dickman
[ 1990] 1 All E.R. 568 at p.573. His Lordship
referred to Lord Keith's speech in Peabody Donation
Fund v. Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co Ltd [1984] 3 All.
E.R. 529 at p.533-4.
21 ) [ 1987] 2 A1 1 E.R. 705.
22) [1987] 2 All E.R. 705 at p.712.
23) [ 1988] 2 A1 1 E.R. 238.
24) [ 1988] 2 All E.R. 238 at p.241.
25) [1985] 59 Aust. L.J.R. 564 (High Court of
Aus t ra 1 ia) .
2 G) [ 1985] 59 Aust. L.J.R. 5G4 at p.588.
27) Caparo Industries pic v. Dickman & others [1990] 1
All E.R. 5G8.
28) [1990] 1 All E.R. 5G8; [1990] 2 W.L.R. 359.
29) This was a deduction from the decision of Hed1ey
Byrne & Co. Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [ 19 G 4 ]
A.C. 4G5.
30) Lord Bridge said that these requirements are neither
conclusive nor exclusive: see Lord Bridge in the
Caparo case [1990] 1 W.L.R 359 at p.384.
31) See A1-Nakib Investments (Jersey) Ltd. and Another
v. Longcroft and others [1990] 3 All E.R. 321, where
the court held that the defendant directors owed no
duty of care to the plaintiffs (who took advantage
of the rights issue and bought shares in the
company) because the purpose for which the
prospectus was issued was to encourage subscription
to the rights issue; but not to encourage purchase
of shares in the market.
32) Per Lord Stewart in the Scottish case of Andrew
01 i ver & Son Ltd. v. Douglas [1981] S.C. 192 at
p.202 .
33) Mullis, "Tort", [1990] All E.R. (Annual Review) 303
at p. 309.
34) See the proposition laid down by Romer J. in Re City
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at p.4 2 9.
35) [ 1990] 2 W.L.R. 359 at p.365.
36) See per Lord Bridge in the Caparo case CI 990 1 2
W.L.R. 359 at p.365.
37) C1990] 2 W.L.R. 359 at p.365.
38) Morris G. "The Liability of Professional Advisers:
Caparo and After", [1991] J.B.L. 36.
39) Morris G. "The Liability of Professional Advisers:
Caparo and After", C19913 J.B.L 36 at p.48.
40) Per Lord Wilberforce in Anns v. London Borough of
Merton [1978] A.C. 728 at p.751.
41) Howarth D. "Negligence After Murphy: Time to Re-
think" [1991] C.L .J, Part I, vol 50, p.58.
42 ) [1990] 2 A 1 1 E.R. 908 .
43 ) [ 1990 ] 3 A 1 1 E.R. 321 .
44 ) [ 1990 ] 3 A1 1 E.R. 321 at p.326.
45 ) [1991] 1 A1 1 E.R. 1 48 .
46 ) [1991 ] 1 A 1 1 E.R. 148 .
47) [1991] 1 A 1 1 E.R. 148 at p.160.
48 ) [1991] 1 A 1 1 E.R. 148 at p.160 per Slade L.J.
49 ) [1991] 1 A 1 1 E.R. 148 at p.159 per Slade L.J.
50 ) [ 1991 ] 1 A 1 1 E.R. 148 at p.159. Slade L.J. said that
the Morg an case could be distinguished from the
Caparo C ia s e on 11ae ground that in the former, some
of t h e representations were made after the
plaintiffs as a bidder had emerged, whereas in the
latter all the representations were made "before an
identified bidder had emerged": see per Slade L.J.
[1991] 1 All E.R. 148 at p.154.
51) Following a telephone call with the legal adviser of
Hi 1 1 Samuel Bank, it was confirmed that this case
was settled out of court.
52) CI 990] 2 All E.R. 908.
53) C1978] A.C. 728.
54) Per Romer J. in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co.
Ltd C1925] 1 Ch. 407 at p.427.
55) See, for examp 1e, Turquand v. Marsha 11 C 1869] 4 Ch.
App. 376; Qverend, Gurney & Co. v. Gibb [1872] LR 5
(HL) 480 at p.494—5; Re National Bank of Wales Ltd.
[ 1899] 2 Ch. 629 at p. 671 (CA) ; and Re Brazilian
Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd. [1911] 1 Ch.
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56) Farrar's Company Law, 2nd ed, [1988].
57) For example, see Turquand v. Marshal 1 [ 1869] 4 Ch.
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(HL) 480 at p.494-5; Re National Bank of Wales Ltd.
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42 5.
58) See Farrar's Company Law, 2nd ed, [1988].
59) See per Lord Hatherly in Turquand v.Marshall [1869]
4 Ch. App. 376 at p.386.
60) Farrar's Company Law, 2nd ed, [1988]
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61) The Parliament has, recently, given attention to
this issue in passing The Company Directors
Disqualification Act 1986 and The Insolvency Act
1986 .
6 2) C19 1 1 ] 1 Ch. 425.
63) C1925] 1 Ch. 407.
64) [1843] 11 M. & W. 113.
65) C1843] 11 M. & W. 113 at p.115
66) [1955] S.C. 200.
67) [ 19 5 5] S.C. 200 at p.206.
68) It is also not easy to drew a line between those
degrees of negligence according to this view.
69) [1925] 1 Ch. 407. In that case, as a result of the
managing director's deliberate fraud there was a
shortage in the company's funds. The managing
director had been convicted and sentenced. Whereas
a number of directors, who where acting honestly,
were held not liable in negligence for the losses
resulting from the managing director's fraud.
70) see generally, Gore — B cowrie on Compani s s , 44th ed,
[19861; see also MacCann, "Directors' Duties of
Care, Skill and Diligence" [1991] 9 I .L.T. 56.
71) [1925] 1 Ch. 407 at p.428. The standard of skill
required from a director had been put in a clear
words by Lindley M.R. in Lag una s Ni tra te Co . v.
Lagunas Syndicate [ 1899] 2 Ch. 392 at p.434. He
said:
If directors act within their powers, if they
act with such care as is reasonably to be
expected from them, having regard to their
knowledge and experience, and if they act
honestly for the benefit of the company they
represent, they discharge both their equitable
as well as their legal duty to the company.
72) See per Romer J. in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance
Co. Ltd [1925] 1 Ch. 407 at p.429. See also
Overend, Gumey & Co. v. Gibb [1872] LR 5 (HL).
73) See Gore—Browne on Companies, 44th ed, [1986], para.
27.19.1; Farrar's Company Law, 3rd ed, [1991], at
p.397; See also Sealy who said that a pure
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175.
74) Pennington R. Directors' Personal Liability [1986]
at p.8 3.
75) Gower, Principles of Modern Company Law, 4th ed,
[1979] at p.604.
76) It should be noted that S.214 (4) of the Insolvency
Act 1986, sets a standard of skill involving
subjective and objective elements. This section
applies only if the company has gone into insolvent
liquidation. Thus, it will not affect the conduct
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of company's directors while the company is a goiiig
concern. It should be noted that this section have
dealt with wrongful trading. It provides:
"
. . . the facts which a director of a
company ought to know or ascertain, the
conclusions which he ought to reach and the
steps which he ought to take are those which
would be known or ascertained, or reached or
taken, by a reasonably diligent person having
both-
(a) the general knowledge, skill and
experience that may reasonably be expected of
a person carrying out the same functions as
are carried out by that director in relation
to the company, and
(b) the genera 1 know 1 edge, skill and
experience that that director has"; See
Chapter No. 8.
In Dorchester Finance Co. Ltd. v. Stebbing [19891
B.C.L.C. 498, the court accepted a distinction
between the duty to exhibit a degree of skill and
the duty to take care. A subjective test was
applied to the former, whereas an objective test
was applied to the latter. This was clear from
the judgment of Foster J. where he said: "(a) A
director is required to exhibit in performance of
his duties such a degree of skill as may
reasonably be expected from a person with his
knowledge and experience. (b) A director is
required to take in the performance of his duties
such care as an ordinary man might be expected to
take on his own behalf": CI 9891 B.C.L.C. 498 at
p.501 .
77) Gore—Browne on Companies, 44th ed, C1990I, para
27.19.1 .
78) C191 13 1 Ch. 425.
79) Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. Ltd C 1 925 3 1
Ch. 407 at p.429.
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82) C18923 " Ch. 100.
83) C17423 2 Atk. 400.
84) Per Byrne J. in Dricqbier v. Wood C18993 1 Ch. 393
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Law. 38, where Foster J. held that it was
unreasonable for directors not to attend board
meetings.
85) C 1987 3 1 All E.R. 114, C 1 9873 B.C.L.C. 193 (HL).
86) S.6 (1) of the Company Directors Disqualification
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Act 1986 provides:
The court shall make a disqualification order
against a person in any case where, on an
application under this section, it is
sa tisfied —
(a) that he is or has been a director of a
company which has at any time become insolvent
(whether while he was a director or
subsequently), and
(b) that his conduct as a director of that
company (either taken alone or taken together
with his conduct as a director of any other
company or companies) makes him unfit to be
concerned in the management of a company.
87) Farrar's Company Law, 2nd ed, [19881.
88) Farrar said that Romer J. 's second proposition must
be re-considered in the light of the Insolvency Act
1985. An inactive director may find it difficult to
persuade the court that he took every step with the
view of minimising the po tent i a 1 loss to the
company's creditors: See S.214 (3) of the Insolvency
Act 1986; see Farrar's Company Law, 2nd ad, C19881,
at p.3 41 .
89) Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. Ltd [19251 1
Ch. 407 at p74 297
90) See Chapter No. 2.
91) This is for the simple reason that "[business!
cannot be carried on upon principles of distrust":
Re National Bank of Wales [18991 2 Ch. 529 at p.673
( CA ) .
92) See Re City EquitabIe Fire Insurance Co. Ltd[19251 1
Ch. 4 07; Howard Marine and Dredging Co, Ltd. v.
Ogden [19781 QB 574; see generally, Forte A.
"Negligent Misrepresentation", [19881 J.L.S.S 93.
93) [18701 LR 5 Ch. App. 763.
94) See per Romer J. in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance
Co. Ltd [19251 1 Ch. 407 at p.429. For ex amp 1 e a
director, who knows or has a good reason to suspect
that a delegate is not honest or competent, is not
entitled to rely on that delegate's assurances or
statements. He has to verify and to check the
soundness of the work done.
95) Cf Department of Health and Social Security v. Wayte
[ 1 972 I 1 W.L.RT 19 (CA) .
96) See Dovey v. Cory [19011 AC 477 at p.493 (HL). In
this case, it was held that a director was under no
duty to verify auditors' calculations: see also Re
City Equitab 1e _Fire Insurance Co. Ltd [ 19 2 5 1 1 Ch.
407 at p.430.
97) [19701 1 All E.R. 189.
98) Re Penham & Co. [18831 25 Ch. D. 752.
99) See Fisheries Developments Corpn. of S A Ltd. v.
Jorge sen [ 19801 4 S A 156 at p. 166."
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DIRECTORS' DUTIES TO SHAREHOLDERS
7.1. Introduction
The relationship between directors and their companies
is a fiduciary one. This relationship gives rise to
some fiduciary duties. These duties are owed to their
companies as separate legal entities. Thus, generally
speaking, directors owe no fiduciary duty to individual
shareholders. Even if the directors act in a way which
causes the company to incur a legal liability, they owe
no duty to the shareholders. Examples of this, are the
situations where the directors cause the company to
breach a contract entered into by it; or where they
cause it to harm the rights of the shareholders by
refusing to allow them to vote at a general meeting. In
these situations, the general rule is that the directors
are not responsible to the shareholders' ' ' . In some
exceptional cases, however, directors may owe fiduciary
duties as well as a duty of care to shareholders in
common law. Those exceptional cases are where there is
an agency relationship between the directors arid the
shareholders, where the directors give an advice to the
shareholders, and where the company has the family
character and the directors occupy a dominant position
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over the company and its shareholders. In addition to
their duties in common law directors owe some duties to
the shareholders under the legislation.
7.2. The general rule of immunity from liability
The general rule, as stated above, is that directors are
immune from liability to individual shareholders. This
rule has been applied in several cases. It has, for
example, been decided that the directors having granted
an option for a shareholder to buy further shares in the
company, were under no liability to satisfy the option
by transferring some of their shares to the option
holder if all the shares had been issued'2'.
Similarly, it has been held that a director of a
subsidiary company, having obtained compensation from
the holding company for leaving his office, without
disclosing to the holding company that he was not
entitled to obtain compensation because he breached some
of his duties to the subsidiary, was not liable to
return that compensation' 31 . In Lindgren v. L and P
Estates Co. Ltd**3 , the Court of Appeal held that the
directors of a subsidiary company were not liable to
compensate the parent company for the loss in the value
of the shares it held in the subsidiary which resulted
from allowing, negligently or wilfully, the subsidiary's
money or assets to be misappropriated. This is, of
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course, a clear application of the "proper plaintiff"
rule(5l . The proper plaintiff in that case was the
subsidiary company. So, the holding' company as a
shareholder in the subsidiary company, was not entitled
to recover any loss suffered by it as a result of the
directors' breach of duty to the subsidiary company.
In Percival v. Wright*6> , which may be regarded as the
most important case in this context , the shareholders
approached the directors and offered to sell their
shares in the company to them, i.e., to the directors.
The directors agreed to buy the shares at a fair price.
They did not disclose that they were negotiating a take¬
over offer from an outsider to buy shares at a higher
price. The directors bought the shareholders' shares
and sold those shares as well as all the company's
shares to the outsider who launched the take-over offer.
As a result the directors made some profit. The
shareholders who had sold their shares to the directors
brought an action against the directors in order to
rescind their contract with them and to seize the
opportunity of selling their shares to the outsider who
offered a higher price. Alternatively, the shareholders
claimed that the directors should be made accountable
for the profit made as a result of re—selling the shares
to the outsider. The shareholders made it clear that
their claims were based on the ground that the directors
had failed to disclose the fact that they were
-3 1 6-
negotiating a take—over offer from an outsider to buy
al 1 the company's shares. The court held that the
directors owed no duty of disclosure to the
shareholders who offered to sel 1 their shares to the
directors. Consequently, the directors could not be
made liable to account for the profit made and the
contract between the directors and the selling
shareholders could not be rescinded. In this case the
shareholders did not allege that the directors had made
any misrepresentation in relation to the company's
financial position or to the value of the shares. They
did not also allege that the directors had exercised
undue influence over them to induce them to sel 1 their
shares. If the shareholders alleged that there was a
misrepresentation on the part of the directors, the
court's decision would probably be in favour of the
selling shareholders. Swinfen-Eady J. said that :
[Tlhere is no question of unfair dealing in
this case. The directors did not approach the
shareholders with the view of obtaining their
shares. The shareholders approached the
directors and named the price at which they
were desirous of se I 1 ing< 7 > .
Percival v. Wright has been widely criticised. The
Cohen Committee' 8) and the Jenkins' Committee'9) both
criticised it and recommended the enactment of
legislation to overrule the decision in that case.
Lord Wilberforce said "The decision Ci.e. the decision
in Percivai v. Wright! was no doubt good traditional
"J 1 / —
equit y bu t when generalised, as it has been, was surely
bad economics . . . "(10). In Co 1 errian v. Myers^ l l ) the
plaintiff's counsel argued that Percival v. Wright was
no longer accepted as one establishing a decisive rule
in the field of directors' duties. Counsel for the
plaintiff also pointed out that no Commonwealth court
had expressly approved the decision in Percival v.
Wright. Mahon J., in Coleman v. Myers*121 said that the
decision in A1 1 en v. Hya 11 < 13) "appears to be the only
decision of coercive authority which in terms adverts to
the decision of Percival v. Wright but does not go so
far, as I read it, as to affirm or approve that
decision". The judge also said''^':
I reach the unhesitating conclusion that the
decision in Percival v. Wright, directly
opposed as it is to prevailing notions of
correct commercial practice, and being in my
view wrongly decided, ought no longer to be
followed in any impeached transaction where a
director dealt with identified shareholders".
In Mahon J's opinion , the directors' duty to disclose
arises only in cases where the parties are identified.
If the parties are not identified it is not possible to
prove that directors are capable of compliance with the
duty of disclosure. In his own words Mahon J. said* 15) ;
The liability of the director cannot be
en forced in the absence of proof that tie was
capable in the specified transaction of
compliance with the duty of disclosure".
Professor Gower has described the judgment in P e r civ a 1
v. Wright as "a calamitous decision"'16' . Professor
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Loss said that the decision in Percival v. Wright is "a
monument to the ability of lawyers to hypnotise
t h emselves with their own creations"' ' ' ' . It is also
said' 18) that the decision in Percival v. Wright is in
conflict with both commercial morality and the rule
which prohibits directors from making a secret profit by
using the property or the confidential information of
the company. However, it is also argued1 1 9 ' that this
case is distinguishable on its facts. In this case the
shareholders themselves approached the directors and
named the price at which they wished to sel 1 their
shares. The directors themselves did not approach the
shareholders to buy their shares with the intention of
gaining personal profit by hiding the fact that they
were negotiating a take—over offer. If the directors
themselves were to approach shareholders then it might
be argued that the court would decide in favour of the
plaintiff shareholders. It is submitted, however, that
in the absence of misrepresentation or unfair dealing in
general, the court would not change its attitude even if
the directors themselves were to approach the
shareholders. The reason is that in such a case the
directors approach the shareholders in their capacity as
buyers, and it is open to the shareholders to accept or
to reject the directors' offer. In the presence of an
unfair dealing on the part of directors, the directors
will be liable to the shareholders. This can be
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understood from Swinfen Eady J. 's decision in Perciva1
v. Wright itself (quoted above).
The court had dealt with a misrepresentation case in
Wa1 sham v. Stainton(20) . in that case the confidential
agents of the partnership conspired together to obtain
for themselves the shares of the plaintiff, who was a
partner, at an undervalue. They executed this
conspiracy by keeping the accounts of the partnership
fraudulently, so as to conceal from the plaintiff the
true value of the shares. The plaintiff sold his shares
at an undervalue. Lord Justice Turner held that the
defendants were liable for the real value of the
shares' SI'.
In relation to P e rciv a 1 v. Wright, the only allegation,
in the absence of a misrepresentation, against the
directors would be that they breached their fiduciary
duties. And, in that case, the court found that there
was no fiduciary relationship between the directors and
the shareholders' 22 ' .
However, in favour of the decision in Percival v. Wright
it has been argued' 23 ' that no Commonwealth court has
ventured to say that that case has been wrongly decided.
In deed, despite the criticisms made by the Cohen
Committee and the Jenkins Committee in respect of the
case in question, the legislature in Britain did not
intervene to abolish the rule laid down by that case.
In addition, in favour of that decision it could be
— j) c. U —
argued that in some cases disclosing some information
about a potential take-over bid might not be in the best
interest of the company.
The reason for directors' general immunity from
liability towards shareholders is the result of the
relationship between the directors and their companies.
A relationship which, in fact, exists between two
parties. On the one hand the directors and on the other
hand the company as a separate legal entity distinct
from its members' 2 4 ) . This legal personality has its
own budget, resources, rights, duties, and creditors.
It also has the ability to sue and to be sued. So,
despite the fact that it is the shareholders who will
suffer economically in consequence of the directors'
breach of duties to their companies, the directors are
under no duty to them as a general rule. However, it
should be understood that this general rule extends only
to directors' conduct while acting on behalf of the
company, i.e., in their capacity as directors.
In the case of partnerships' 25) t one has to make a
distinction between t h e English Law and the Scots Law.
The English Law does not recognise partnerships as legal
entities distinct from the members composing them'26'.
This attitude has been evinced by S.4(l) of the
Partnership Act 1890. This section provides that:
Persons who have entered into partnership with
one another are for the purpose of this Act
called collectively a firm, and the name under
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which their business is carried on is called
the f i rm name .
This section defines "firm" as meaning the members or
the partners who compose the firm. Thus, the English
Law maintains its inflexible position of denying a
partnership a separate legal personality. The view of
the English Law, however, is not free from criticisms.
Lind1ey< 2 7) has considered the non— recognition of the
personality of the firm as a defect in the English Law.
Accordingly, he criticised the Partnership Act 1890 as
one which failed to bring the English Law into line with
Scots Law in relation to this issue. Miller*28' states
that "[the] view of the English Law is in conflict with
the realities of the commercial life"*29 ' .
The nature of partnerships in Scotland is different from
that in England. The Scots Law recognises partnerships
as separate legal entities. This position has been
evinced by S.4(2) of the Partnership Act 1890. The
section provides that:
In Scotland a firm is a legal person distinct
from the partners of whom it is composed, but
an individual partner may be charged on a
decree or diligence directed against the firm,
and on payment of the debt is entitled to
relief pro rata from the firm and its other
partners.
This section recognises the distinguishing features of
Scottish firms. The nature of the legal personality of
partnerships in Scotland, however, is different from
that of incorporated companies. S.4C2) of the
Partnership Act 1890 made it clear that an individual
partner may be held liable for the partnership's debts.
On the other hand, a partner who has paid a debt on
behalf of the partnership is entitled to "relief pro
rata from the [partnership] and its other partners".
While those qualifications do not destroy*3°> the legal
personality of partnerships in Scotland, they give that
personality a special nature*31) different f rom that of
incorporated companies. The liability of shareholders
in the incorporated companies, for example, is limited
to their shareholdings in these companies.
Going back to the main issue, to whom a managing
partner's duty is owed in a partnership: in England,
since partnerships have no separate legal personalities,
fiduciary duties of the partners are owed to each other.
So, an outsider's offer to purchase the partnership's
shares must be disclosed by the directors to the other
partners* 32) . Accordingly, it would seem that had
Fercival v. Wright dealt with a partnership, the
defendants would have been held liable for the failure
to disclose information, to the partners, about the
outsider's take—over offer. On the other hand, in
Scotland, a partnership has a separate legal
personality. So, a managing partner's duties are owed
primarily to this legal entity. Accordingly, if
Fercival v. Wright had dealt with a Scottish
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partnership, the court's decision, it would seem, would
not have been different.
The general rule of immunity from liability to
shareholders, was affirmed by Dillon LJ. in
Multinational Gas & Petrochemical Co. v. Multinational
Gas & Petrochemical Services Ltd*3 3). His Lordship
said:
The directors . . . stand in a fiduciary
relationship to the company . . . and they owe
fiduciary duties to the company though not
to individual shareholders.
In some exceptional cases, however, directors may owe
duties to the shareholders at common law as we 1 1 as
under the legislation. In their relationship with
shareholders, directors may find themselves subjected to
the rules which govern the agency relationship,
contracts or even the rules of delict. In addition,
directors may find themselves liable to the shareholders
under the legislation. The duties which directors may
owe to the shareholders can be fiduciary duties as well
as a duty of care and skill. Those exceptional cases to
the general rule of immunity from liability will be
discussed next.
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7.3. Exceptions to the general rule of immunity from
Liability: Directors" Duties to Individual Shareholders.
7.3.1. Exceptions at the Common Law.
7.3.1.1 Directors as agents of the shareholders.
Directors may be considered as agents of the
shareholders and, consequently, a fiduciary relationship
may exist between them* 3 4 ' . A director may become the
agent of a shareholder or a group of shareholders in
several ways. For example, a director might be
appointed by a shareholder to act as his proxy to
represent him at general meetings and vote on his
behalf. The director, as a proxy, is the representative
of the shareholder who appointed him and, consequently,
the law of agency is applied to their relationship. A
director might be appointed by a shareholder or a group
of shareholders to sel1 their shares in the company. In
such a case, the shareholders are relying upon the
appointed director's skills, knowledge and bargaining
power. Again, the rules of the law of agency are
applied to this case. Thus, if it is found that a
director is acting as agent on behalf of a shareholder,
or a group of shareholders, then he wi11 owe fiduciary
duties to the shareholders, who appointed him, similar
to those owed by an agent to his principal under the law
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of agency. As an agent, a director must not exceed the
powers given to him by his principal. He must act in
good faith and exercise reasonable care in performing
his duties. He must further the interests of his
principal and not allow his own interests to conflict
with his principal's. In addition, he must not gain
profit out of his position without the consent of the
principal.
In Allen v. Hyatt'35>, the directors obtained options
from the shareholders to buy their shares in the company
through representations that this would facilitate a
potential amalgamation with another company. The
directors exercised the options and sold the shares to
the amalgamating company. The price at which the
directors exercised the options was lower than the price
paid by the amalgamating company. Consequently, they
made a handsome profit. The court held that the
directors were the agents of the shareholders when they
took the options from them, and so were liable to the
shareholders (i.e. their principals) to account for the
profit made. Viscount Haldane L.C. said'36> :
The [plaintiff shareholders] appeared to have
been under the impression that the directors
of a company were entitled under al 1
circumstances to act as though they owed no
duty to individual shareholders. No doubt the
duty of the directors was primarily one to the
company itself. It might be that in
circumstances such as those of Percival v.
Wright they could deal at arm's length with a
shareholder. But the facts in the present
case were widely different from those in
Percival v. Wright, and their Lordships
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thought that the directors must here be taken
to have held themselves out to the individual
shareholders as acting for them in the same
footing as they were acting for the company
itself, that was, as agents ....
It has been said' 37 ' that the decision in Per c i va 1 v.
Vv'rig h t was too generous to directors. It places the
directors under no liability to shareholders in general.
However, despite the fact that the decision in Allen v.
Hya 11 has invaded that generosity, it is said'38' that
it has a limited scope of application because it is
based on the particular way in which the defendant
directors choose to carry out their fraud.
The fact that the appointed director must further the
interests of his appointor or appointors does not,
however, mean that he is allowed to ignore the interests
of the company of which he is a director. Thus, the
appointed director must not agree to subordinate the
interests of the company to the interests of the
shareholder or shareholders who appointed him'39'.
7.3.1.2. Directors' duty to give an accurate advice to
shareho1ders.
In relation to all forms of negligence liability,
including liability for negligent statements, the test
of the existence of a duty of care has been subjected to
radical developments, over a short period of time'49'.
In brief, before 1932 there was no general principle
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upon which the courts could rely to determine the
existence of a duty of care in all circumstances. The
courts had no choice but to rely on traditional
categorisation of recognisable situations as guides to
the existence of a duty of care and the scope of that
duty. In other words, the courts were relying upon the
existing precedents. In 1932 Lord Atkin in the case of
Donoghue v. Stevenson1 4 1 > , laid down the famous
"neighbourlifcJ of"f oreseeabi 1 i ty" principle. That general
principle had been the subject of many developments.
The most comprehensive attempt to formulate a general
principle was achieved by lord Wi lberforce in Anns v.
London Borough of Merton{42) . His Lordship laid down a
test of two stages. "Neighbourhood" or "proximity" and
"f oreseeabi 1 i ty" are the main elements of the first
stage of the test. The second stage deals with policy
considerations which may negate the duty of care or
limit its scope. In latter cases, the courts added a
new element, to this test, which was whether it is
"fair, just and reasonable" to impose a duty of care on
the defender in any given case. Over the years, the
general principle test of liability, has been criticised
as being an impractical test* 43' . The terms "proximity"
and "fairness" have been attacked as being no more than
"labels" to attach to specific situations which "the law
recognises pragmatical ly as giving rise to a duty of
care"*44> . Most recently, in Caparo Industries pic v.
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Pi cknian1 4 5 > , the House of Lords abandoned the general
principle test of liability and preferred the
traditional categorisation of recognisable situations as
guides to the existence of a duty of care and the scope
of that duty. In addition, the decision in the Anns
case has, recently, been overruled by the decision of
the House of Lords in Murphy v. Brentwood District
Counc j I ( 4 6 ) . I n the latter the House held that, when
carrying out its statutory functions of exercising
control over building operations, a local authority owed
no duty of care to owners or occupiers who suffered
economic loss as a result of repairing structural defect
in their property. Thus, the Anns case which al lowed
recovery for pure economic loss has been overruled.
In relation to liability for negligent statements or
negligent advice the leading case is Hedley Byrne & Co.
Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd(47) . Before this case
there had been no case al lowing recovery in negligence
for economic loss caused by negligent statements!< 8) .
In that case the House of Lords held that, in the
absence of an express disclaimer of responsibility, the
bank, who gave information about one of its customers'
creditworthiness to a firm of advertising agents, owed a
duty of care to the advertising agents to insure that
the information it gave was sound. The House of Lords
based its decision on the existence of a "voluntary
assumption of responsibi1ity"!49> on the part of the
defendant which gave rise to a "special relationship"
between the defendant and the plaintiff. Reliance was a
crucial factor in that case. The House stated that a
"special relationship" between the defendant and the
plaintiff might exist if the defendant knew or ought to
have known that the plaintiff would rely on the given
statement* 50' . Most recently, the House of Lords, in
Caparo Industries pic v. D i ckrnan *51) t accepted and
affirmed the decision of the Hed1ey Byrne case. The
Caparo case was concerned with the liability of the
auditors of a public company to potential investors.
From the decision in the Hedley Byrne case, the House of
Lords, in the Caparo case, deduced the following grounds
which are necessary for a duty of care to arise: (1) The
statement or the advice was given to a known person; (2)
It was given to achieve a specific purpose; (3) the
maker of the statement or the advisor was aware of that
purpose; (4) the maker of the statement or the advisor
aware, "actually or inferential 1y"* 5 2) , that the advisee
or the recipient of the statement would rely on it; and
(5) the recipient or the advisee had, actually, relied
on the statement or the advice and "acted upon to his
detriment"' 5 3 ) . The absence of any of those grounds is
capable of preventing liability from arising'54). But,
does the existence of all t h e s e grounds necessarily me a n
that liability will arise?. The answer is found in Lord
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Oliver's speech in the Caparo case itself. His Lordship
That is not, of course, to suggest that these
conditions are either conclusive or exclusive,
but merely that the actual decision in the
case does not warrant any broader
propositions' 55) .
His Lordship also said:
in a swiftly developing field of law,
there can be no necessary assumption that
those features which have served in one case
to create the relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant on which liability
depends will necessarily be determinative of
liability in the different circumstances of
another case' 56) _
His Lordship meant that the decision, in the Caparo
case, left an open door to further conditions in the
future. In one's opinion, new conditions or
"propositions" can be divided into two types: (1)
General conditions which are applied to all cases in all
c i r c urns tarices (e.g., the f oreseeabi 1 i ty of the harm);
and (2) special conditions which stem from the special
circumstances of a given case (e.g. the purpose of
making a report under S.23G and S.237 CA 1985). Special
conditions are applicable only to the case from which
they stem. Developing any general condition will
necessarily limit the scope of the duty of care.
Whereas the effect of any special condition is confined
to the case from which that condition stems. Thus, the
specie 1 condition3 of a particular case, whi1e able to
prevent liability from arising in that case, are unable
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to do the seme in other cases. In other words these
conditions amount to no more than considerations which
"ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of
the duty or the class of persons to whom it is owed or
the damages to which a breach of it may give rise"'571.
Thus, one can conclude that if Lord Oliver's statement
(quoted above) means that the door is open to further
general conditions or propositions, then the law is
moving toward narrowing the range of the duty of care in
relation to negligent misstatement and negligent advice.
Going back to the main issue: directors' duty of care to
shareholders. If directors advise the shareholders to
accept the wrong take—over bid, will they be field liable
to the shareholders?. Before giving an answer to this
question, one should examine the issue of whether, for a
duty of care to arise, the advisor must be professional
(i.e. possesses the skill and knowledge to give an
advice of the sort given). In Mutual Life & Citizens'
Assurance Co. Ltd v. Eva 11 < 5 8 ) f the majority of the
Privy Council held that for a duty of care to arise
under the Hed 1 ey Byrne rule, the one who gives the
advic e mus t be either a professional, i.e. specialised
in giving business advice of that kind or lias held
himself out as a skilled or competent to give an advice
of the kind given' 59 ' . It is said' 60 > that the only
possible exception to this rule is where the adviser or
the giver of the information has a financial interest in
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the informa t i on he is giving. In their dissenting
judgment. Lord Reid and Lord Morris, stated that, for a
duty of care to arise, it is unnecessary for the advisor
to be an expert or specialist in the matter on which he
gave the advice. They said:
We can see no ground for the distinction that
a specially skilled man must exercise care but
a less skilled man need not do so( 6 1 > .
An unskilled advisor, in their opinion, owe a duty to
take reasonable care before giving the advice. A
skilled advisor must conform to the standard of skill
and competence which is generally shown by persons who
carry on the business of giving an advice of the sort
given. Thus an unskil led advisor cannot escape
liability by saying that he does not possess the
necessary skill and knowledge. Accordingly, their
Lordships said:
We are unable to accept the argument that a
duty to take care is the same as a duty to
conform to a particular standard of skill<62> .
For a duty of care to arise, however, the advisee must
act reasonably in seeking the advice. A reasonable man
will not seek a legal advice, for example, from a
butcher. The liability will not arise in this case, not
because the butcher has no skill to give a legal advice,
but because the advisee has not acted reasonably in
seek irig the advice. In addi t i on , the one who seeks an
advice must make it clear to the advisor that he is
going to rely on it in relation to a certain matter*63>.
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Finally, the advisee must follow the advisor's
directions. If he failed and, consequently, suffered
loss, the advisor would not be blamed.
It is to be noted, however, that the decision in the
Mu t u a 1 Life case is not binding on the British courts.
So, it has only a persuasive force in Britain*64) .
Accordingly, it is agreed* 6 5' that the courts in Britain
may not release an advisor from a duty of care merely
because he is not a professional or expert in giving
advice of the kind given. Here, suppose that a director
of a company advised the shareholders to accept a
certain take-over bid and to reject a rival one; the
shareholders relied on that advice and accepted that bid
which turned out not to be the best one. VVi 1 1 the
directors be held liable in this case?. The answer
seems to be yes. The directors in such a case owe a
duty of care to the shareholders. It is to be noted
that Rule 3 of the Code on Take-overs and Mergers (The
Code)*65> , requires the board of an offeree company to
obtain "competent independent" advice on any take-over
offer. Rule 25 imposes a positive duty on the board of
an offeree company to advise the shareholders of its
views on the offer. It also requires the board to make
known to the shareholders the substance of the advice
given to it by its independent advisers. General
principle 5 of the Code, requires that the advice must
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be given with the highest standards of truth and
accuracy* 6 7 ' .
It remains to examine the question of casual advice.
Casual advice cannot give rise to a duty of care* 68 ' .
An advice can be regarded as a casual one, if it has
been given in a social context or, generally, in
circumstances which make it clear to a reasonable
enquirer that the giver of the advice does not intend to
bind himse1f by it. In the Mutual life case, Lord Reid
and Lord Morris stated:
no duty beyond the duty to give an
honest answer can arise when advice is given
casually or in a social context, and the
reason is that it would be quite unreasonable
to impose any greater duty on the advisor*69'.
The duty of care discussed above is the common law duty
of care. The courts, however, went beyond that and held
that in the presence of a relationship of dependency and
confidence between the adviser and the recipient of the
advice, the former may owe a fiduciary duty of care to
the latter. A breach of this fiduciary duty of care was
held to be an adequate ground for rescinding the
contract entered into by the adviser and the recipient
of the advice. In Lloyds Bank Ltd v. Bundy* 7 0 ' it was
field that because the bank's officials had failed to
give an advice to the guarantor as to the possible
consequences of the bank's customer defaulting, the
guarantor was entitled to rescind the guarantee which he
gave to secure a bank's loan made to that customer. The
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courts emphasised that the guarantor should be advised
to seek an independent advice before entering into the
transaction. The bank officials failed to give that
advice and so the guarantor was entitled to rescind the
transaction. The duty which had been breached by the
bank officials was a fiduciary duty of care stemming
from the relationship of dependency and confidence which
existed between the guarantor in the one hand and the
bank and its officials in the other hand. It is
said1 7 1 ' that the court in such a situation might be
entitled to order compensation for the loss suffered by
the plaintiff, and to compel the defendant to account
for any profit made by him.
The common law duty of care as we 1 1 as the fiduciary
duty of care can be applied to companies' directors when
giving advice to the shareholders. A director's
inaccurate advice may cause the shareholder a direct or
an indirect loss. A direct loss may be caused if a
director advises the shareholder to sell or to purchase
shares at an under or over value. An indirect loss may
be caused to a shareholder if a director advises the
shareholder to approve the company's decision to sel1 or
to purchase shares at an under or over value. The
company's shares, in the latter case, will loose value
in the market and consequently, the shareholders wi11 be
adversely affected by that loss. The rule in Foss v.
Harbottle(?2), however, remains an obstacle to
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shareholders' actions against directors when the loss is
classified as an indirect one'73' . So, the damages
available to shareholders are limited to the loss
sustained directly by them. In other words, they are
not entitled to recover damages "merely because the
company in which Cthey are] interested has suffered
damages"' 74' . The proper plaintiff in that case is the
company itself. Shares are merely rights of
participation in a company. Thus it is logical that a
personal action cannot be allowed in cases where the
loss suffered by a shareholder is merely a reflection of
the loss suffered by the company through the diminution
of the value of its shares' 75) . if the company recovers
its loss, the shares will return to their former
value' 76 > . It is said'77' that going beyond these
limits might permit double recovery and may destroy the
rule in Foss v. Harbo11 1 e' 78 ' . In addition, going
beyond those limits may subvert the rule which provides
that the company is a separate legal entity'73 ' . It is
said'30' that if a share i s con sidered as a piece of
personal property, a shareholder will be entitled to
bring a personal action against those who cause injury
to that property.
Where there are two rival bids, directors must not act
recklessly in deciding between these two bids. In Heron
International Ltd v. Lord Grade'81', it was alleged that
the directors had, by sel ling their own shares, forced
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the shareholders to accept a particular bid which was
not the best at the time. The court held that there was
no negligence on the part of the directors. They were
right to consider that, at the time, the rival bid was
unrealistic. The Court of Appeal, however, stated that
had the directors been found negligent, they would have
been held, financially, liable for the failure to decide
between the two rival bids.
When giving shareholders advice, whether to accept or to
reject a take-over offer for their shares, directors are
under a duty to act in good faith. This fiduciary duty
is owed directly to shareholders. In Gething v.
Ki1ner(8 2) ( Brightman J. said that where a take-over bid
had been made, the directors of the offeree company were
under a duty to act honestly and not to mislead the
shareholders. Similarly, in Prudential Assurance Co.
Ltd v. Newman Industries Ltd (No. 2){83), the court held
that the directors were under a duty to act in good
faith when giving shareholders advice whether to
approve a scheme for the purchase of a large block of
assets from another company.
7.3.1.3. Duties resulting from the special characters of
a company and the dominative position of directors.
In some circumstances, the court may hold the directors
liable towards the shareholders depending on the nature
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of the company. In the New Zealand case of Co 1 ernan v.
Myers<8 *> , Mr Myers, the chairman's son, indicated to
his father that he was not ready to undertake the job of
chief executive unless he had a sizeable stake in the
company. The company's shares were held by various
members of three generations of the Myers family. So,
the company was effectively a family business. With the
assistance of his father, Mr Myers contracted to buy two
large blocks of shares in the company, on condition that
he did not have to pay the price of those shares for six
months. During this period, he used the control given
to him by holding these shares and intended to compel
the company to se 1 1 valuable buildings and to lend him
the cash obtained thereby. He intended to use the cash
to pay for the shares which he bought from the company.
Following an attack on him by the other shareholders, he
formed another company and launched a full-scale
takeover bid in order to buy the shares of the minority
shareholders compulsorily. He fixed the price at which
he offered to buy the shares. He and his father, the
second defendant, recommended that the shareholders
should accept the offer. Mr Myers had successfully
carried out his plan and made profit out of the sale of
the company's buildings which produced more money than
was necessary to buy the shares at the price that had
been agreed. The minority shareholders, whose holdings
were compulsorily purchased, brought an action against
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Mr Myers and his father. The minority al1eged that the
defendants had committed a fraud, and breached their
fiduciary duty as well as their duty of care arid skill.
With respect to the second allegation, i.e., the breach
of the fiduciary duty, the court rejected the approach
which says that directors will never owe fiduciary
duties to shareholders. The court accepted that
directors can owe fiduciary duties to shareholders even
in the absence of an agency relationships. The court
emphasised that these fiduciary duties do not stem
solely from the director — shareholder relationship.
Some other factors may give rise to these fiduciary
duties. In determining these factors Woodhouse J.
s a i d' ° 5 ) ;
[The] standard of conduct required from a
director in relation to dealings with a
shareholder will differ depending upon all the
surrounding circumstances and the nature of
the responsibility which in a real and
practical sense the director has assumed
towards the shareholder. In the one case
there may be a need to provide an explicit
warning and a great deal of information
concerning the proposed transaction. In
another there may be no need to speak at all.
There will be intermediate situations. It is,
however, an area of the law where the courts
can and should find some practical means of
giving effect to sensible and fair principles
of commercial morality in the cases that come
before them; and while it may not be possible
to lay down any general test as to when the
fiduciary duty will arise for a company
director or to prescribe the exact conduct
which will always discharge it when it does,
there are nevertheless some factors that wi 1 1
usually have an influence upon a decision one
way or another. They include, I think,
dependence upon information and advice, the
existence of a relationship of confidence, the
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significance of some particular transaction
for the parties and, of course, the extent of
any positive action taken by or on behalf of
the director or directors to promote it.
Woodhouse J. indicated that factors which gave rise to
directors' fiduciary duties were not limited and could
not be enumerated. The judge gave as examples of those
factors: a relationship of confidence between the
parties; reliance by the plaintiff on the defendant's
skil1 and knowledge; and the significance of some
transactions for the parties. These are all among the
factors which may give rise to fiduciary duties. In
his judgment Cooke J. emphasised the importance of the
family character of the company, the position of the
directors, their high degree of inside knowledge and the
way in which they carried out their plans as factors had
participated in giving rise to the directors' fiduciary
duties in the Co 1 eman case. Cooke J. said'561 :
[The] facts giving rise to the [fiduciary]
duty are the family character of this company;
the positions of father and son in the company
and the family; their high degree of inside
knowledge; and the way in which they went
about the take-over and the persuasion of
shareho1ders .
Indeed, the considerations which were taken into account
in the Coleman case were very sirni lar to those in
Ebrahimi v . Westbourne Gal 1 e r i e s Ltd.'8 7). The effect
of the decision in the latter case, however, does not
extend beyond cases where the company is to be wound up.
It does not extend to govern the relationship between
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directors and shareholders when the company remains a
going concern. It is agreed18 31 that any such extension
may develop directors' fiduciary duties, in Britain,
along the lines of the Co 1eman case. This is because to
fol low the decision in the Co 1eman case means to create
a rule capable of governing directors —shareholders
relationship while the company is a going concern189'.
7.3.2. Directors' Duties to Shareholders under the
legislation
In relation to directors' statutory duties to
shareholders, only two main and important duties wi11 be
discussed. Namely, directors' duties in relation to
prospectuses and the compensation for loss of office.
So, it is to be noted that directors' duties to
shareholders under the statutes are not confined to
these two issues.
7.3.2.1. Liability for Untrue or Misleading Statements
in a Prospectus1 9(" .
In Perry v. Peek1 9 1 > , the House of Lords held that the
directors were not liable, in the absence of fraud, for
negligent, untrue, statements in a prospectus. This
decision was overruled by the decision of Hed1ey Byrne &
Co. Ltd v. He 1 1er & Partners Ltd192) , where it was held
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that persons could be held liable for negligent
statements where there was a sufficient degree of
proximity between them and the person who suffered loss
as a result of that statement.
In relation to directors' duties for the falsity of a
statement in a prospectus, however, the Directors'
Liability Act 1890 reversed the decision of Perry v.
Peek'9 3} . The Directors' Liability Act 1890 contained
provisions which laid down directors' liability for
untrue statements in prospectuses. Those provisions are
now contained in the Companies Act 1985<94)a3 well as in
the Financial Services Act 1986.
The Companies Act 1985 imposes some statutory duties on
directors toward individual shareholders. One
important duty is to issue accurate prospectuses. A
director may be held liable to compensate shareholders
for the loss they suffer as a result of untrue
statements in prospectuses. Thus, the law gives the
subscribers the right to seek compensation from
directors who are responsible for issuing prospectuses
which cause loss to them. This is covered by S.67(1) CA
1985. The section provides:
Where a prospectus invites persons to
subscribe for a company's shares or
debentures, compensation is payable to all
those who subscribe for any shares or
debentures on the faith of the prospectus for
loss or damage which they may have sustained
by reason of any untrue statement included in
i t .
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It is clear from the wording of this section that
directors' liability may arise only if the prospectus
includes untrue statements. In other words, this
section does not extend to cover cases of omission from
prospectuses' 95l .
The provisions which dealing with directors' duties in
relation to prospectuses are now contained, as mentioned
above, in the Financial Services Act 1986'96>. S.1G6
FSA 198G provides that:
.the person or persons responsible for a
prospectus or supplementary prospectus shall
be liable to pay compensation to any person
who has acquired the securities to which the
prospectus relates and suffered loss in
respect of them as a result of any untrue or
misleading statement in the prospectus or the
omission from it of any matter required to be
included by section 1G3 or 1G4 . . .
Under the section stated above, the company itself can
be responsible for untrue statement in a prospectus and
accordingly can be made liable to pay compensation to
the injured party' 97 ) . A director is also among those
who are responsible for a prospectus'98).
S.1GG extends to cover omissions from a prospectus of
any matter required to be included by the statute. In
addition to their liability under this section,
directors ca n also be sued for a breach of a statutory
duty if they omit to include the necessary information
in a prospectus as required by the statute. The pursuer
needs not prove that he relied on the statement
contained in the prospectus'99'. He needs only to prove
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that he has suffered loss a result of the falsity of the
s t a t ement.
How can a director escape liability? The statutory
d e f ences
The liability of a director for untrue or misleading
statement in a prospectus or the omission from it is not
an absolute. He can escape liability by relying on one
or more of the defences set out in the Financial
Services Act 1986' 10 0 > .
It is said' 1 ° 1 > , that those defences reduce the
liability of directors to "at mos t one for negligence".
So, a director can escape liability by proving that the
statement in prospectuses were not made negligently.
S. 167(1) FSA 1986 enumerates those defences. According
to that section a director can escape liability:
(1) If he satisfies the court that he reasonably
believed that the statement was true and not misleading
or that the matter whose omission caused the loss to the
plaintiff was properly omitted, and
(a) that he continued in that belief until the
time when the securities were acquired; or (b)
that they were acquired before it was
reasonably practicable to bring a correction
to the attention of persons likely to acquire
the securities in question; or (c) that before
the securities were acquired he had taken all
such steps as it was reasonable for him to
have taken to secure that a correction was
forthwith brought to the attention of the
those persons; or (d) that the securities were
acquired after such a lapse of time that he
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ought in the circumstances to be reasonably
excused' 10 2).
(2) If" he satisfies the court that, at the time when the
prospectus was delivered for registration, he believed
on reasonable grounds that the expert, who authorised
the statement was competent to make or to authorise the
statement and had consented to the inclusion of that
s t a tement < i o3) .
(3) If he satisfies the court that a timely correction
was made before the securities were acquired or that the
fact that the expert was not competent was "published in
a manner calculated to bring it to the attention of
persons likely to acquire the securities in
question"' 1041 , or that he took all reasonable steps to
"secure such publication and reasonably believed that it
had taken place before the securities were
acquired"< l 0 5 ) .
(4) If he satisfies the court that the untrue statement
arises from the accurate and fair reproduction of a
public official statement or document'106' .
(5) If he satisfies the court that the person who
suffered loss was aware of the falsity of the
s t a t ernent <10 7).
Thus, directors' liability in respect of prospectuses is
not an absolute. A wide range of defences is available
to directors to escape liability for untrue or
misleading statements in prospectuses.
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The measure uf i-uunpensa t i on
If the pursuer proves the falsity of the statement' 1 08 '
in a prospectus and the loss he has suffered, he will be
entitled for compensation from those who are responsible
for that statement. This is, of course, unless the
defender has managed to escape liability by relying on
one or more of the available defences. If a director is
the only person who is responsible for the falsity of a
statement in a prospectus, the pursuer subscriber cannot
rescind the contract because the director is not the
other contracting party. So, the measure of
compensation is the delict measure. It is not the
contract measure. The measure of compensation,
accordingly, is the difference between the price paid by
the pursuer subscriber to the company and the real value
of the shares at the date they were issued to him' I 09' .
In addition the pursuer may be granted compensation for
any consequential loss'''01.
7:3.2.2. Loss of Office Compensation
A company, according to S.312 CA 1985, is prohibited
from making any payment to a director by way of
compensation for loss of office in the absence of the
company's approva1 ' l l l ) . A similar prohibition is
contained in S.313 CA 1985. This section provides that
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if "in connection with the transfer of the whole or any
part of the undertaking or property of the company", any
payment is made to a director by way of compensation for
loss of office or in connection with his retirement from
office, it must be disclosed to and approved by the
company in general meeting. In the absence of an
approval, in relation to S.312 and S.313 , the amount
received by the director must be held in trust for the
company. The shareholders' approval is required in such
situations because of the position of directors. It is
in the shareholders' interests to know what might change
the directors' attitude. The payment of compensation
for directors might, of course, affect their attitude
toward the company and its shareholders.
A company may become a target of a take—over bid. The
bidder may offer compensation to directors who will lose
their office. This compensation must be disclosed to
and approved by the selling shareholders. If the
selling shareholders refuse to approve it, the directors
who received the compensation must hold it in trust for
the selling shareholders'112' . A director's liability
toward individual shareholders, in relation to
compensation for loss of office, can be attached to him
on 1y if:
(a) an offer made to the general body of
shareholders; or (b) an offer made by or on
behalf of some other body corporate with a
view to the company becoming its subsidiary or
the subsidiary of its holding company; or (c)
an offer made by or on behalf of an individual
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with a view to his obtaining the right to
exercise or control the exercise of not less
than one—third of the voting power at any
general meeting of the company; or (d) any
other offer which is conditional on acceptance
to a given ex tent( 113 > .
It is the director's duty to disclose the proposed
compensation to the selling shareholders. If he fails
to do so he will be liable to a f ine' ' ' ^ ' . Compliance
with the duty of disclosure, however, does not mean that
the director who received the compensation is entitled
to keep it for himself. He must seek the approval of
the selling shareholders.
The selling shareholders who sell their shares to the
offeror for a cash consideration are those who will
become the beneficiaries of the statutory trust. The
shareholders who exchange in the target company for new
shares in the offeror company are not entitled to
receive a fraction of the amount which is paid to the
directors as compensation for loss of of fice' 115). In
S.312 and S.313 CA 1985, the recipient of the payment
a.r>ci S, 'i'S
must hold it in trust for the company. In S.314A CA
1985, this payment must be held in trust for the selling
shareholders. The reason is that if the company is made
the beneficiary of the statutory trust under S.314, then
the selling shareholders wi11 have no remedy, i.e., they
wil1 obtain no fraction out of the amount paid to
directors. They wil1 have no remedy because they are no
longer shareholders in the company. Thus, S.314 is
designed to protect the interests of the selling
shareholders. To achieve this purpose the section
provides, in clear words, that the amount of money
received by the directors shall be held "in trust for
persons who have sold their shares as a result of the
offer made". In addition, to achieve the purpose of
protecting the selling shareholders, S.316(2) CA 1985
provides that if the price to be paid to a director, who
will lose his office, for his shares in the company is
in "excess of the price which could at the time have
been obtained by other holders of the like shares"'1161,
the excess wi 1 1 be deemed as a payment made by way of
compensation for loss of office or in connection with
his retirement from office' 1 1 7 ' . This section is, in
fact, providing an effective way to prevent such an
attempt to circumvent S.314 and S.315.
A proposed compensation and a contractual compensation
Compensation for loss of office, which is unlawful in
the absence of the shareholders' approval, does not
extend to the contractual compensation payment which the
company is, perhaps, bound to pay to its managing
director' 1181 . It would seem that the phrase "the
proposed payment" in S.314 CA 1985 is confined only to a
proposed payment to a director qua director. That is,
it does not extend to embrace the payment which the
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company is bound to make to its managing director under
the service contract.
A director and a managing director
In the Scottish case of Anderson v. James Sutherland
(Peterhead) Ltd and others' ' ' ^ 1 , Lord President Norrnand
said'120):
the managing director has two functions
and two capacities. Qua managing director he
is a party to a contract with the company, and
this contract is a contract of employment
it is a contract of service and not a
contract of services.
So, the managing director is usually a party to a
contract of employment with the company. This is not
the case in relation to a director qua director. Lord
Jenkins'121) accepted that the positions of director and
managing director formed "two distinct of fices"' 122) .
In the Australian case of Lincoln Mills (Aust) Ltd v.
Gough' 12 3) r G was the director of L company and the
managing director of that company. Under the agreement
of employment, L would pay G a lump sum if the agreement
with G as a managing director was terminated in certain
circumstances. The agreement was terminated and L paid
the agreed lump sum, but later claimed that G field it in
trust for L. The court field that G held two offices: a
director and a managing director. The compensation he
received, the court said, was for an uncompleted term as
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managing director, and was a lawful payment to him under
the statute. Hudson J. said<l24) ;
[The payment] was not made with the intent or
object of compensating EG] for loss of his
office as a director or as a consideration for
his retirement therefrom. It was a payment
which the plaintiff company made and was
liable to ma ke to EG] in the events that had
happened on the termination of his office as a
managing director. If it is properly
described as a compensation for loss of office
. then it was for loss of . . . the office
of managing director and not that of a
director.
In the New Zealand case of Taupo Totara Timber Co. Ltd
v. Rowe<125) f R was the director and the managing
director of T. As a managing director R had entered
into a service contract with T. To encourage R to stay
in the company as a managing director his service
contract with the company contained special provisions
regarding resignation and compensation. One of those
provisions provides that T company will pay R a lump sum
if it terminates his service contract or if R resigns
after a successful take-over bid. Following a take-over
of T by another company, R resigned. The question was
whether the proposed payment was lawful or not. The
Privy Council held that R was holding two offices in the
company; on the one hand the office of a director; on
the other hand the office of a managing director. As a
managing director, R had a service contract with the
company. So, he was one of the company's employees. He
was entitled to have the benefits of that contract
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including the agreed compensation for loss of office of
a managing director. The Privy Council held that the
payment made by the company was lawful and not in
contravention of the relevant statute' 1 26' .
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Directors' Duties to Creditors
8.1. Introduction
Directors are under a duty to exercise their powers for
the purposes for which they were conferred and bona fide
in the interests of the company' i > . This duty is not
owed to "individual members of [the] company, but only
to the c ompany itself, . . . "(2). Th is principle
indicates that, in general, though there are important
exceptions to be discussed later, directors owe no
duties to company's creditors, nor they are liable for
its debts to creditors with whom they deal on the
company's behalf. Thus, directors were held not to be
liable, at common law, for the company's debts, even if
they knew that the company was insolvent at the time the
debts were incurred' 3 ) . Moreover, the fact that the
directors' negligent conduct or breach of fiduciary duty
to the company has caused the company to breach its
contractual obligations, does not make the directors
liable to the company's creditors or to the other
contracting party who has suffered loss as a result of
the company's breach of obiigation'<'. Directors are
also not liable for wrongs or torts committed by the
company so long as they have not personally participated
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in the commission of the tort or authorised its
commission' 5 1 . The reason for this general immunity
from liability stems from the distinct legal personality
of the company'6 ' . Since the company has a separate
legal personality, then it is the only one who is
responsible for the fulfilment of its obligations or the
payment of its debts. However, in some exceptional
cases directors may be held to owe duties to creditors
regardless of the general rule of immunity which is
stated above. The principles of agency, the statutes
and the courts have tried to provide creditors with some
sort of protection against the directors' actions. So,
this chapter will discuss the available methods of
protecting company's creditors. It is divided into two
main parts. (I) The statutory protection of creditors.
(II) The judicial protection of creditors. A great
significance, however, will be attached to the second
part. One must declare that directors' duties to third
parties, under the principles of agency, will not be
examined in this chapter. That is because the rules of
agency are well established and one felt that it is
unnecessary to discuss those rules here'7).
8.2. The Statutory Protection of Creditors.
The statutes contain several provisions aiming to
protect creditors of the company. This issue can be
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divided into two parts: (1) fraudulent and wrongful
trading; (2) directors' concurrent liability. In
these cases, directors may incur personal liability to
creditors under the statute. In the former, a director
may be compel led by the court to contribute to the
company's assets. In the latter, the director may
become concurrently liable, with the company, for the
payment of its debts for the benefit of the creditors.
8.2.1. Fraudulent and wrongful trading.
8.2.1.1. Fraudulent trading.
Fraudulent trading is governed by S.213 of the
Insolvency Act 1986. The section provides:
(1) If in the course of the winding up a
company it appears that any business of the
company has been carried on with intent to
defraud creditors of the company or creditors
of any other person, or for any fraudulent
purpose, the following has effect.
(2) The court, on the application of the
liquidator may declare that any persons who
were knowingly parties to the carrying on of
the business in the manner above mentioned
are to be liable to make such contributions
(if any) to the company's assets as the court
thinks proper'8'.
To hold a director liable under this section, the
company must be in the course of being wound up; the
director has knowingly engaged in carrying on the
company's business for the purpose of defrauding
creditors or for any fraudulent purpose. These are the
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key elements of S.213. Because fraudulent trading is a
criminal offence under S.458 CA 1985, a high standard of
proof of fraud is required in order to obtain an order
imposing personal liability on the defender. A standard
which is equal to that required for criminal conviction.
For example, it must be proved that the defender
director is actually aware of his company's inability to
pay its debts, when he acts on its behalf, and that he
intends to defraud the creditors or to achieve any
fraudulent purpose'91 . Here, it would seem that an
inferential knowledge of the company's inability to pay
its debts, is not enough to make a director liable under
S.213. This is clear from the judgment of Maugham J. in
Re Patrick and Lyon' 1 ° ' , where he said that the words
"defraud" and "fraudulent purpose" connote "real
dishonesty involving, according to current notions of
fair trading among commercial men at the present day,
real moral b 1 ame"< l l ) . S.213 has been designed to
punish persons who deliberately and knowingly set out to
defraud creditors' 12) . The words "fraud" and
"fraudulent", in this context, must be distinguished
from the word "fraud" in the context of the minority
protection. In the latter, the word "fraud" was given a
wide interpretation. Thus, it is said(l3) that "fraud
on the minority" can be held to exist if it is proved
that the action of the majority shareholders confers
some benefit on them. Consequently, a majority's
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negligence can constitute fraud on the minority provided
that that negligence confers some benefit on the
majority. Likewise "fraud on the minority" can be held
to exist if it is shown that the majority has abused its
powers, for example, by injuring one class of
shareholders to the benefit of another'1♦'. Therefore,
in relation to the meaning of "fraud" in the context of
"the minority protection", lack of honesty is not a
necessary element for the existence of fraud.
Otherwise, owing to the difficulty of proving
dishonesty, it would not always be possible to hear the
groaning of the minority shareholders who suffer under
the rigidity of the majority rule'15'. One feels that a
wide interpretation of the word "fraud" while suitable
and desirable in the context of "minority protection",
is inappropriate in the context of "fraudulent trading".
The reason lying behind this conclusion is the
fundamental point that fraudulent trading is a criminal
offence, while a fraud on the minority is not.
Fraudulent trading is a criminal offence which deserves
a criminal penalty. Thus, a strict interpretation of
the word "fraud" is more appropriate. Consequently,
dishonesty must remain a crucial element to prove
fraudulent trading. Thus, in order to make a director
liable under S.213, it is not sufficient to prove that
he is gui 1 ty of negligent mismanagement. In addition,
the mere omission by a director cannot constitute a
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breach of that section. That is because the expression
"parties to" invoIves some positive step'16'.
Despite the difficulty of proving "actual dishonesty" it
has been held that this requirement can be satisfied if
it is proved that the director caused the company to
incur additional liabilities at a time when it was clear
to him that the company would never be able to pay its
creditors. Similarly, the requirement of "actual
dishonesty" can be satisfied if it is proved that the
director has obtained credit for the company when he
knew that "there is no reason for thinking that the
company is able to meet all its liabilities as they fall
due"'17'. It is not necessary, however, for the purpose
of making a director liable under S.213 to prove that
all creditors have been defrauded. Thus, in Re Gera 1 d
Cooper Chemicals Ltd'16' , it was held that a single
transaction which was carried out to defraud a single
creditor could constitute a violation of the fraudulent
trading provision.
The expression "carrying on business" was held not to be
necessarily synonymous with actively carrying on
trade' '9 > . Thus, "the collection of assets acquired in
the course of business and the distribution of the
proceeds of these assets in discharge of business
liabilities"'20' , can constitute a carrying on of
bu sine s s. However, in Re Sarflax Ltd.'2 1) it was held
that where the only al legation against the company or
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its officers was that they preferred one or more
creditors over others, this could not constitute fraud
within the meaning of S.213.
The court has been given a discretionary power to make
the defender liable to contribute to the company's
assets as it thinks proper. The Insolvency Act 198G
puts neither maximum nor minimum limit on the liability
to contribute to the company's assets in cases of
fraudulent trading. It follows that it is not necessary
to bear in mind how many debts incurred by the company
during the period of fraudulent trading nor whether
certain creditors were misled'22) . It is said'23' ,
however, that (when deciding the amount of contribution
to the company's assets) the court will take into
account the decrease in the company's assets and the
increase in its liabilities resulting from fraudulent
trading. It should be noticed that under S.213(2) the
contribution ordered to be made must be made to the
company's assets. Thus, the money recovered wi 1 1 be
available for all creditors and not paid to particular
creditors'24'. S.215(4) gives the court the power to
direct that the whole or any part of the debt owed by
the company to the person who is found gui1ty of
fraudulent trading and any interest thereon "shall rank
in priority after all other debts owed by the company
and after any interest on those debts"'25) .
Furthermore, imposing a criminal liability on a director
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who is found guilty of fraudulent trading does not
exonerate him from the civil liability to contribute to
the company's assets' 25' . Finally, for the purposes of
S.458 CA 1985, fraudulent trading can be prosecuted even
if the company is not in the course of being wound up.
In other words, the criminal offence is not linked to a
winding up<27). whereas the "course of winding up"
requirement is still intact in relation to the civil
1iabi1ity.
8.2.1.2. Wrongful Trading.
The Cork Committee'28) t suggested the wrongful trading
provision under which civil personal liability could
exist without proof of dishonesty'29' and without
requiring the high standard of proof which is required
for criminal convictions. The wrongful trading is now
governed by S.214 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The
reason behind the enactment of the wrongful trading
provision is to govern cases in which directors have
carried on of business recklessly and can escape
liability owing to the difficulty of establishing a case
of fraudulent trading against them. So. it would seem
appropriate to draw a distinction between fraudulent
trading and wrongful trading at this stage. First, in
fraudulent trading a personal liability may be imposed
upon any person who is a party to the carrying on of the
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company's business' 30' . Whereas in wrongful trading
only the directors and shadow directors' 31 1 are caught
by its provisions. In relation to shadow directors,
they cannot be made responsible for wrongful trading
unless the directors are accustomed to act in accordance
with their instructions'32' . Second, in fraudulent
trading, the onus of proving the intention to defraud
creditors is on the liquidator. Whereas in wrongful
trading, directors who wish to escape liability bear the
onus of proving that they have taken every step to
minimise the potential loss to the company's creditors.
It follows that while it is necessary to prove actual
dishonesty in order to establish a case of fraudulent
trading, proving dishonesty is unnecessary to establish
a case of wrongful trading. Thus, mere negligence is
sufficient for the purposes of the wrongful trading
provisions'33' . Third, while fraudulent trading is a
criminal offence'34' , wrongful trading is not. The
similarities, however, between fraudulent trading and
wrongful trading lie in two matters: first, the
liquidator is the one who can make an application to the
court in relation to both types of trading; second, in
both fraudulent and wrongful trading, the defender may
be held personally liable to contribute to the company's
assets as the court thinks proper.
According to section 214 the court may declare that a
person, who is or has been a director or shadow director
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of a company, is liable to contribute to tbe company's
assets as it thinks proper if:
a) the company has gone into insolvent
1 iquidation,
b) at some time before the c ornmen cement of
the winding up of the company, that person
knew or ought to have concluded that there
was no reasonable prospect that the company
would avoid going into insolvent liquidation;
and
c) that person was a director of the company
at that time<3 5 > .
S.214 was applied in Re Purpoint' 36 > . In that case a
car, which was not needed for the purposes of the
company, was bought by the director on behalf of the
company. It was also bought in a time when the company
was in parlous state. The court field the director
liable to contribute to the company's assets. The court
based its decision on the ground that he should have
realised that the company could not avoid insolvent
liquidation; and that he would be liable to contribute
to the company's assets in an amount equal to the loss
suffered by the company (as a result of the continuation
of trading after its being unable to pay its trade
debts).
Since the court's jurisdiction under S.2I4 is meant to
be "compensatory rather than penal", then when holding
directors liable to contribute, the court may have
regard to the extent of the loss caused to the company's
creditors by the directors' conduct* 371 .
o *7 O
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A director, however, can escape liability if he
satisfies the court that, after he realised the
likelihood of insolvent liquidation, he took every step,
he ought to have taken with a view to minimising the
potential loss to the company's creditors' 38) . in
relation to this particular point, one does not agree
with the view that the liquidator must prove, in
addition to the requirement found in S.214(2), that the
defender director took insufficient steps in the
circumstances to minimise the potential loss to the
company's creditors' 33' . It would seem that S.214 is
very clear. If the liquidator satisfies the court as to
the requirements of that section, the court may declare
that the defender is liable to contribute to the
company's assets. It is then for the defender to prove,
if he wishes to avoid liability, that tie has taken every
step with the view to minimising the loss to creditors.
S.214 has tried to increase the possibility of pursuing
directors who are involved in wrongful trading by
introducing an objective element to the standard of care
required from a director. Thus, the section leads to a
substantial increase in claims by liquidators against
directors of insolvent companies' <0) . To decide whether
a director ought to have concluded that an insolvent
liquidation was unavoidable, the court must apply the
test which is laid down in S.214(4). According to that
section the conclusions which a director
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"ought to reach and the steps which he ought
to take are those which would be known or
ascertained or reached or taken, by a
reasonably diligent person having both-
(a) the general knowledge, skil1 and
experience that may reasonably be expected of
a person carrying out the same functions as
are carried out by that director in relation
to the company, and
(b) the general knowledge, skill and
experience that that director has.
It is clear from the wording of S.214(4) (a) and (b)
that the directors' conclusions are subjected to a test
consisting of two elements. First, an objective element
which is found in S.214(4) (a) (i.e. a reasonable man of
a reasonable general knowledge, skill and experience
carrying out the same functions); and, second, a
sub j e c tive e1ement which is f ound in S.214(4) (b) (i.e.
the personal knowledge, skill and experience which the
defender has)1.
Finally, it should be noted that since the recovery is
corporate under both 3.213 and S.214, neither of those
two provisions violates the principle that all creditors
participate pari passu in bankrupt estate'*2'.
8.2.2. Concurrent Liability of Directors.
The Companies Act 1985 contains some provisions under
which a director may be held concurrently liable, with
the company, to the creditors, for the debts or the
contractual obligations of the company. Examples of
those situations are to be discussed next.
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8.2.2.1. A director's Liability as a sole member of the
company.
S.24 CA 1985 provides that if a company carries on
business with only one member for more than six months,
the sole member is liable jointly and severally with the
company for the payment of the company's debts
contracted by the company after the six months have
expired and during the time that he remains the sole
member of the company and is aware of that fact.
Directors are caught by this section and, in fact, it is
the most likely that the sole member of a company is a
director. The purpose of this section is to ensure that
a company always has a minimum membership of two as
required by the legislation in order to carry on its
business. However, the liability of the sole member,
under this section, is confined to the debts resulting
from contracts entered into by the company after the
period defined by the statute. So, if the company
incurred debts by the operation of law such as taxes,
the sole member will not be made liable for those debts.
It should be noticed, however, that the Twelfth
Directive of the EEC makes possible the creation of a
one man company. The Directive applies to private
limited companies only. That Directive should have been
implemented on the 1st of January 1992. However, it has
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not been implemented by the United Kingdom so far.
Professor Murray' 43) argues that it is the duty of the
national courts to construe national law in the light of
Twelfth Directive even although the national legislature
has failed to i rnp 1 ernent it into state legislation. An
important and direct result of implementing this
directive will be the abolition of the rule that a
winding up order is justified where the number of the
members of the company is reduced below two'4 * 1 .
8.2.2.2. Directors' liability in connection with
negotiab1e instruments.
S. 349(4) CA 1985 provides that a person who signs or
authorises the signature of a bill of exchange,
promissory note, cheque or order for money or goods in
which the company's name is not mentioned as required by
the statute'4 5) , commits an offence punishable by a
fine, and he is further personally liable to the holder
for the amount of instrument unless it is duly paid by
the company. Accordingly, it was held that the name of
the company was not stated in full if part of it was
contracted by an "etc"'46' . Similarly, it was held that
the name of a limited company was not stated in ful1 as
required by the statute if the word "limited" had been
omit ted'47' . However, S.27C1) CA 1985 treated the
contractions "ltd" or "pic" as equivalent to the
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expressions "limited" and "public limited company". The
contraction "Co." was also accepted as equivalent to the
word "company"'48' . It should be noted that, under
S.349(4), the defender cannot escape liability by
pleading that the payee is aware of the fact that the
company's name was misstated in the instrument'49' .
Directors are caught by S.349(4). If a director is
found liable under this section, his liability will be
concurrent with that of the company. The purpose of
this section is to ensure that the company's acceptance
of liability for the negotiable instruments or for
orders for money or goods is made clear by a statement
of its full name.
8.2.2.3. Liability of Disqualified Directors to
creditors.
The court may disqualify a director, in the future, from
acting as a director or in any other capacity in
relation to the company's business if (1) he is
convicted of criminal offence in relation to the
company' 50 ) or, (2) he has been persistently in default
in relation to the provisions of the companies
legislation requiring any return, account or other
document to be filled with, delivered or sent, or notice
of any matter to be given to the Registrar of
Companies' 5 1 ) or, (3) he is found guilty of fraud in
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relation to the company or responsible for fraudulent
trading'52' or, (4) he is found unfit to be a
director'53) . In addition, a person who is an
undischarged bankrupt is automatically disqualified from
acting as a director of a company until he obtains his
discharge in bankruptcy, unless the court gives him
leave to act as such' 54 > . The period of
disqualification is to be fixed by the court. The Court
of Appeal in Re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail)'55' , gave
guidance on the periods of disqualification to be
imposed. It stated that a period over 10 years should
be imposed in particularly serious cases such as a
second disqualification. The period of 2—5 years
applied to cases which were not very serious. Whereas a
period of 6—10 years applied to serious cases which did
not merit being labelled particularly serious'56'. With
respect, this classification would see in artificial and
vague because it is not easy to draw a clear cut
distinction between "serious cases" and the so cal led
"particularly serious cases". In general, however, the
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1936 provides
that the maximum period of disqualification is 15 years
except in the case of persistent breaches of companies
legislation where the maximum period of disqualification
is 5 years'57) . An application of the provisions
dealing with disqualification orders is found in many
cases. For example, in Re Civica Investments Ltd'5®' , A
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was the sole director of a number of companies. He had
made a large number of defaults in relation to the
provisions of the companies legislation. He had been
convicted in respect of 59 defaults involving failure to
file accounts and annual returns. Nourse J. held that
it would be improper not to impose any period of
disqualification on the defendant having regard to the
huge number of defaults he had made. The judge,
however, limited the disqualification period to only one
year'66' . If a director defied the disqualification
order and acted in violation of it without leave of the
court, he would be made personally liable for the debts
and liabilities incurred by the company during the time
he was involved in its management while
disqualified< 60) . Where a disqualified director is held
to be personally liable for the debts of the company, he
is jointly and severally liable in respect of those
debts, with the company, to creditors and others who
have claims against the company'61' . Professor
Pennington'62' argues that such a director can be made
liable for the company's debts incurred during the time
he was involved in the management while disqualified
even if these debts were incurred by operation of law.
It would seem that the only justification for this
extension of liability lies in the fact that violating a
disqualification order constitutes a criminal
offence'63' and thus, the object of the provisions
-379-
dealing with disqualification orders is penal rather
than compensatory. Final I y, the court has no power to
exonerate someone who acts in contravention of a
disqualification order, from personal responsibility for
the debts incurred by the company while he was involved
in its management. S.727(l) CA 1985 which gives the
court the power to exonerate directors or officers from
liability if they are acting bona fide and in a
reasonable way, has no application in relation to a
personal liability incurred under the provisions dealing
with disqualification orders'1 .
It should be noted that the above situations are not the
only ones in which a director may become concurrently
liable for the company's debts. A director of a public
company, for example, may incur concurrent liability if
his company commences business before obtaining its
"trading certificate"' 65 ' . It must be noticed that the
expression "trading certificate" is not synonymous with
the expression "certificate of incorporation". The
former certificate is required to be obtained by public
companies only. This certificate is a conclusive
evidence that the company is entitled to do business and
exercise any borrowing powers. Without this
certificate, a public company shall not do business or
exercise any borrowing powers, unless it is re¬
registered as a private company. The private companies
are n o t required to obtain s u c h certificate. So, they
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can do business immediately after obtaining the
certificate of incorporation which is necessary for both
private and public companies.
If a public company X entered into a contract with Y
before obtaining its "trading certificate", Y can
enforce X to discharge its obligations under that
contract. If X fails to do so, then its directors will
be jointly and severally liable to indemnify Y for any
loss he suffers as a result of X's failure to discharge
its contractual obligations. The contract between X and
Y, described above, cannot be considered as a pre —
incorporation contract. That is because the "trading
certificate" is completely different one from the
certificate of incorporation. However, under S. 117(7)
CA 1985, this contract amounts to a criminal offence
punishable by a fine. Similarly, a director may become
responsible for the company's debts, concurrently with
the company, if he guarantees those debts which the
company has failed to pay. The creditor in this case is
entitled to resort to the company or the surety, or both
of them, to recover the debt or the damages suffered by
him as a result of the company's breach of
obligations*65> .
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8.3. The Judicial Protection of Creditors.
The statutory protection of creditors has been already
examined. It remains only to discover if the courts
have extended directors' duties to creditors, and
whether creditors are, truly, in need for this
extension. Despite the statutory protection available
to creditors, and the agency principles which offer some
protection to them it would seem that the courts are
willing to protect creditors particularly in cases where
the company is on the verge of col lapsing. There is,
however, a debate over whether the debt market is able
to protect creditors. Professor Po sne r <6 7) ( an exponent
of the idea that the debt market can protect creditors,
u>W
laid down a theory provides that interest rates
accurately reflect the risk in the most efficient
manner168). in his opinion, most creditors advance
loans in cases where different interest rates or prices
are charged for incremental levels of risk. The
interest rate charged on a loan represents a payment, in
advance, for the rental of the capital as well as for
the risk that the borrower may fail to repay that
loan*59> . Consequently, Professor Posner reached the
view that because an increase in risk wi11 be matched by
an increase in the interest rate, the lender wi 1 1 be
relatively unconcerned with the outcome of the venture.
That is because the borrower himself will bear the cost
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of exploiting the loan in risky ventures. Professor
Posner pointed out that the lender has to investigate
the credit-worthiness of his customers, before giving
loans or supplying goods, in order to know the level of
risk. Therefore, he acknowledged that the calculation
of the risk depends to some extent on the honesty of the
borrower. He reached a final conclusion that in the
absence of misrepresentation, on the part of the
borrower, of facts important to the calculation of the
risk, the lenders are well protected and will not be
harmed!70). Professor Posner, however, admitted that
his theory does not work in two main cases: ( 1 ) where
the costs of obtaining sufficient information about the
risk are disproportionate to the value of or the amount
of the transaction' 7 i ) , and (2) it does not work in
cases of involuntary creditors such as tort
creditors'72' and the tax collectors at all level of
government'72' . On the other hand. Landers' 7 *' pointed
out that the debt market is unable to provide adequate
protection to creditors. In some situations, Landers
argues, the interest rate falls below the level of risk
undertaken, and consequently, the borrower will be able
to externalise the cost of the debt. That is, the cost
of the debt can be, to some extent, shifted to the
lender. Landers argues'7 5) that many creditors choose
not to investigate the credit-worthiness of their
customers because they cannot afford it. And even if
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they can and do investigate, they usually do not
increase prices of goods or interest rates on loans to
match the expected risk. Landers added that even if
creditors choose to investigate the credit-worthiness of
their customers, it is quite possible that the customers
may not provide the creditors with full information*
about the nature of the venture, their financial
position and their ability to achieve completion of that
venture. In addition, fixed prices for goods is a
common phenomenon. This pricing system does not reflect
the actual risk of supplying to those whose credit¬
worthiness has not been investigated by the supplier.
Trade creditors were accustomed to make some
investigation about the coedit-worthiness of their
customers. They, however, tend to rely on borrowers'
history of regular payment. A history of regular
payment does not necessarily reflect the actual risk of
giving loans, particularly in cases of parent-subsidiary
companies. In these cases, it is quite possible that
those regular payments have been made by the assistance
of the parent company to the subsidiary company where
the latter is the borrower* 76 > . In the above
situations, the interest rate will not be able to
reflect the real risks. Consequently, the borrower will
be able to externalise the cost of the loan, i.e. to
shift it to the lender. Landers also argues that the
interest rate reflects the predictable risks on 1y. That
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is, it reflects the risks which are known at the time
the loan is made. Thus, any increase in the risk after
that date will effectively lower the interest rate. An
unpredictable risk is found, for example, in cases
involving parent—subsidiary companies and veil piercing
is ordered. In these cases, there is a risk that
creditors of one of these companies will reach the
assets of the other one. Creditors of the borrower, in
these cases, cannot estimate this risk in advance, and
thus the interest rate will not be able to reflect this
type of risk. Consequently, the new unpredictable cost
will be shifted to the 1 end e r' 7 7 > . Professor Posner's
reply was that creditors could protect themselves
against unpredictable costs, such as the cost of
exploiting the loan in risky ventures, by restrictive
covenants'78' . McDaniel , who is a critic of the debt
market restraints argues'79' that these covenants are
not very common and are an inappropriate response for
trade creditors.
In support of his argument that the market can provide
creditors with the necessary protection, Professor
Posner'80' said that, in cases involving a multi-unit
corporate enterprise, creditors can be protected by
operating individual units as individual "profit
centres" rather than as components of a single
enterprise. Consequently, the creditors of one unit
will not be exposed to the enterprise dangers. In
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return, Landers*8' ' argues that this approach is
inaccurate because separate corporate units are usually
formed either to advance a business need of investors or
to take advantage of the skills developed in one line of
activity. In other words, most multi—unit corporate
enterprises involve interrelated business. In addition,
many corporate managers do not, in fact, aim toward
maximum profitability of each individual corporate unit.
The debate over the efficiency of the market to protect
creditors is, however, far from over. It could be
concluded that the market can, to some extent, protect
creditors in cases where it is clear that the company
will continue in its business. If the company can
continue in trade or has the intention to continue i n
it, the market can restrain directors' conduct provided
that full information is given about the venture and the
financial position of the borrower. This was, in fact,
the conclusion reached by Professor Posner where he said
that in the absence of misrepresentation, on the part of
the borrower, of facts important to the calculation of
the risk, the lenders are w£l1 protected and will not be
harmed*82> . Landers' argument that, in practice, many
creditors choose not to investigate their customers
credit-wor thiness or that they choose not to increase
interest rates, does not seem able to undermine Posner's
theory. Posner's theory does not apply to creditors who
do not take the necessary steps to protect themselves.
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Professor Posner assumes that creditors will investigate
careful ly. However, what seems to be a weak point in
Posner's theory is the remarkable exceptions to it.
Professor Posner acknowledges that his theory does not
work where the costs of obtaining information about the
risk are disproportionate to the amount of the venture.
Similarly, he recognises that his theory does not work
in cases involving involuntary creditors. Nor does it
work in cases where the company is tending to
insolvency. These exceptions, in fact, limit the scope
of the application of Posner's theory. The last
exception leads us to a very important point which is
the protection of creditors in cases where the company
is insolvent or threatened with insolvency. In this
case the borrower does not care about the lender's
confidence. A lender's confidence represents a long
term interests for the borrower. These interests exist
only when the company expects to continue in trade.
Thus, a company that need money from time to time has an
incentive to avoid causing losses on creditors. If it
happened that a company caused harm to its creditors, it
would definitely loose their confidence. In addition,
new creditors will demand additional interest as
compensation for the expected risk of suffering the same
fate as the old creditors'83 1 . On the other hand, what
is important for a company faced with financial
difficulties is the avoidance of insolvency. Therefore,
the directors will not hesitate in exploiting loans in
any risky ventures so long as there is a gleam of hope
that the company will avoid insolvency. In other words,
it is rational for a company to make a venture which is
"riskier but alone offers the possibility, albeit
remote, of a bonanza pay off that wi 1 1 prevent
insolvency"' 8< l . In this case, i.e. the case of
insolvency, the potentiality for creditors-shareholders
conflict exists because creditors have prior but limited
claims on the company's assets while the shareholders
have limited liability for the company's debts and
unlimited claims on the rest of its assets' 8 8' . In case
of insolvency, shareholders' investments are already
lost, and because their liability is limited, it makes
sense to use loans in what may be a futile rescue
attempt'86' . Thus, the onset of a company's insolvency
may motivate the company to harm its creditors by
shifting the cost of loans from the shareholders to the
creditors. Consequently, it would seem that creditors
are in need for protection at this stage of a company's
life. A judicial protection for creditors' interests
can be also justified on the ground that the company's
failure to repay its debts may lead its creditors to
insolvency. And it is quite possible that the
insolvency of one creditor may lead to a series of
insolvencies amongst other creditors. This at the end
will adversely affect the interests of the society as a
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whole. Creditors deserve protection, as much as the
shareholders do, because they play a major role in
financing companies with the needed capital.
Fischel(87) t argues that there is no difference between
the position of shareholders and that of creditors.
Both provide companies with needed capital in exchange
for an expected rate of return generated by cash flows
from the companies' assets. The issue of creditors'
protection leads some writers to take, as it seems, some
extreme views. It is argued' 38) t for example, that
shareholders are no more the owner of the company than
are the debentureholders, other creditors and employees.
Similarly, Baysinger and Butler< 83' referred to
shareholders as risk bearers rather than owners of the
company. The critics of the debt market restraints
concluded that since the market is unable to provide the
creditors with the necessary protection, particularly in
cases where the company is tending to insolvency, there
must be some other means to protect them. Since the
statutes do not provide the creditors with that
protection, then it is to the courts to offer them some
judicial protection. Some writers, however, argue, on
grounds other than the market restraints, that creditors
do not need judicial protection. For example, Professor
Sea 1y(9 0) argues that the establishing of duties owed
directly by directors to creditors is "unnecessary".
The reasons are as follows: (1) to give remedies to some
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creditors in an insolvency which are denied to others
will undermine the fundamental principle that all
creditors participate pari passu in bankrupt estate;
(2) that the novel "wrongful trading" provision of the
Insolvency Act 198G, section 214 provides a protection
to creditors on a statutory footing. This section makes
any judicial rule, established to protect creditors,
unnecessary. Furthermore, to recognise a duty owed by
directors to individual creditors is to create a problem
of double recovery and a multiplicity of suits if both
the company and individual creditors are allowed to sue
directors' 91 > .
The courts in the United Kingdom have recognised that
creditors' interests need special attention where the
company is insolvent or on the edge of insolvency. They
realised that directors in these situations may take
actions capable of causing harm to the creditors'
interests. Thus, directors may owe some duties to
creditors in these situations. This will be discussed
next .
Directors' duties to creditors on and before insolvency.
There is a difference between saying that directors owe
fiduciary duties to creditors and that they are bound to
consider the interests of creditors'92'. The former
statement implies that creditors can enforce these
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duties t herns e 1 ve s. The latter indicates that the
director's duty to consider the creditors' interests is
a duty owed to the company and is, consequently,
enforceable by the company alone*93' . In other words,
in the latter case, the company's interests are extended
so as to embrace that of its creditors. Before
considering the relevant case law, one should give
examples of managerial actions which may be prejudicial
to the creditors' interests.
Creditors' interests can be prejudiced not only by
managerial actions but also by managerial inaction1 94 > .
The directors of the company may, after the loan has
been made, reduce the "pool of assets"*95* from which
the company can repay a loan. This can be achieved by
distributing the company's resources by means of
excessive dividends, or by selling its assets at an
undervalue, or by granting securities over those
assets*96' . The interests of the creditors can also be
harmed if the company's directors, after the making of
the loan, cause the company to incur additional
1iabi1ities*9?> , for example, by taking new loans. The
new loans or debts may compete with the original ones
for the security. This action might cause greater
damage to the interests of the old lenders where the new
loans were obtained at a higher interest rate and were
used for a very risky ventures*95' . A venture is risky
if it has low possibility of success but a big profit if
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succeeds195'. If the venture succeeds, shareholders
will collect most of the gain. The market value of the
company wi11 increase, but most of the increase wi11 go
to shareholders' 1 00 ) . But if the venture fails, the
market value of the company wi 1 1 decrease, and the
lenders will be those who will sustain most of the
loss'101). If these actions lead the company to
insolvency, the creditors may not find enough assets to
recover their money. In these situations, it is the
directors' positive conduct which cause harm to the
interests of the creditors. Directors' inaction may
prejudice the creditors if, for example, the directors
fail to exploit the opportunity for which the loan has
been advanced'112).
The question which arises at this stage is when and how
to protect creditors. In their attempt to protect
creditors, the courts have avoided novelty and relied
instead upon the existing rules which govern directors'
actions. In other words, the courts do not create new
rules establishing duties owed by directors to
creditors. They have adopted and expanded the existing
rules so as to make them capable of protecting
creditors' interests' 103) .
Before considering the relevant authorities, it is
useful to rehearse the established rules that govern the
conduct of the directors. The board of directors is
vested with wide powers in order to run the company's
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business. These powers are largely free of shareholders
interference*104'. The scope of those powers is,
however, limited by some obligations imposed upon
directors. First, directors are under a duty to
exercise their powers for the purposes for which they
were conferred* ' "5 ) . They are also obliged to act in
good faith in what they consider as in the best
interests of the company*106). Second, Directors are
under a duty not to make a secret profit and/ or to
place themselves in a position where their personal
interests conflict with their duty to the company' l o 7 ) .
Third, directors are required to exercise due care and
skill in the management of the company's affairs'108' .
These are the most important rules governing directors'
conduct. It is the first rule which is relevant to the
question of the protection of creditors. That is,
directors must exercise their powers bona fide in the
best interests of the company. The courts have relied
on this rule in their attempts to extend directors'
duties to creditors. In many cases the courts have
considered the creditors' interests as being embodied in
the interests of the company. To clarify this issue,
one should examine the relevant authorities.
The first judicial att empt, to establish that the board
of directors mu s t consider the interests of the
creditors, is found in the comments of Mason J. in the
Australian case Walker v. Wimborne' 108 ' . This case had
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dealt with a claim of misfeasance arising out of
shifting of funds between companies in a group. Mason
J. said:
In this respect it should be emphasised that
the directors of a company in discharging
their duty to the company must take account
of the interest of its shareholders and its
creditors. Any failure by the directors to
take into account the interest of creditors
wi 1 1 have adverse consequences for the
company as we 1 1 as for them. The creditor of
a company . . . must look at that company for
payment. His interests may be prejudiced by
the movement of funds between companies in
the event that the companies become
inso1vent( l l0 > .
It is to be noted that there is nothing in the comments
of Mason J. to suggest that the duty to consider the
interests of creditors is owed directly to the creditors
themselves. He did not say that directors owe duties to
creditors, merely that, while performing their duties to
the company, the directors must have regard to the
creditors' interests.
Thus, the duty to take account of the creditors'
interests is owed to the company and is, consequently,
enforceable by the company alone. The judgement of
Mason J. found some support in the remarks of Cooke J.
in the New Zealand case Nicholson v. Permakraf t (NZ)
Ltd.<ill'. In that case, a new company was formed, with
identical shareholders, to purchase the original
company's shares. The proceeds of the sale were
distributed to the shareholders by way of capital
dividend. The effect of this conduct was to reduce the
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pool of the available assets within reach of creditors.
The Court of Appeal held that the board of directors was
acting within its powers and in the best interest of the
company. The liquidator's claim that the board had
breached its duty was rejected by the court. Cooke J.,
however, made some important remarks. He said:
The duties of directors are owed to the
company. On the facts of particular cases
this may require the directors to consider
inter alia the interests of creditors' 1121 .
So, neither Mason J. nor Cooke J. said that directors
owe a duty directly to creditors. In their comments
both judges confirmed the old rule that directors'
duties are owed to the company. The rule which finds
its origins in the case of Foss v. Ha rbottle < l l 3 ) and
its line of cases. In support of this rule, Dillon L.J.
stated
The directors indeed stand in a fiduciary
relationship to the company, . . . they owe
fiduciary duties to the company though not to
the creditors, present or future . . .(114) .
However, the dictum of Lord Templeman in V/inkworth v.
Edward Baron Development Co. Ltd.(ll5)goes against that
rule. It suggests that directors owe a direct duty to
creditors. His Lordship said:
But a company owes a duty to its creditors,
present and future. The company is not bound
to pay off every debt as soon as it is
incurred and the company is not obliged to
avoid all ventures which involve an element
of risk, but the company owes a duty to its
creditors to keep its property inviolate and
available for the repayment of its debts.
The conscience of the company as we 1 1 as its
management, is confided to its directors. A
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duty is owed by the directors to the company
and to the creditors of the company to ensure
that the affairs of the company are properly
administered and that its property is not
dissipated or exploited for the benefit of
the directors themselves to the prejudice of
the creditors' 1 1 6 ' .
The dictum of Lord Tempi eman has been referred to with
apparent approval in the New Zealand decision of Hi 1 ton
International v. Hilt on' 117). In that case Tipping J.
held that the directors owe a duty, when declaring a
dividend, "not only to the company but also to its
creditors . . ., both present and future"' l l 8 I . It
should be noted that the idea of imposing a direct duty
upon directors to creditors is beset with some problems.
First, it, as mentioned above, goes against the old and
the well established rule that directors owe their
duties to the company alone. Second, if it is accepted
that the aim of the creation of companies is to achieve
a maximum profit, and the function of the directors is
to pursue that maximisation, then a direct duty owed by
the directors to the creditors will disrupt this
function' US'. Directors will not be entirely free to
fulfil their duty of maximising shareholders
utility'120' . Tha t is because they will be under the
creditors' control. The creditors are interested in the
assets of the company and look to it for payment. They
will not allow the directors to use the company's assets
in a risky venture. Thus, it is submitted that where
the company is solvent, directors' duties are owed to it
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and enforceable by it alone. The creditors' interests
do not emerge as an important matter distinct from the
company's interest. A confirmation of this is found in
Brady v. Brady**2** , where Nourse L.J. said:
where the assets are enormous and the
debts minimal , it is reasonable to suppose
that the interests of creditors ought not to
count for very much' ' 2 2 ' .
The creditors' interests, which must be taken into
account by the directors in cases where the company is
solvent, emerge as part of or are included in the
company's interests. The position may differ in cases
where the company is insolvent''23) . While the interest
of the company is the collective interest of its
shareholders where the company is solvent, the interest
of the company could be regarded as the creditors'
interest where the company is insolvent. So, the
question here is whether insolvency is a crucial element
or not. This point has been clarified by Nourse L.J. in
Brady v. Brady'1241 where he said:
Where the company is insolvent, or even
doubtfully solvent, the interests of the
company are in rea 1 i ty the interests of the
existing creditors alone'1251.
Thus, if the company is insolvent, the shareholders and
the directors are no longer able to deal freely with its
assets. This point has been emphasised by Street C.J.
in Kinsel la v . Ru s s e 1 1 Kinsella pty Ltd' 1 26 > , where he
identified the rationale behind directors' duty to
consider the interests of creditors. His Honour said:
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In a solvent company the proprietary
interests of the shareholders entitle them as
a general body to be regarded as the company
where a company is insolvent the
interests of creditors intrude . . . It is in
a practical sense their assets and not the
shareholders assets that . . . are under the
management of the directors'127'.
The statement of Street C.J. was quoted with approval by
Dillon L.J. in the B r i t i s h case of West Mercia
Safetyware Ltd v. Dodd < l 2 8 ) . I n that case. Vilest Mercia
Ltd. was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dodd and Co. Ltd.
(Dodd). D was the director of both companies. Both
companies banked with the same bank. Dodd's overdraft
at the bank was guaranteed personally by D. In May 1984
West Mercia Ltd. owed Dodd about £30,000. At that time
both companies were in financial difficulties. On 21
May D transferred £4,000 from the account of West Mercia
Ltd. to Dodd 1 s account. In June both companies went
into liquidation. The liquidator of West Mercia Ltd.
alleged that D was guilty of misfeasance and breach of
trust. Accordingly, he asked the court to order D to
repay the £4,000 transferred from West Mercia Ltd. to
Dodd. At the trial, the judge held that although D had
acted improperly, he didn't misapply West Mercia's
assets. The transfer of £4,000 was repayment in part of
a debt owed by West Mercia Ltd. to Dodd. The liquidator
appealed. The Court of Appeal al lowed his appeal and
held that D had breached his duty. D was ordered to
repay the £4,000 with i literest. The court's decision
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was based on the ground that West Mercia Ltd. was known
to D to be insolvent when he caused the £4,000 to be
transferred from its account to Dodd1s account. The
court emphasised that once a company was insolvent, the
creditors' interests overrode those of the shareholders.
That was because the company's assets belonged in a real
sense to the creditors, and these assets were the only
source for the satisfaction of their debts. Thus, D
had, in fact, disregarded the interests of the creditors
of the insolvent company when he transferred the £4,000.
A direct result of the decision in West Merc i a is the
restriction of the shareholders' right to ratify
directors' breach of duty. The We s t Me r cia case clearly
stated that where a company is insolvent, the creditors'
interests override, the shareholders' interests in the
company cease to exist and thus the shareholders should
be prevented from ratifying the directors' breach of
duty* 129).
Thus it would seem that insolvency or even "doubtful
solvency" is a crucial element in relation to creditors'
interests. Thus, if the company is insolvent of
"doubtfully solvent", the creditors' interest arises as
an issue which deserves protection. While it is clear
from the case law, which dealt with directors duties to
creditors, that directors owe a duty to consider the
interests of the creditors particularly where the
company is on the verge of insolvency, the content of
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that duty is as yet unclear. In Nicholson v. Permakraf t
(NZ) l_td<l30) t Cooke J. indicated that directors were
not required to give creditors' interests a sort of
positive consideration. In taking account of the
creditors' interests directors must consider "whether
what they do will prejudice their company's practical
ability to discharge prornptly debts"' ' 31 ) . Likewise in
Winkworth v. Edward Baron Development Co. Ltd.' 1 3 2 ' ,
Lord Templernan felt that the directors owe a duty to
ensure that the company's property was not "dissipated
or exploited for the benefit of the directors themselves
to the prejudice of creditors"' 1 33 ' . Similarly, in Re
We I fab Engineers Ltd.'134) f Hoffmann J. held that the
directors' duty extends only to avoiding action that
would cause damage to creditors' interests. The above
cases share the view that directors are not under duties
similar to those of a liquidator in relation to
creditors' interests. This view cannot be affected by
the fact that the company is insolvent or near
insolvency. So, according to this view directors are
under a negative or prescriptive duty to creditors.
They are only bound to avoid actions which may prejudice
the interests of creditors.
To the contrary, in Brady v. Brady'135' , Nourse L.J.
pointed out that the board was boun d to act in the
interests of the company. However, his Lordship said
that "where the company is insolvent, or even doubtfully
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solvent, the interests of the c ornpany are . . . the
interests of the existing creditors alone"'136). So, in
his Lordship's opinion, the creditors are the
beneficiaries if the company is "insolvent or doubtfully
solvent". In such a case directors must actively
further the interests of the creditors because the basic
fiduciary obligation'137) requires fiduciaries to take
positive actions in furtherance of the beneficiaries'
interests. A similar view is also apparent in Kinse1 la
v. Russell Kinsella pty Ltd < l 3 8 ) wf,ere Street C.J. said
that "where a company is insolvent the interests of
creditors intrude . . . It is their assets . . . that
are under the management of the directors"< l 39 ) . Thus,
there is a division within the authorities in relation
to the content of directors' duty to creditors.
Regarding the company's assets as belonging to creditors
in cases where the company is insolvent, is the only
view that gives weight to the idea of imposing a
positive duty on directors to further the interests of
creditors. That is because, as mentioned above,
fiduciaries must take positive actions to further the
interests of the beneficiaries who are, in cases
involving insolvent companies, the creditors alone. It
follows that directors must serve the interests of
creditors alone'140' ; and that directors may be held
liable if they further the interests of non-creditors,
such as the interests of the employees, notwithstanding
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that their conduct has no damaging effect on the
interests of the creditors* 141 >. It lias been, however,
argued* 142) that the division amongst the authorities is
more apparent than real . Creditors' interests in most
cases can be served by a prescriptive duty for two
reasons: (1) The now fashionable "enterprise"* 1*3) view
of the company requires directors to consider the
interests of various groups who are interested in the
company. The shareholders, the creditors and the
employees are examples of those groups. During the
lifetime of the company, however, the interests of one
group may deserve greater consideration than the
others'. While it is correct to say that the interests
of creditors deserve greater consideration than the
other i rite rests in case of insolvency, this does not
mean that directors are entitled to ignore the interests
of other groups. So, directors can satisfy the
creditors' claims simply by avoiding prejudicial
conducts* 1 4 4 ) . <2) Creditors can be exposed to a real
risk if the directors transfer the wealth form creditors
to shareholders by causing the company to incur
additional liabilities or by withdrawing its assets. It
fol lows that the interest rate charged upon the loan
becomes inadequate. In this case creditors can be
better served and protected by prohibiting directors
fro in externalising the cost of the debt* l 4 5 ) , That is,
the creditors' interests can be adequately served by a
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prescriptive duty. In cases where the interest rate
reflect the real risk, creditors will not be concerned
by the inability of the company to repay the loan
because the interest rate charged upon the loan
represents a payment, in advance, for the rental of the
capital as well as for the risk of the borrower failing
to re turn it < l* 6) .
To conclude, the case law indicates that where the
company is insolvent or near insolvency, the creditors'
interests are in need for protection. Where the company
is solvent, the directors owe no duty to creditors to
keep the company's capital intact*1471. That is because
creditors interests are not impaired sufficiently to
justify judicial restraints on the company's self-
interested actions* 148) , The creditors have no locus
s t andi to sue the directors for their mismanagement.
The rule in Foss v. Harbott1e* 1491 remains an obstacle in
the creditors' way to sue directors. They cannot also
bring a derivative action on behalf of the company since
none of the exceptions to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle
applies to their claims. So, it is only when the
company goes into liquidation that the creditors' claim
can be heard. However, the creditors may not succeed in
their claims against directors whose actions lead the
company to insolvency. That is because the bona fides
of directors is judged subjectively*1501 • So, even if
the directors appreciated that their actions may lead
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the company to insolvency, the court might hold that
they were acting bona fide in the interests of the
company. It is, however, argued*151> that creditors'
interests need more protection than is afforded by the
subjective test. An objective test may be demanded in
cases where the directors' actions threat the existence
of the company*152). However, whatever the test is, the
rule in Foss v_. Ha r bo 11 1 e will operate to prevent
creditors from suing directors as long as the company is
solvent.
It remains to say that if it is accepted that directors'
duties to consider the interests of creditors are owed
to the company, the recovery will be corporate. That
is, the company is the one who wi11 receive the damages.
There is, in fact, a merit for considering that
directors' duties are owed to the company rather than to
individual creditors. This merit lies in the fact that
the principle of par i pa ssu distribution to the
creditors of the company will not be undermined.
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CHAPTER 9
Litigation and Protection of Minority Shareholders
9.1. Introduction
There are three main judicial means by which the court
can enforce directors' duties on an application made to
it. First, the court may issue an interdict' ' > to
prevent a director from committing a breach of duty.
Alternatively, if the legislation provides a special
remedy for a certain type of default, the court will
apply it. For example, under S.185(1) and (7) CA 1985,
the court may order the directors to issue a new share
certificate to a transferee of shares. Secondly, the
court may order the director who is in default to pay
damages to the company or the creditor or the
shareholder whose rights have been infringed. The court
may also order restitution. That is to say, the court
may order a director to restore the assets of the
company which were misappropriated by him, or to account
to the company for any secret profit improperly obtained
by him. Thirdly, the court may declare that a certain
transaction made by the director is invalid if, for
example, it violates a statutory rule.
This chapter is divided into two ma in parts. (1)
Litigation by a company. (2) Litigation by shareholders
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and creditors. Greater significance, however, will be
attached to litigation initiated by shareholders;
particularly, in relation to protection of the minority
shareho1ders.
9.2. Litigation by a company
Directors' duties to their companies stem either from
their service contracts' 21 or legislation'3) or the
common law'4). These duties can be enforced by the
court on an application made to it by the company itself
and in its own name. The nature of the relief sought by
the company depends on the nature of the duty al1eged to
be broken by directors. Common law remedies can be
sought in relation to directors' breach of fiduciary
duties. The company may obtain an interdict to restrain
the wrongdoer director from breaching his duties. If
the breach is of a continuing nature, an interdict may
be obtained to stop the director from committing it.
For example, the court may issue an interdict to prevent
a director from directing the company's profits to his
own account. If restoration is possible, the company
may bring an action against the defender director to
compel him to restore its property and the proceeds of
that property which are misappropriated by him.
Similarly, the court may order a director to account to
the company for any profit he obtains from exploiting
-417-
any corporate opportunity'5> . Constructive trust notion
has been applied to cases involve persons who are "under
a fiduciary duty arising from a relationship other than
an express trust"'5'. Since directors stand in a
fiduciary position, the court may hold them liable as
constructive trustees in relation to the company's
proper ty which is held by them'7 > . In addition, if a
director uses his company's property for his personal
purposes and makes profit, he may be held liable to
account for the profit he has made. That is because he
stands in a fiduciary position to the company's) . He
will also be held liable to account for bribes or
commissions received by him while acting as a director.
Directors owe a duty to disclose their personal
interests in contracts with the company. If they fail
to do so, the company may rescind such contracts. In
He 1 y - Hutchinson v. Brayhead Ltd.<9> , Lord Denning MR
said:
It seems to me that when a director fails to
disclose his interest, the effect is the same
as non-disclosure in contracts uberrimae
fidei, or non-disclosure by a promoter who
sells to the company property in which he is
interested . . . Non-disclosure does not
render the contract valid or a nullity. It
renders the contract voidable at the instance
of the company and makes the director
accountable for any secret profit which he has
made'10 > .
Breach of a fiduciary duty is also a justifiable ground
for dismissal . In Maintenance Co. Ltd. v. Dormer' 1 ' > ,
the managing director and his family dealt in the
-4 18-
company's property without the consent of the
shareholders in general meeting. The company dismissed
him from office. The Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT)
held that the dismissal of that director was fair. The
EAT based its decision on the ground that a director is
in a sirni lar position to that of a trustee and, being in
a fiduciary relationship, he is prohibited from placing
himself in a position where his personal interest and
the interest of the company conflict.
Awarding damages is the appropriate remedy for a breach
of common law duties. Accordingly, a company may claim
damages from the defender director for the loss suffered
by it as a result of a breach of duty even if the
defender has made no corresponding gain. If, for
example, a director performed his duties negligently and
caused the company to suffer loss, he might be sued in
damages for that breach.
If there is a contract of service between a director and
his company, the company may claim damages for the loss
it suffered as a result of the director's breach of his
contractua1 obiigations.
In relation to directors' statutory duties, the
legislation, usually, specifies the remedy which can be
sought by the company where a director breaches those
duties. S.313(2) of the Companies Act 1985, for
example, provides that the director who has received
unlawful compensation for loss of office must hold it in
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trust for the company. In this case the company can
bring an action to recover the amount of compensation
which is unlawfully paid to the director. Similarly,
S. 80 CA 1985 prohibits directors f rorn allotting relevant
securities un less they are authorised to do so by the
company in general meeting or by the articles of
association'12' . If> however, the statutes do not
specify the appropriate remedy, the company is not
prevented from claiming damages for past defaults or
obtaining an interdict to compel directors to comply
with their statutory obligations in the future'13'.
Power to litigate in the company's name is usually
vested in the board of directors. So, the shareholders
cannot, by passing an ordinary resolution, require the
board of directors to depart from litigation initiated
by the board in the company's name' 1 4 1 , unless the
articles of association give them the right to instruct
to the board as to the exercise of its powers including
the power to litigate. However, the shareholders can,
by passing an ordinary resolution, decide that the
company will sue regardless of the board's opposition.
This is so even where the shareholders have no power
under the articles to give instructions to the board of
directors' 1 5 ) . in this case, the general meeting may
choose the persons who will exercise the right to
litigate in the company's name' . It is noteworthy
that no individual shareholder, or group of
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shareholders, can bring an action in the company1s name
without the consent of the shareholders in general
meeting. Any proceedings in the name of the company
brought by an individual shareholder without the consent
of the majority shareholders in general meeting is
liable to be struck out by the court on an application
made by the defender1 171 . It is, however, possible for
the board of directors to adopt those proceedings. In
this case the proceedings wi 1 1 be regarded as properly
brought in the company's name1 18). If the company goes
into liquidation, these proceedings may be adopted by
the 1 iquidator' I 9 > . If the company goes into
liquidation, the liquidator is the one who has the power
to 1 itigate in the company's name. He also has the
power to authorise anyone to initiate the action in the
company's name. If the liquidation is ordered by the
court, the liquidator must obtain the court's consent or
that of the liquidation committee to sue the directors
or others in the company's name'20'. The court,
however, wi11 not give guidance as to whether the
liquidator should bring an action against directors.
This matter is left to the liquidator's discretion'21'.
In cases where a receiver is appointed, the receiver has
the power to sue the directors in the company's name for
a breach of their duties'22'. But where the receiver is
appointed by the court, he has to obtain the court's
-42 1-
consent to bring an action against directors in the
company 's name1 2 3).
9.3. Litigation by Shareholders and Creditors
9.3 t. The enforcement of directors' personal
liabilities to shareholders and creditors.
Directors may incur personal liability to individual
shareholders' 24) or to creditors' 25) . Directors' duties
to these two groups can be enforced by personal claims
initiated by the shareholders or the creditors whose
rights have been infringed by the directors' breach of
duties. It should be noticed that in an action against
a director, the director must be named as defender and
the shareholder or the creditor must be named as
pursuer. So, in a personal claim against a director,
the company's name does not appear as defender in cases
where the director is solely 1 i ab 1 e' 2 6 ) . I cases where
the company and its directors are concurrently liable,
the company's name may appear as defender in addition to
that of the director or the directors unless the pursuer
chooses to sue the directors without first suing the
company. It is noteworthy, however, that in some cases
special terms can be found compelling the pursuer to sue
the company first. An example of these terms can be
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found in cases involving guarantee of a company1s debts
by directors' 27 ' .
The recovery in personal claims is not corporate. So,
for example, a recovery in relation to false statements
in a prospectus or in relation to an inaccurate advice
given to a shareholder can be obtained by the pursuer
shareholder not by the company.
Directors' liability to contribute to the company's
assets in cases of fraudulent and wrongful trading
cannot be enforced by creditors'281 . The fact that the
creditors are those who will benefit from such
contribution does not give them the right to sue
directors for fraudulent or wrongful trading.
Directors' liability in this case can only be enforced
by the court on an application made by the liquidator.
The recovery, here, is corporate and will benefit the
company's creditors co1 1ec tive1y< 2 9) .
9.3.2. The enforcement of directors' liabilities to the
company by shareholders.
Since the company is a separate legal persona capable of
suing and being sued, the duties owed to it can be
enforced by it alone and in its own name. This in
essence is the rule in Foss v. Harbott1e'30) . Normally,
the power to sue in the company's name is vested in the
board of directors. The general meeting, as is already
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mentioned, can pass an ordinary resolution to 1 itigate
in the company's name regardless of the opposition of
the board. But it is perfectly possible that the
directors may form the majority of the shareholders: in
other words, the directors control the majority of
votes. In this case, the directors can breach their
duties to the company and escape liability unless the
minority shareholders are allowed to sue them on behalf
of the company. According to the rule in Foss v.
Harbo 111e the minority shareholders cannot sue on behalf
of the company because they do not represent it and they
have no power to sue in its name. Thus, if this rule is
strictly applied, the minority shareholders remain at
the mercy of the majority. Since rigid application of
this rule may be both unreasonable and unfair, the
courts have established several exceptions to it. Some
of those exceptions are intended to allow minority
shareholders to litigate on the company's behalf in
order to enforce its rights. Such an action is called a
derivative action. It is derivative in the sense the
minority derives the right to sue from that of the
company. On the other hand, some exceptions to the rule
allow a minority shareholder, who has suffered personal
loss in addition to the harm to the company, to bring a
representative action on behalf of himself and all the
other shareholders who have suffered similar harm.
Additional ly, he may raise a personal action if only his
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personal rights have been infringed. We wi 1 1 first
examine the rule and then the exceptions to it. Since
the exceptions to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle
represent the common law protection of the minority
shareholders, they and the rule itself will be examined
under the heading of "common law protection of the
minority shareholders". Later in this chapter,
statutory protection of minority shareholders wi 1 1 be
discussed.
9.4. The Common law protection of the minority
shareho1ders.
9.4.1. The ru1e in Foss v. Harbottle'3 1 ' .
It is a basic principle of company law that minority
shareholders have no title to sue for wrongs done to the
company. This principle is known as the rule in Foss v.
Harbot tie. In that case, two shareholders brought an
action against the company's directors alleging that the
latter had misapplied and wasted the company's property.
The court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to
sue on behalf of the company and that the right to sue
was confined to the company alone.
The basic rule was clearly expressed by Jenkins L.J. in
the case of Edward v. Ha 1 1iwe I I (32) . His Lordship said:
The rule in Foss v. Harbottle . . . comes to
no mo re than this. First, the only proper
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plaintiff in an action in respect of a wrong
al leged to be done to a company . . .is p r i rn a
facie the c ornpany . . . itself. Secondly,
where the alleged wrong is a transaction which
might be made binding on the company . . . and
on all its members by a simple majority of the
members, no individual member of the company
is allowed to maintain an action in respect of
that matter for the simple reason that, if a
mere majority of the members of the company .
is in favour of what has been done, then
cadit quaestio' 3 3 > .
What is central to the rule is that the minority
shareholders cannot sue the directors whenever a breach
of directors' du ties is ratifiable. In an application
of this rule it has been established that a mere breach
of directors' fiduciary duty owed to the company is
ratifiable and therefore cannot be a subject of a
minority shareholders' action'3<1 . For example, it was
held that directors' acts which exceeded their powers
were ratifiable by the majority shareholders and hence
could not be the subject of a minority shareholders'
action' 35 1 . The ru 1 e wa s also app lied in the Scottish
case of Rixon v. Edinburgh Northern Tramways Co.'3 e > .
In this case Lord Kinnear (Ordinary) said:
although the transaction complained of
was beyond the powers of the directors, it was
competent for the shareholders to sanction it,
arid therefore that a single shareholder, or a
minority, had no title to sue'37'.
Despite the negative effect of the rule on the minority
shareholders, it has several advantages. Firstly, it
prevents multiple actions. "If each shareholder were
permitted to sue, the company might be harassed by a
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succession of actions started and discontinued by
innumerable p1 aintiffs"* 38 ' . Secondly, it prevents
fruitless actions. If the wrong done to the company is
ratifiable, then, it is futile to have litigation about
it without the consent of the shareholders in general
meeting*39 ' . Thirdly, it secures the principle of
majority rule and emphasises the fact that the company
is a separate legal persona distinct from its
members*4 9 ' .
9.4.2. Exceptions to the rule in Foss v. Harbott1e.
As it has already been mentioned, some of the exceptions
to the rule have been designed to allow a minority
shareholder to bring a derivative action to enforce the
company's rights. It has also been mentioned that a
minority shareholder, in this action, derives the right
to sue from that of the company. Thus, if the company
has no right to sue, then no derivative action will have
been a 1 1 owed* 41 > .
It is to be noticed that a derivative action is unknown
in Scotland. Thus, a minority shareholder would require
to sue the wrongdoer directors in his own name* 43 ) .
However, it has been argued*43' that an action to
enforce the company's rights in Scotland, is subject to
some preconditions which are sirnilar to those imposed on
derivative actions. These conditions are: (1) the
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a 1 1 eged wrong rnuat not be ratifiable. If it is
ratifiable, the complaint must be brought to the
directors' attention or to that of the shareholders in
general meeting before raising an action*445 ; (2) the
wrongdoers must be in control of the company and have
the power to prevent the company from suing in its own
name<45). in any case, S.461(2)(c) CA 198 5 * 4 5> empowers
the court to "authorise civil proceedings to be brought
in the name of and on beha 1 f of the company" . This
section applies to Scotland. So, it is agreed' 47 1 that
a derivative action has been introduced into Scotland by
virtue of that section'48' .
In derivative actions, the company must be joined as a
nominal defender together with the wrongdoers. The
reason lying behind this policy is to prevent the
company suing again in its own name, on the same facts,
in cases where the action was a failure. In other
words, to bind the company by the court's judgement'43'.
In addition, if the action succeeds, the only way for
the company to benefit from it, is by joining it as a
party to the action'50'.
The recognised exceptions to the rule in Foss v.
Harbo 111e are the following: (1) where the wrong
c oinp lained of is an illegal or ultra vires transaction;
(2) where the matter is one which can be validly done or
sanctioned, not by a simple majority, but only by some
special majority; (3) where the individual rights of the
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pursuer as a shareholder
where the ma j orit y is





(1) where the wrong complained of is an i1 1ega1 or uItra
vires t r ansaction.
It is well established that illegal acts cannot be
ratified. Thus, a minority shareholder can bring a
personal action against the company a rid its directors to
restrain them from entering into an illegal
transaction'52). if the pursuer failed in his personal
action he would bear the costs of litigation.
Therefore, it is to his advantage to bring a derivative
action instead of a personal action. A minority
shareholder is entitled to bring a derivative action
against directors to restrain them from doing illegal
acts on behalf of the company'53) . In derivative
actions the pursuer can apply to the court for an order
that he be indemnified out of the company's funds.
However, if the majority of independent'5 <) shareholders
resolves not to sue directors to compel them to pay
damages for the loss suffered by the company as a result
of an illegal act, the resolution will bind the minority
provided that it has been made in good faith and for the
benefit of the company' 55) . This means that a minority
shareholder is in a better position to prevent
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prospective illegal acts while it is riot in good
position to obtain damages for the company once the
i 1 legal act has been committed. In Smith v. Croft (No.
5 s )
F a derivative action was brought by the minority
shareholders to compel the directors to repay money
i 1 legal ly spent as contravening 3.151 CA 1985. In that
case the defendants controlled 65% of the shares. The
plaintiffs held about 12%. The rest of the shares were
held by another company (Wren). Wren had made it clear
that it opposed the plaintiff's action.
Wren's opposition as a majority independent shareholder
was regarded by Knox J. as a sufficient reason for
disallowing the minority's action. The judge said:
Ultimately the question which has to be
answered in order to determine whether the
rule in Foss v. Harbottle applies to prevent a
minority shareholder seeking relief as
plaintiff for the benefit of the company is
'Is the plaintiff being improperly prevented
from bringing these proceedings on behalf of
the company ?'. If it is an expression of the
corporate will of the company by an
appropriate independent organ that is
preventing the plaintiff from prosecuting the
action he is not improperly but properly
prevented arid so the answer to the question is
'No'. The appropriate independent organ will
vary according to the constitution of the
company concerned and the identity of the
defendants who wi11 in most cases be
disqualified from participating by voting in
expressing the corporate will . Finally, on
this aspect of the matter I remain unconvinced
that a just result is achieved by a single
minority shareholder having the right to
involve a company in an action for recovery of
compensation for the company if all the other
minority shareholders are for disinterested
reasons satisfied that the proceedings will be
productive of more harm than good'57).
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The judge continued:
C T]e r e is no sufficient evidence that in
relation to the present question whether these
proceedings should continue Wren Trust has
reached its conclusion on any grounds other
than reasons genuinely thought to advance the
company's interests' 581 .
Thus, in striking out the plaintiffs' action in this
case, Knox J. regarded the decision of the majority of
independent shareholders as conclusive. However, the
court in this case retains a discretion to override the
decision of the majority of independent
shareholders' 59) .
The minority's actions in relation to illegal acts has
been discussed. It remains to examine these actions
regarding u1t ra vires acts.
Prior to the Coinpanies Act 1985 (S.35, originally S.9 of
the European Communities Act 1972)'60) t an ultra vires
t ransac tion wa s void. It foil owed tha t an u1tra vires
transaction would not be ratified and, therefore, could
not be enforced either by the company or by a third
party'6' ' . S.35(1) CA 1985 provides that an ultra vires
transaction is valid vis a vis third parties who are
dealing with the company in good faith. 3.35(2)
provides that third parties are "not bound to enquire as
to the capacity of the company to enter into Ca
transaction] or as to any such limitation on the powers
of the directors, and Care] presumed to have acted in
good faith unless the contrary is proved". However, a
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proposed u1tra vires transaction can be challenged and
restrained by any member of the company. It can be
inferred from the wording of section 35 that an u 1 tra
vires transaction with a third party who does not act in
good faith is void and, therefore, cannot be ratified.
The section was widely criticised'621 and has been
replaced by what are now new 3.35A and 3.35B (3.108 CA
1989).
3.2 CA 1985 provides that the memorandum of any company
must state the objects of the company. This section has
not been changed or amended by the Companies Act 1989.
A company is however, al lowed to do things which are
reasonably incidental to its objects' S3) .
Despite S.2 of the 1985 Act, the new 3.35 (3. 108 CA
1989) states that a company's capacity is not limited by
its memorandum. So, even if the company details its
objects, its capacity is not limited to these objects.
The direct consequence of this section is that the u1tra
vires doctrine has been abolished as far as a bona fide
third party is concerned. This is clear from the
wording of the new S.35C1) which provides:
The validity of an act done by a company shall
not be called into question on the ground of
lack of capacity by reason of any thing in the
company's memorandum.
Unlike the old 3.35 CA 1985, the new S.35(l) is not
subject to any condition. There is no reference, for
example, to "transactions decided on by directors".
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Thus , third parties are protected even it the act has
been done by one director or by an officer. Moreover,
the new 3.35(1) refers to acts rather than transactions.
It follows that this section covers gifts as well as
c omme rcial contracts'641 .
The position of third parties is strengthened by 3.142
CA 1989 (the new S.711A) which abolishes the doctrine of
constructive notice for all purposes except the case
where a person takes a charge over a company's property.
This person is deemed to "have notice of any matter
requiring registration and disclosed on the register at
the time the charge is created"'661.
While the new S.35 provides that a company's capacity is
not 1 i mi ted by its memorandum, it does not remove the
limitation on directors' powers under the memorandum.
So, to protect third parties, new 3.35A removes any
limitation on the powers of directors or others under
the company's constitution as far as bona f i de third
parties are concerned.
New S.35A (2)(c) provides that good faith on the part of
a third party is presumed unless the contrary is proved.
Most important is the new S.35A (2)(b) which goes
further to state that:
CA] person shal1 not be regarded as acting in
bad faith by reason only of his knowing that
an act is beyond the powers of the directors
under the company's constitut ion'6 61 .
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The legislature has not been fully satisfied with the
provisions discussed above as a statutory shield to
protect third parties. So, the new S.35B has been
enacted. The section makes it clear that "a party to
a transaction with the company is not bound to
enquire as to whether it is permitted by the company's
memorandum or as to any limitation on the powers" of the
directors to bind the company. It would appear that
apart from being defective, new S.35B is entirely
unnecessary. First, it is defective in that it refers
to "transactions" rather than acts. So, it does not go
with the new 3.35 which refers to "acts" rather
"transactions"'^ ' . The question which ar ises here is
whether a gift is included in the meaning of the word
"transaction" or not. Secondly, it is unnecessary
because: (1) by virtue of the new 3.35, a company's
capacity is free from any limitation; (2) by virtue of
new 3.35A, directors' powers are free from any
limitation under the company's constitution in favour of
a bona f i de third party; and (3) by virtue of the new
S.711A (S.142 CA 1989), the doctrine of constructive
notice has been abolished for all purposes except in
cases where a person takes a charge over a company's
property.
The original purpose of the ultra vires doctrine was the
protection of both investors and creditors's 8) . If a
company drafted its objects clause clearly, then
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investors would know exactly what kind of business they
were going to invest their money in. Creditors of the
company wi11 also be aware of the company1s business and
the u1tra vires doctrine will guarantee that the company
will not act beyond its objects clause. The u1tra vires
doctrine was criticised as being unable to achieve these
purposes. Thus, Parliament has been led to limit the
effects of that doctrine in the Companies Act 1985<S9) ,
and to abolish it insofar as a bona fide third party is
concerned, by the new 3.35 (S.108 CA 1989)<70>.
Moreover, under the new S.3 5 an ultra vires act is
ratifiable and no longer void.
It has already been mentioned that the protection of
third parties, who are dealing with the company in good
faith, is now guaranteed by the new S.35. To preserve
some sort of balance between the interests of third
parties and those of the members of the company, the
1989 Act retains the ultra vires rule as between the
company and its members.
Wh i 1 e an u 1 t r a vires act is valid in favour of third
parties dealing with the company in good faith, the
right of an individual shareholder to restrain the
company from doing an ultra vires act is preserved by
the new 3.35(2) and 35A (4). The members' right to seek
an interdict to prevent an ultra vires act is not
subject to the rule in Foss v. Harbott 1 e. A member's
right to prevent an u 1 t r a vires act is, however, not
-435-
absolute. It is subject to several restrictions.
First, a member cannot bring proceedings to restrain the
doing of such act if the company is required to carry it
out in "fulfilment of a legal obligation arising from a
previous act of the company"' 71 1 . Thus, if a company is
legal ly bound to carry out an u 1 t r a v i res act in
pursuance of a previous obligation, the members cannot
bring proceedings to restrain the doing of that act.
Second, since an u1t r a vires act is valid and binding
on the company vis a vis bona fide third parties by
virtue of the new S.35 (1), then a completed u 1 t r a
vires act cannot be challenged or restrained by a
company's members unless the third party is dealing with
the company in bad faith. It follows that, so long as a
third party is dealing with the company in good faith,
the members can only bring proceedings to restrain a
proposed u1t r a vires act. Third, the members' right to
restrain an u 1 tra vi res act is restricted by the new
S.35(3) which allows the company to ratify u1tra vires
acts by special resolutions. It follows that if the
company ratifies a proposed u1tra vires act involving a
bona f i de third party, or a proposed or a completed
u I tra vires act which involving a ma 1 a fide third
party, no shareholder can bring proceedings to restrain
the doing of such an act'72).
What remains to a company's members is to sue directors
who may incur liability as a result of involving the
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company in u1tra vires acts. Again, the 1939 Act
restricts the members 1 right to sue directors by
al lowing the company to re 1ieve directors of any
liability incurred as a result of an u1t r a vires act.
A separate and special resolution is, however, needed
for an effective relief*73) .
Owing to the restrictions mentioned above, it would
appear that the 1989 Act does not provide the
shareholders with protection equivalent to that
available to third parties. If, however, an ultra
vires act and/or relief of directors from liability have
been sanctioned by an ordinary resolution rather than by
a special one, the members can prevent that act and can
sue directors for liabilities incurred by them as a
result of that act. It is submitted that this will
bring the matter within the scope of another exception
to the rule in Foss v. Harbottie. That is, the "special
majority" exception to the rule which will be discussed
next. Alternatively, the aggrieved members may petition
under 3.459 of the 1985 Act or 3.122(1) (g) of the
Insolvency Act 1986*.
(2) Where the matter is one which can be validly done or
sanctioned, not by a simple majority, but only by some
special majority.
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In Edwards v. Ha 1 1 iwe 1 1< 7 5) , Jenkins L.J. considered
that any act which according to the articles of
association ought to be done by special majority fell
outside the rule in Foss v. Harbottle; otherwise,
a company which, by its directors, had broken
its own regulations by doing something without
a special resolution which could only be done
validly by a special resolution, could assert
that it alone was the proper plaintiff in any
consequent action, and the effect would be to
al low a company acting in breach of its
articles to do eke facto by ordinary resolution
that which according to its own regulations
could only be done by special resolution'76'.
Thus, if a particular act was sanctioned by a simple
majority in contravention of the articles (which
required that that act could only be sanctioned by a
special resolution), it would be competent to a minority
shareholder to bring a derivative action to restrain the
doing of that act. In other words, the rule in Foss v.
Harbo 111e does not apply to this case'77' .
The reason for the creation of this exception is that
the articles constitute a contract between the company
and its members. This is clear from the wording of S.14
CA 1985'78' which provides:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the
memorandum and articles, when registered, bind
the company and its members to the same extent
as if they respectively had been signed and
sealed by each member, and contained covenants
on the part of each member to observe al1 the
provisions of the memorandum and of the
articles.
In Qu i n a n d Ax tens Ltd v. Salmon'79' , the articles
provided that certain transactions could not be entered
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into without the consent of both managing directors.
One of the directors dissented; but subsequently a
simple majority of shareholders tried to authorise the
transaction without that director's consent. It was
held that the dissenting director had the right, in an
action brought on behalf of himself and al1 other
shareholders except the defendants, to obtain an
injunction restraining the company from authorising that
transaction which was inconsistent with the articles.
The plaintiff in that case brought a representative
action in his capacity as a member. The company's
attempt to authorise that transaction was held to be an
attempt to "alter the terms of the contract between the
parties by a simple resolution instead of by a special
resolution"'' . So, the plaintiff's action in this
case was meant to compel the company to observe the
contract under the articles' 81 ' .
In this context, was there a conflict between 5aImon's
case'3 2' and the case of Hickman v. Kent or Rornney Marsh
Sheep Breeders' Association '33) ?. In Hickman's case,
Astbury J. laid down a rule which provided that
"outsider"— rights can never be enforced by reliance
upon the articles'34' . Th e plaintiff in S a 1 mon ' s case
was one of the directors. In his capacity as a director
he was an outsider. Since his action was tantamount to
an indirect enforcement of "outsider"—rights vested in
him, there was an apparent clash between this case and
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the rule in H i ckman ' s case. But it is agreed' ' 5 ) that
since the plaintiff in Salmon's case brought the action
in his capacity as a member qua member, his action would
be regarded as one intended to compel the company to
comply with the terms of the contract under the
articles. This is so, even although the effect of his
action is, in fact, an indirect enforcement of his
rights as an outsider.
If it is correct that the articles constitute a contract
between the company and its members; and that the
members can compel the company to observe the terms of
that con tract' 86) t then it wou Id s e em that there is a
conflict between this conclusion and some earlier cases
based on the rule in Foss v. Harbottle. For example, in
MacDougal1 v. Gardiner'87), James L.J. expressed the
view that a member did not have the right to complain of
"irregularities" even if they are inconsistent with the
articles. The above conclusion also clashes with cases
such as Grant v. United Kingdom Switchback Railway
Co.'3 3 > and Irvine v. Union Bank of Australia'8 9), where
the court permitted the ratification, by the majority
shareholders in general meeting, of conduct in breach of
the articles. However, such ratification can be
justified on the ground that it deals with some minimal
internal irregularities and does not amount to
alteration of the terms of the contract under the
articles' 90 ) . It is submitted that if the company's
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a 11 ernp t to ratify an action, by a simp 1 e majority,
amounts to a real attempt to al ter the terms of the
contract under the company's articles, then a clear
conflict with Salmon's case exists. So, to avoid this
conflict, a majority of shareholders must not be allowed
to ratify, wiia L in substance, is an alteration of the
articles, or a breach amounting to a "complete
transformation of the company — a fundamental alteration
of policy"(91 ' . However, it is further submitted that
it is not easy to draw a clear distinction between acts
which constitute actual alteration of the articles and
those which do not. This matter should be left to the
court to be judged on the specific facts of each case.
The scope of the "special ma jority" exception to the
rule in Foss v. Harbottle has been widely curtailed by
new S.35A (S.108 CA 1989)'92' . The section provides
that in favour of a bona fide third party, the powers of
directors to bind the company "shal 1 be deemed to be
free of any limitation under the company's
constitution". The word "constitution" includes the
memorandum of the company and its articles of
association. And for the purposes of new S.35A, the
company's constitution includes the company's
resolutions in general meetings and any agreement
between the company's members'93' . Thus, even if the
articles require a special majority to sanction a
specific act, if a bona fide third party is concerned,
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and the act with him has been concluded, a member of the
company cannot restrict the doing of that act. The
members, however, can sue directors who incurred
liability as a result of that act unless the c omp a n y
relieves the directors of liability by a special
reso 1ution' 9 4).
(3) Where the individual rights of the plaintiff as a
shareholder have been infringed.
First of al 1 , it should be noted that this matter cannot
be considered as a true exception to the rule in Foss v.
Hanbo 111e, simply because the rule deals with wrongs
done to the company rather than wrongs done to the
members of the company. This, indeed, is the reason
that the action, in respect of this matter, is a
personal rather than a derivative one. Alternatively, a
representative action can be brought in cases where the
rights of more than one member have been infringed.
Members' personal rights stem from the articles of
association, or from legislation, or from contracts of
employment'35'. A contract of employment may, in some
cases, incorporate the articles of association as terms
of agreement' 96 ) . A company, according to S.9 of the
1985 Act, is entitled to alter its articles. Contracts
of employment cannot restrain the company's right to
alter the articles. However, the company may incur a
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liability for breach of contract if it alters its
articles in cases where the articles have been
incorporated as terms of agreement in a contract of
emp 1 oyrnen t ' 3 7 ' .
The articles of association of a company give rise to
some personal rights which are of great importance.
Examples of these rights are a shareholder's right to
vote and to have his vote recorded' 9 2 ) ; the right to
prevent irregular alterations in rates of contribution
to the trade union'99); a shareholder's right to have
shares offered to him' 100) ; the right to prevent
directors holding office in breach of the articles'""';
the right to enforce a declared dividend as a legal
debt' 102) and, the right to prevent alterations in the
articles which would constitute a "fraud" on the
minority shareho1der(s)' l 03 ) . in these cases the court
held that a shareholder was entitled to bring a personal
action to enforce these rights against the company,
namely, to obtain an interdict restraining the company
from doing acts which would infringe his personal
rights. It is argued'104) that a shareholder may not be
able to obtain a money judgment against his company,
while he is a shareholder, except in cases of a declared
dividend which has become a debt due to him.
To enforce his personal rights, which spring from the
articles, a member must sue in his capacity as a member.
Thus, in Quin a n d Ax tens Ltd v. Salmon' 105), the
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director's action against the company to compel it to
observe the terms of the articles was al lowed because he
was suing in his capacity as a member. "Outsider"—
rights can never be enforced by reliance upon the
articles of association' 106) . Thus, had the plaintiff,
in Sh 1 ri'ifit'i 1 s rase, sued in his capacity as a di rcc to r,
his action would have not been allowed. So long as the
plaintiff sues in his capacity as a member, it is of no
effect that the action tantamount to an enforcement of
"outsider"-rights vested in him as a director.
There is a debate over whether a member has the right to
have all the articles observed. Wedderburn argues that
a shareholder has the right to have al 1 the articles
observed "subject only to those matters of 1 internal
management 1 on which the courts have seen fit to
displace his contractual rights in favour of the
majority rule"'1871 . Beck' 103' argues that a personal
action is justified wherever the directors breach their
fiduciary duties. Farrar'109) argues that membership
rights which stem from the articles are limited. Farrar
re 1ies on some cases in which a member's action was
disallowed. For example, it was held that a member did
not have the right to have a po 1 1 taken' l l 0 > j a member
did not have the right to have directors retire in
accordance with the articles' 111' ; nor did he have the
right not to have the value of his shares reduced by the
wrongdoing of the directors where that wrongdoing had
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caused loss to the company and his loss as, a
shareholder, was only consequential to that of the
company( 112) . jf the loss suffered by the shareholder
is consequential to that suffered by the company, no
personal action will lie. To found a personal action, a
shareholder's loss must be separate from that of the
company<113).
The answer to the question of how to determine the
extent of the membership rights is as yet unclear. One
is, however, inclined to accept Wedderburn's argument
since it finds some support in the wording of S.14 of
the Companies Act 1985. The section provides that the
company and the members are bound by the memorandum and
the articles, and that the memorandum and the articles
contain covenants on the part of each member to observe
"a 1 1 the provisions of the memorandum and of the
articles". Since al 1 the members are bound by the
memorandum and the articles, it would seem that, as a
general rule, each member has the right to have al1 the
articles observed. The generality of the section is,
however, subjected to the provisions of the Companies
Act. For example, a company can alter its articles by a
special resolution. Thus, when accepting to become a
member of a company a person agrees to a contract
alterable by the company at any moment.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the more we extend the
scope of the membership rights, the more we restrict the
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scope of application of the rule in F o s s v.
Harbottle* 114) .
f A \ Where the majority is c ovarii i 11 i ng a fraud on the
minorit y.
In respect of this matter, the action is a derivative
one brought by a minority shareholder on behalf of the
company. In order to found a derivative action based on
the "fraud on the minority" exception, in England, the
plaintiff must establish two elements: (I) a "fraud on
the minority" , and (II) wrongdoer control. The
situation in Scotland is slightly different. It is not
sufficient for the pursuer to plead that the majority
has the power to outvote him. The pursuer must have
first made a clear a 11 emp t to obtain the majority's c o —
operation' H 5) . This means that, in Scotland, the
minority shareholder who wishes to sue the wrongdoers
for a fraud alleged to be committed by the latter, must
prove that it has made a definite attempt to obtain the
majority's co-operation prior to establishing fraud and
wrongdoer control.
(I) Fraud on the minority.
The word "fraud" in this context does not mean deceit in
the criminal sense' ''6 I . it is not, however, confined
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to fraud at common law. It has been given a wider
interpretation in many recent cases. In Daniels v,
Daniels'117) , the directors authorised the sale of the
company 1 arid to one of them at an undervalue. A
minority shareholder brought an action to set aside the
sale. The directors argued that the action should not
be al lowed since fraud had not been al 1eged. Templeman
J. rejected this argument and said:
a minority shareholder who has no other
remedy may sue where directors use their
powers, intentionally or unintentionally,
fraudulently or negligently in a manner which
benefits them at the expense of the
company' 113' .
The essence of the decision in this case is that the
minority shareholders can bring a derivative action
whenever the directors use their powers in a manner
which benefits them and the majority at the expense of
the company. The Daniels case was distinguished, by
Tempieman J., from Pavlides v. Jensen'its), on the
ground that the sale in the latter was to a third party
and thus the directors had not benefited by their
'negligence' at the expense of the company. It is
correctly argued'120' that Templeman J.'s decision is
signalling the demise of the rule in Foss v. Harbottle.
That is because the decision has widened the scope of
non-ratifiab1e conducts and consequently limited the
scope of application of that rule.
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In Estmanco (Ki I ne r House) Ltd v. Greater London
Counc i I < 1 2 1 ) it was decided that the ina j or i ty 1 s abuse of
power could ariiount to a fraud on the minority. In that
case the majority had attempted to defeat the purpose
for which the company was formed. The facts of the case
were as fol lows: the Greater London Council (the GLC)
when under Conservative control decided to sel1 a block
of 60 flats. The company (Estmanco) was formed in
accordance with an agreement with the GLC to manage the
flats on a non-profit mak ing basis after all GO flats
were sold. Each of the purchasers was to have one share
in the company, but would have no voting power until al1
60 flats were sold. Prior to the completion of the sale
of all the flats, the voting shares would be vested in
the GLC. After the completion of the sale the
purchasers would carry votes and the GLC would withdraw.
Control of the GLC passed to Labour after only 12 flats
had been sold. The GLC decided that the flats should be
let rather than sold. The 12 purchasers had been
approached by the GLC to give up the flats in return for
damages. Estmanco voted to discontinue proceedings
against the GLC for breach of the agreement existed
between them. One of the purchasers brought an action
in Estrnanco1 s name to obtain an injunction preventing
the GLC from carrying out its scheme. The GLC argued
that it was acting bona fide in the interest of the
company and there was no fraud on the minority. The
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a voteless shareholder who had an
expectancy of becoming qualified to vote in the future
was within the exception of fraud on the minority. The
plaintiff was granted an injunction to enforce the terms
of the agreement against the GLC. Megarry V—C said that
it may be in the best interest of the company to deprive
the minority of some of their rights, but this does not
give the majority an absolute right to do this. Megarry
V-C addedi
Mo right of a shareholder to vote in his own
selfish interests or to ignore the interests
of the company entitles him with impunity to
injure his voteless fellow shareholders by
depriving the company of a cause of action and
by stultifying the purpose for which the
company was formed( 122) .
He a 1 so said:
I feel little doubt that the Council has
used its voting power not in order to promote
the best interests of the company but in order
to bring advantage to itself and disadvantage
to the minority( 123) .
It is to be concluded that the word "fraud" has been
given its widest sense. The effect of this wide
interpretation is, in fact, the extension of the scope
of application of the "fraud on the minority" exception,
and consequently, the contraction of the scope of
application of the rule in F o s s v. Harbott 1 e. This,
definitely, signals the courts' willingness to provide




In addition to establishing fraud on the minority, a
pursuer who wishes to bring his case within the "fraud
on the minority" exception must establish wrongdoer
control which prevents the company suing in its own
name < 124). Wrongdoer control exists where the
wrongdoers control the majority of the votes, or where
the majority has ratified conduct which constitutes a
fraud on the minority* 125) . Control in this context
means de jure control , i.e., an actual voting control .
However, in Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd v. Newman
I ndust r i e s Ltd ( Mo_. 2) (12 6) t Vinelott J. was prepared to
recognise d e facto control as sufficient to a 1 1 ow a
minority shareholder to bring a derivative action. That
is, a derivative action should be permitted wherever the
wrongdoer, though not holding the majority of the
shares, was shown to be able "by any means of
manipulation" of his position in the company, to ensure
that the majority shareholders would not allow a claim
to be brought in relation to the al 1 eged wrong* 127) .
However, the Court of Appeal in that case expressed no
opinion on this point. If Vinelott. J's view is
accepted by the courts, then, it will have a great
impact on the rule in Fo s s v. Ha rbottle. The judge's
view aims to widen the ambit of the fraud on the
minority exception and, consequently, the scope of
application of the rule will be narrowed.
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On the other hand the fraud on the minority exception
has been narrowed by the decision of Knox J. in Sini th v.
Croft (No.2)o 2 3) r where he held that if a disinterested
ma jority of the independent shareholders do not wish to
sue, then no action can be brought even if the
defendants are in control. So, contrary to the signals
we inferred from the decisions in Daniels v.
Daniels*129) and Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd v. Greater
London Counci j < 1 30 ) t Knox J. 's judgment shows a clear
wil1ingness to keep the minority shareholders out of the
court*131).
Cases in which a fraud on the minority was held to exist
are numerous. Examples of these cases wil1 be discussed
next .
1) Expropriation of a company's property.
In Cook v. Peeks* 132) , the directors took a
which the company was actively pursuing, in
name. Subsequently, at a general meting,
their vote to pass a resolution declaring
company had no interest in that contract.
Council held that the resolution was a misuse
powers and was a fraud on the minority and
ineffective. In other words it was held
directors' conduct was not ratifiable and t he











of that contract. The directors' conduct in that case
amounted to an appropriation of the company'
assets' 133) . Re c onc i I i ng this case with Rega 1
(Hastings) v. GuI I iver' 134) may not be easy. In the
Rega 1 case the directors made a personal profit out of
exploiting a corporate opportunity which their company
was financially unable to exploit. The House of Lords
held that the directors were liable to account for the
profit so derived. However, the House of Lords decided
that their conduct was ratif iable. Thus there is an
apparent clash between these two cases. It is said' '3 5)
that the two cases can be reconciled on the basis that
the Rega 1 case was one involving incidental profit
making by bona fide directors, while the conduct of the
directors in Cook v. Deeks constituted an actual
misappropriation of the company's assets'135' . In other-
words, the directors in the Reg a 1 case was acting bona
fide in the interests of the company when they made a
personal profit, whereas in Cook v. Deeks they deprived
the company of a contract in which it was interested and
appropriated that contract for themselves. However,
Professor Sealy'13?' noted that it is difficult to say
why the impropriety in the Rega 1 case was rat if iable
while that in Cook v. Deeks was not , unless the fact
that the profit in the Regal case was made incidentally
was regarded as a crucial finding.
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2) An issue of shares designed to cause harm to the
minority.
In Clemens v. Clemens Bros. Ltd(l3S> , the plaintiff held
45% of the issued shares and her aunt , who was one of
the directors held 55% of the shares. The aunt's shares
were used at the general meeting to secure the passing
of resolutions to issue further shares to directors and
trustees. As a result the plaintiff's holding was
reduced to about 24.5% of the issued shares. This
deprived the plaintiff of her power to block special or
extraordinary resolutions. The court set a side the
resolutions on the ground that they were oppressive to
the plaintiff because they were designed <i> to ensure
that the plaintiff could never get control of the
company, and (ii) to deprive the plaintiff of her right
to defeat special resolutions' 139) .
3) An act done to defeat the purpose for which the
company was formed
In Estmanco (Ki lner House) Ltd v. Gr eater London
Counc j I ( 1 4 0 ) F the court held that the decision of the
company to discontinue proceedings for breach of
contract, against the GLC, amounted to a fraud on the
minority. Megarry V-C said:
No right of a shareholder to vote in his own
selfish interests or to ignore the interests
of the company entitles him with impunity to
injure his voteless fellow shareholders by
depriving the company of a cause of action and
by stultifying the purpose for which the
company was formed'l 4 l ) .
4) A negligent act which benefits the majority at the
expense of the company.
While it is possible for the minority shareholders to
bring a derivative action in cases of directors' breach
of fiduciary duties' 142) t it has been held that no
derivative action can be brought against directors f or
failure to exercise their powers with proper skill and
care. In other words, mere negl igence on the part of
the control ling directors or shareholders, is not
sufficient to ground a derivative action. Mere
negl igence on the part of control 1 ing directors or
shareholders does not amount to a fraud on the
minor i ty' 14 3! . In Pav 1 i des v . Jensen' 144) t the assets
of the company were sold to a third party at an
undervalue. The court held that the directors' conduct
was ratif iable and there was no fraud on the minority.
On the other hand in Daniels v ■ Daniels' 145) t the sale
of the company's assets to one of the directors at an
undervalue was held not to be ratif iable. The court
based its decision on the ground that since the
directors' conduct benefited them at the expense of the
company then there was a fraud on the minority.
Consequently, the derivative action was allowed. It
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could be inferred from the previous two cases that ,
while mere negligence does not justify a derivative
ac tion, se1f-serving negligence does. It is agreed'H 6)
that the probable explanation of this case lies in the
fact that a director is prohibited from making personal
profit out of his directorial position. In other words,
since it is a breach of a fiduciary duty for a director
to gain personal prof it from the exercise of his
functions, the cause of action in the Daniels case is,
in fact, not the directors' negligence but the retention
of a windf a 1 1 profit resulting from negligent exercise
of directors' powers. So, it would seem correct to say
that the decision of the Daniels case reflects a well
known category of non-ratifiable conduct which is the
misappropriation of a company's assets' 147) .
9.5. The Statutory Protection of minority shareholders.
The Companies Act 1985 as we 1 1 as the Insolvency Act
1986 contains some provisions intended to protect
minority shareholders against the misconduct of
directors or that of the control 1ing shareholders' 148).
Two situations only wi11 be examined under this heading,
namely, the unfair prejudicial conduct under S.459 CA
1985 and the winding up of a company on the "just and
equitable" ground under 3.122(1) (g) IA 1986.
9.5.1. Protection of minority shareholders under 3.459
of the Companies Act 19S5.
Because a "just and equitable" winding up under 3.122(1)
(g) IA 1986'149) is, usually, inappropriate, 3.459 CA
1935 has been enacted to provide an alternative remedy
for a minority shareholder'1501 .
The roots of 3.459 were found in 3.210 CA 1948. 3.210
provides:
(1) Any member of a company who complains that
the affairs of the company are being conducted
in a manner oppressive to some part of the
members (including himself) may make an
application to the court by petition for an
order under this section.
(2) If on any such petition the court is of
the opinion (a) that the company's affairs are
being conducted as aforesaid and (b) that to
wind up the company would unfairly prejudice
that part of the members, but otherwise the
fact would justify the making of a winding up
order on the ground that it was just and
equitable that the company should be wound up.
3.210 was widely criticised. First, a remedy under this
section will not be available unless the facts of the
case justify the making of a winding up order on the
"just and equitable" ground. Second, a single and
completed action cannot form an oppression under the
section. There must be a continuing wrong to justify
the making of a winding up order' 151 ) . Third, the
concept of oppression was narrowly construed by the
courts' 15 2) . Finally, it was held that under S.210 a
member must complain in his capacity as a "member qua
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member"'153). Those requirements restricted the section
and reduced its efficiency as a remedy for minority
shareho1ders. Therefore, during the 1 ifetime of the
section only two applications for relief from oppressive
conduct were accepted'i54'.
Th e defects suffered by S.210 had led Fa r1iamen t to
reform the remedy. SS.459—4S1 of the Companies Act
1985<15 5) replace S.210 . They avoid many of their
predecessor's defects. 3.459 provides:
( 1 ) A member of a company may apply to the
court by petition for an order under this part
on the ground that the company1 s affairs are
being or have been conducted in a manner which
is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of
s ome part of t h e me rubers (including at least
himself) or any actual or proposed act or
omission of the company (including an act or
omission on its behalf) is or would be so
prejudicia 1 .
It is clear from the wording of 3.459 that the rule,
that the conduct complained of could only be cha11enged
where it consisted of a continuous course of conduct
which continued up to the date of the petition, was
abo 1ished' 15 6) . The section also replaces the concept
"oppression" by the expression "unfairly prejudicial".
In addition, there is no longer requirement that the
facts of the case must justify the making of a winding
up order. 3.459 maintains the judicial requirement that
a member can only bring a petition in his capacity as a
"member qua member' 157). it is to be noticed that the
Companies Act 1989 has replaced the phrase "unfairly
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prejudicial to the interests of some part of the
members" in 3.459(1) by the phrase "unfairly prejudicial
to the interests of its members general ly or of some
part of its members'" 158) . The effect of this amendment
is the abolition of the judicially created restriction
of the scope of the remedy available in 3.459 and its
predecessor 3.210 CA 1948. That is, the abolition of
the rule that a member has no cause of action where the
conduct complained of has affected al 1 the members of
the company'159).
3.459 will now be analysed since some words or terms in
it need special attention.
1) The term "member".
It is to be noticed that neither the old 3.210 nor the
new 3.459 used the term "minority". Instead, the term
"member" has been deployed. It is not, however, easy to
imagine a majority shareholder petitioning under this
section. So, it seems that this section is designed to
protect the minority shareholders. The direct result of
using the term "member" is, of course, the exclusion of
creditors. Thus, a creditor has no cause of action or
has no locus standi to petition to the court under
3.459' 1 ® 0 ' . As previously mentioned, S.459 fails to
abolish, in clear words, the rule which the judiciary
had developed in the old 3.210, that a member could only
bring a petition under the section in his capacity as a
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"member qua member"'161). Thus, a member whose
interests have been prejudiced in his capacity as a
director or as an employee, but not as a member, cannot
bring a pe tition under 3.459.
2) The term "interests".
There is no statutory guidance as to the meaning of the
word "interests". It is also unlikely that the articles
or the memorandum of a company provides a definition for
this word' 162) . Thus, the courts may look beyond the
legal entity of the company to examine the existence of
these interests. In Ebr ah i mi v_. VYestbo u r n e
Gal ieryes' 16 3) f Lord Wilberforce said:
There is room in company law for recognition
of the fact that behind Cthe legal entity of a
1imited company] or amongst it, there are
individuals with rights, expectations and
obligations inter se which are not necessarily
submerged in the company structure.
Lord Wilberforce's approach is not confined to a winding
up cases. It is applicable to cases of unfair prejudice
too' 16 + ) . Similarly, in Postage & Denby (Agencies)
Ltd' 16 5), Hoffmann J. noted:
Section 459 enables the court to give full
effect to the terms and understanding upon
which the members of the company became
associated , but not to rewrite them
Hoffmann J. 1 s remarks are a clear indication of the
court's wi 1 1 ingness to override the "qua member"
requirement. In sma 1 1 private companies and in "quasi —
-459-
p a r trierships" a me rnber ' s expectations are wide. A
member may, for example, expect to take part in the
management of the company or to be employed by it in
return for salaries. If such a member is excluded from
the management of a company which is formed on the basis
of management participation, can this member bring a
petition under S.459 ?. In this case the member's
interests were prejudiced in his capacity as a director
or as an employee rather than as a member . In Re a
Company< 16 6) f Vinelott J. said that he thought it is
unlikely that such a member was precluded from bringing
a petition under 3.459 even though the exclusion from
ma na g ernent wouId not strictly affect his rights as a
member. In Re a Company1 1 6 7 ) r Hof fmann J. said that if
the exclusion from management amounts to exclusion from
a "legitimate expectation" then it will be unfairly
prejudicial conduct1168' . Similarly, in Re Ring tower
Holdings P1c' 169) r Peter Gibson J. accepted that if
participation in the management formed a legitimate
expectation then the exclusion form it could found an
unfair prejudice petition'170> .
It could be concluded that the courts are willing to
give the word "interests" a wide interpretation so as to
embrace "legitimate expectations". Thus the word
"interests" is not limited to strict legal rights under
the company's constitution' ' . It is submitted that
this interpretation is capable of overriding the "qua
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member" requirement at least in respect of private
companies where employment and management participation
are, usual 1y, "legitimate expectations". However, if
the court finds that management participation is not a
"legitimate expectation" 3.459 will not apply. In other
words, the special circ urns tances of each case will
determine the existence of a member's interests and
whether prejudicing these interests may entitle him to
bring a petition under 3.459.
3) The term "unfairly prejudicial".
The conduct complained of must be both unfair and
prejudicial. The case law provides some guidance as to
the scope of this term. The conduct complained of may
be past, present or future'1'2' .
The judgment of Slade J.'1?3), which was cited with
approval by Nourse J. in Re R.A. Nob 1e (Clothing)
Ltd' 17 4), gave some indication as to the meaning of the
term "unfairly prejudicial". The judgment reads as
foilows:
Without prejudice to the generality of the
wording of [3.4591, which may cover many other
situations, a member of a company will be able
to bring himself within the section if he can
show that the value of his shareholding in the
company has been seriously diminished or at
least seriously jeopardised by reason of a
course of conduct on the part of those persons
who have had de facto control of the company,
which is unfair to the member concerned. The
test of unfairness must, . . ., be an
objective, not a subjective one. In other
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words, it is not necessary for the petitioner
to show that persons who have had de fact
control of the company have acted as they did
in conscious knowledge t h a t this was unfair to
the p e titione r o r t hat they were a c t i n g in bad
faith; the test . . . is whether a reasonable
bystander observing the consequences of their
conduct would regard it as having unfairly
prejudiced the petitioner's interests.
Thus, the test of what constitutes unfair prejudice is
a n objective. Consequently, 'bad faith' and lack of
fair dealing by those in control are irrelevant* "5) . a
case of unfair prejudice might be established even if
the defender was acting in good faith. As far as
directors' fiduciary duties are concerned, a breach of a
fiduciary duty may assist in establishing unfair
prejudice. According to the judgment (quoted above) ,
de facto control by those against whom unfairly
prejudicial conduct is alleged is sufficient. In other
words, de jure control is not a crucial element for a
petition under S.459. This, indeed, constitutes a
judicial attempt to circumvent the limitations of the
"fraud on the minority" exception to the rule in Foss v.
Harbottle. In three cases* 176) . Hoffmann J. regarded
allegations of breach of fiduciary duties as capable of
establishing unfair prejudice. Thus, a misappropriation
of a company's assets by a majority shareholder is
capable of establishing unfair prejudice to the minority
shareho1ders* 1 77 ) . The fact that misappropriation of a
company's assets entitles minority shareholders to
bring a derivative action, does not prevent it from
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bringing a petition under 3.459* 1 7 8) . When making a
statement supporting one of two rival take—over bids,
directors owe a duty not to mislead shareholders. A
breach of this duty is capable of establishing unfair
prejudice1 t 73 ' . In Re a Company* ISO) t the directors
fraudulently induced the petitioners to sell their
shares in the company. Hoffmann J. refused to strike
out the petition on the ground that the conduct
complained of constituted a wrong to the petitioners as
defrauded sel lers of their shares and as wrongful ly
dismissed managing director (as regard to one
petitioner) of that company*181).
The payment of excessive remuneration to directors to
the detriment of a company's members would be unfairly
prejudicial to the interests of those members who were
not directors* 132 ) . it is, however, difficult to prove
that the remuneration paid to directors was excessive.
The courts are incl ined not to interfere with matters
which require the commercial judgement of the board.
Therefore, the test of excessive remuneration would seem
subjective. If the board has, in good faith and
genuinely, exercised the power to pay remuneration, the
court wi 1 1 not determine whether the remuneration paid
were reasonable*133' . However, failure to pay adequate
dividends coupled with excessive remuneration may found
unfair prejudice*134'.
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In Ma 1 aga Investments Ltd (Petitioners)' 1S5) t the
petitioner requisitioned a general meeting to make
resolutions to replace three non-elected directors whose
appointment was previously rejected by the shareholders
in general meeting. The board wrongly obtained a
"freezing order" on the shares of the protesting
minority shareholders under 3.216 CA 1385, so preventing
the protesting shareholders from voting on the
resolutions. The court held that the board's conduct
was capable of establishing unfair prejudice1 1861 .
It is to be noticed that the conduct complained of must
be that of the company represented by the board of
directors or the controlling shareholders'137' . 3.453
does not apply where the conduct complained of is that
of a director in his personal capacity. That is because
such conduct cannot be one on behalf of the company. If
a director, for example, stole cash from the company's
safe, his conduct could not be described as on behalf of
the company. It seems that it will make no difference
if that director has abused his directorial position to
effect or to facilitate the theft.
In relation to the directors' duty of skill and care,
the question whether a petition can be brought for
breach of that duty under 3.453 is as yet unclear.
Directors' breach of duty of skill and care may cause a
real harm to the company's affairs and consequently the
value of the members' interests wi 1 1 be harmed. The
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wording of S.459 is, however, encouraging. A petition
under the section can be brought in relation to "any
actual or proposed act or omission of the company
including an act or omission on its beha1f", where this
"is or would be so prejudicial". Thus, it would appear
that directors' negligence which was found to be
unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the members
should be governed by the section'iss).
4) Court order s
If the court is satisfied that a petition under S.459 is
we 1 1 founded, it may make such order as it thinks proper
for giving relief in respect of the matters complained
of< i s 9 ) .
S.461(1) gives the court an unlimited discretion to make
a proper order. S.461(2) , however, enumerates five
possible orders which the court may make.
i) An order regulating the company's affairs in the
future' 19 0).
An example of this type of order is that made by the
court in Re H. R. Ha rme r Ltd < l 9 l ) . I n that case the
court ordered that the 80 year old founder director who
had managed the company in a tyrannical and autocratic
way, ignoring the articles and the board's wishes.
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should be made a president of the company with no
rights, duties or powers. The court also ordered that
the company should contract for his services as a
consultant for life. In addition the old director was
ordered not to interfere in the company's management
unless he was asked by the board to do so. Under this
heading the court may also order that the capital should
be reduced, or a director should be removed or
appointed, or the articles should be altered' 192) _
ii ) An order to restrain the doing or continuing of an
act or omission' 1 99 ) _
An example of this type of order is that made in Whyte,
Petitioner' 194) f where the court issued an injunction
restraining a company from passing a resolution removing
a director and replacing him with another'195).
iii) An order authorising civil proceedings to be
brought in the name and on beha1f of the company by such
person or persons and on such terms as the court may
direct'196' .
3.461(2)(c) is intended to circumvent the difficulties
of bringing a derivative suit under any of the
exceptions to the rule in Foss v. Harbot 11 e. If the
court authorised civil proceedings a minority
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shareholder can sue a director on behalf of the company
even if he cannot bring his action within one of the
exceptions to that rule.
iv) An order providing for the purchase of the shares of
any member by other members or by the company* 197) .
An example of this type of remedy is that made in
Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society v. Meyer*198).
In that case, the petitioners were minority shareholders
in a subsidiary company formed by Scottish Co—operative
Wholesale Society. The board of directors of the
subsidiary company consisted of five directors three of
whom were nominees of Scottish Co—operative Wholesale
Society and the petitioners were the other two
directors. The subsidiary was dependent on Scottish Co¬
operative Wholesale Society for its supplies. A dispute
between the petitioners and Scottish Co-operative
Wholesale Society had led the latter to adopt a policy
of deliberately ruining the subsidiary by cutting of its
supplies. The nominee directors supported that policy.
As a result the value of the petitioners' holdings was
reduced from £6 a share to nothing. The court found
that there was an oppression on the minority and
consequently Scottish Co—operative Wholesale Society was
ordered to buy the petitioners' shares for £3. 15s a
share. The value of the petitioners' shares was
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assessed Oi'i the b a S i S of wha t a fair p r ice would have
been if the oppressive conduct had not occurred' 199).
Most recently, in Holt v. Holt'200)i the Privy Council
held that the applicable test to share valuation was the
price at which a hypothetical "willing but not anxious
vender would sel 1 [his shares] and a wi 1 1 ing 'out not
anxious purchaser would buy [ them] " ' 2 0 1 ) ,
5) The conduct of the petitioning shareholder.
The power of the court to give re 1 ief under 3.459 is
equitable in character' 202 ) . Thus, the one who wishes
to bring a petition under 3.45 9 must come before the
court with "clean hands"'203). A petitioner's motive is
of importance in deciding whether a re 1 ief is to be
g i ven. I n Re Be j__l a do r Silk L t d' 2 ^ ' , the petition was
held to deserve dismissal because the petitioner's
motive was to put pressure on the company to compel it
to pay a debt it owed him. Similarly, in Re R.A. Noble
ot Son's 0 5 ) ( Nourse J. refused to grant a petition under
S.459 on the ground that the management exclusion had
not been unfair since it was partly due to the
petitioner's disinterest. Instead, the Judge made a
winding up order on the "just and equitable ground".
a c r>
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9.5.2. Protection of Minority Shareholders under
S.122(l)(g) of the Insolvency Act 1985.
3.12 2(1) (g) empowers the court to order that a company
be wound up where it is "just and equitable" to do so.
The section provides:
(1) A company may be wound up by the court if:
(g) the court is of the opinion that it is
just and equitable that the company should
be wound up.
An appl i cat ion for a winding up can be made by tha
company, or the directors, or by any creditor or
creditors or by any contributory1206'. A contributory
is defined as a "person liable to contribute to the
assets of the company in the event of its being wound
up"(207). A contributory cannot bring a winding up
petition unless either (a) the number of the members i3
reduced below two'208) r or (b) the shares weie
originally allotted to him or
have been held by him and registered in hi3
name for at least 6 months during the 1 ^
months before the commencement of the windii'1®
up, or have devolved on him through the d^a^'
of a former holder' 2 0 9) .
A partly paid-up shareholder is a contributory since he
is liable to contribute to the company1s assets in t h3
event of its being wound up. Thus, he is qualifier t°
present a winding up petition. A fully paid-up mernb£'r
cannot be a contributory. However, if he estab1ish^s
that he has a tangible interest in the winding up he i3
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qualified to bring a petition -for a winding up
order* 210) . Establishing that the petitioner had only a
purely private advantage in the winding up was held to
insufficient* 2 11) . The "tangible interests" requirement
is purely judicial*"*^). It goes against the substance
of S.125 of the Insolvency Act 1986, which provides that
"the court sha 1 1 not refuse to make a winding up order
on the ground only that . . . the company has no
assets". However, the purpose of establishing the
"tangible interests" requirement is the avoidance of
mala fide petitions which are intended to destroy the
company. It is submitted that while it is correct that
a fully paid-up member will not be harmed financially by
the continuation of his company because his liability is
limited; the "tangible interests" requirement is
arbitrary. The term "interest" should not be limited to
cases of "tangible" or financial interests. A member of
a good reputation may have an interest in the winding up
of his insolvent company. It is quite possible that his
being a member in an insolvent company may injure his
reputation. So, why should not he be able to bring a
petition for the winding of this company?*2l3).
A petitioner for a winding up order on the "just and
equitable" ground must come before the court with "clean
hands". If the breakdown of a company's business was a
result of the petitioner's misconduct, the court would
not make a winding up order* 214) . jf the conduct
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complained of was sanctioned by the petitioner prior to
the bringing of the petition, again the court would not
make a winding up order'2151. Similarly, if the
petition was intended only to put pressure on the
company and not to obtain a relief, the court would not
make on order for the winding up of the company'216).
The availability of an alternative remedy, such as that
under S.459 CA 1985 does not deprive the court of making
a winding up order. However, according to S.125 of the
Insolvency Act 1986, if the court is of the opinion that
the petitioner is acting unreasonably in not pursuing
the available alternative remedy, it may strike out his
petition for a winding up. In Re a Company' 2 17) the
petitioner was offered to sell his shares at a fair
value to be determined by an independent expert. The
petitioner refused the offer. The court found that his
refusal was unreasonable and, therefore, his petition
for the winding up of the company was struck out.
The attempt to categorise the grounds, on which a
winding up order may be granted on the "just and
equitable" ground, has been criticised by Lord
Wi lberforce in the leading case of Ebrahimi v.
Westbourne Galleries Ltd'218). Im that case Lord
Wilberforce pointed out that the words contained in
S.122(l)(g) were general and should not be restricted or
1imited to a specific number of instances. However, one
wi11 examine some situations, as examples, in which the
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court made a winding up order on the "just and
equitable" ground.
i ) Loss of substratum
If the main purpose for which a company was formed has
been fulfilled or achieved or its achievement has became
impossible, the court may order the winding up of it on
an application made by a petitioner* 213 ' .
ii) Deadlock situations.
If there is a deadlock in the management of the
company's business because the directors cannot agree on
important matters, a winding up may be ordered. An
example of this situation is found in the case of Re
Y en i d j e Tobacco Co. L t d . ' 2 2 0 ) . I that case a company
was formed by two shareholders. They were also the
directors of the company. The relation between them had
totally broken down. They failed to agree on many vital
matters such as the appointment of senior employees.
They refused to talk to one another and al1 the
communications between them were through a third party.
The court held that the winding up was justifiable.
It is said*221) that "deadlock" may not be accepted as a
ground for a winding up of a company which is not a
"quasi—partnership" . That is because, in such a
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company, the general meeting would be able to exercise
its residual powers to resolve any deadlock.
iii) Collapse of mutua1 trust and confidence.
If a company is in essence a partnership and the basis
of mutual trust and confidence has been broken, the
court may order the winding up of it. An example of
this situation is found in the leading case of Ebrahimi
v. Westbourne Galleries Ltd* 22 2) . Im that case, E and N
had been business partners since 1945. In 1958 a
private company was formed. The shares of the company
were divided equal ly between them. Each one held 500
shares out of 1000. They were also the directors of the
company. Shortly afterwards N's son, G, joined the
business. E and N each transferred 100 shares to G.
The company was prosperous and made a good profit. E ,
N and G were accustomed to distribute the profit amongst
them as directors' remuneration. Following a
disagreement between E an N, a general meeting was
called and E was removed from the board by N and G. E
petitioned for an order that the company be wound up on
the "just and equitable" ground. The House of Lords
ordered that the company should be wound up. The House
of Lords based its decision on the ground that when E
and N formed the company, it was clear that the
character of the association or the basic nature of
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their personal business relationship would remain the
same. That is, E expected to continue in taking part in
the management of the company and to receive prof its
distributed as a director's remuneration. In this case,
N and G were, in fact, acting within the limits of their
powers. This fact did not prevent the House of Lords
from ordering that the company be wound up. Some
equitable considerations may come into play to further a
member's rights which are not defined by the articles.
An example of these considerations is the mutual
confidence between the members. Lord Wilberforce
suggested that in order to make a winding up order on
the "just and equitable" ground, the court should find
out whether one or more of the following factors exists:
(i) an association formed or continued on the
basis of a personal relationship involving
mutual confidence . . .; (ii) an agreement, or
understanding, that all, or some (for there
may be sleeping members) of the shareholders
shall participate in the conduct of the
business; (iii) restrictions upon the transfer
of members' interests in the company
.(223)
iv) Lack of probity.
If there is a justifiable lack of confidence in the
conduct and management of a company's affairs, the court
may order that the company must be wound up. In Loch v.
John BI ackwood< 2 2 4 )
f in order to keep the petitioners
ignorant as to the value of the company, so that they
could acquire the petitioners' shares at an undervalue,
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the directors failed to submit accounts or recommend
dividends and even failed to call meetings. The Privy
Counci1 ordered that the company be wound up. Lord Shaw
said;
It is undoubtedly true that at the foundation
of applications for winding up on the 'just
and equitable rule' there rnu s t lie a
justifiable lack of confidenee . . . grounded
on conduct of the the directors . . . in
regard to the company's business.
CWlhenever the lack of confidence is rested on
a lack of probity in the conduct of the
company's affairs, then the former is
justified by the latter and it is, under the
statute, just and equitable that the company
be wound up( 2 2 5 ) .
Finally, the importance of S.122(1)(g) has been reduced
by the enactment of 3.459 which provides a petitioner
with an alternative remedy. The outcome of a petition
under 3.459 is more satisfactory and more favourable
than that under 3.122(l)(g). It is mo re satisfactory
because of the wide range of remedies available for the
petitioner in comparison with the sole and undesirable
ou t c ome of a petition under S.122(l)(g). In addition,
the winding up of a company may not benefit the
petitioner since the break—up value of the company's
assets may be sma 1 1 < 2 2 6 ) . Suffice here to imagine the
undesirable effects of applying S.122(l)(g) on the
existence of a prosperous company, its employees and the
society as a whole. Therefore, it is suggested that
S.122 (l)(g) should not be applied whenever an
alternative remedy is available.
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The board of directors is the organ through which a
company, usually, conducts its business. The law leaves
the distribution of powers between the two main organs
of the company (i.e. the board of directors and the
shareholders in general meeting) to the articles of
association. Therefore, the true construction of the
articles is the real touchstone against which the
division of powers between the board of directors and
the general meeting is defined. It is well established
that where the power to manage the company's affairs is,
by the articles, clearly vested in the board of
directors, the general meeting will have no control over
the board in relation to the management of the affairs
of the company. However, if the articles give the
shareholders in general meeting a supervisory power over
the board in relation to the management of the company's
business, then, the directors are bound to fol low the
instructions of the general meeting.
If a company adopts Art. 70 of the 1985 Table A, then,
the shareholders in general meeting can instruct the
board on how to manage the company's business. However,
for binding instructions a special resolution is
required.
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Directors are, usually, vested with the power to
1 itigate in the name and on behalf of the company. If
the assets of the company are subject to a floating
charge and a receiver is appointed, it is submitted
that, the directors can sue in the name of the company
even without the receiver's consent, provided that the
exercise of the power to sue must not harm the interests
of the charge holder in his capacity as such. To avoid
multiplicity of actions (i.e. to avoid the case of
bringing proceedings on the same cause of actions by two
different sets of people, the directors and the
receivers) it is suggested that the directors must have
made a real attempt to obtain the receiver's co¬
operation. If the receiver refuses to bring an action
in the name and on behalf of the company, directors must
have the power to sue in order to protect the interests
of the company including the interests of its creditors.
This suggestion extends to cases involving defending
actions on behalf of the company.
A company's articles, normally, allow the board of
directors to delegate some of its powers to others. It
is submitted that where the articles empower the
directors to delegate all of their powers, then, it is
competent to them to delegate any power without
exception even if a particular power is expressly vested
in them. It is also submitted that if directors
delegate a particular power to the exclusion of their
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own powers, they must not be al lowed to interfere with
the exercise of that particular power by the delegates,
unless the directors reserve to themselves the right to
interfere. Similarly, unless the directors reserve to
themselves the right to revoke the delegation of a
particular power, they must not be allowed to revoke it
so long as the service contract is in existence.
However, delegation of powers must not amount to an
assignment of office. An assignment of office can only
be authorised by a special resolution of the general
meeting.
In general, after the incorporation of a company, the
company is bound by the transactions entered into by its
directors on its behalf. According to new S.35A CA
1985, the board's excess of power, abuse of power and
defective delegation are no longer effective defences in
the hand of a company to invalidate a particular
transaction (so long as those breaches arise from
limitations under the company's constitution and the
third party deals with the company in good faith). To
strengthen the position of a bona fide third party, new
3.711A CA 1385 abolishes the doctrine of constructive
notice for almost all purposes.
Abuse of powers and excess of powers by directors are
ratifiable so long as there is no fraud on minority
shareholders. It is submitted that ratification "cures"
the irregularity in a transaction but does not relieve
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directors from liability. For a ri effective relief from
liability a separate resolution of the general meeting
is needed.
Directors' primary duty is owed to the company itself as
a separate legal persona and not to individual
shareholders. A director is not allowed to place
himself in a position where his personal interests and
his duty to the company may conflict. Consequently, he
is not allowed to enter into transactions with the
company unless permitted by the articles of association
or a due disclosure is made. He is not allowed to make
a secret profit out of his directorial position or to
take a bribe. Further, he is prohibited from diverting
to himself business opportunities belonging to the
company. Those rules, it is submitted, are inflexible.
The legislation as well as the courts have realised the
rigidity of those rules and show their willingness to
relax t h em.
A director owes a duty to the company not to act in a
manner which is illegal or u 1 t r a vires. An illegal act
is void and cannot be ratified. In the past, an u1t r a
vires act was held to be void and could not be ratified.
Nowadays, the new 3.35 CA 1985 makes it possible for a
company to ratify an u1t r a vires act. However, it is
now well established that an ultra vires act is binding
on the company insofar as a bona fide third party is
concerned. But, a director is still liable in damages
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for any loss suffered by the company as a result of
involving it in an u1 t ra vires act. Relieving a
director from liability in this case is possible but
only by way of a special resolution.
Directors must exercise their powers "bona fide, in what
they consider not what the court may consider to be in
the best interests of the company". The test of bona
fides is mainly subjective. It is submitted that the
interests of the company include the interests of its
creditors, but not those of future members. In addition
to their duty to act bona fide in the interests of the
company, directors must exercise their powers for the
purposes for which they were conferred. The applicable
test, here, is mainly objective.
Directors' duty of skill and care is mainly governed by
the common law. Since directorship is not a profession
and directors do not form a homogeneous group, the
standard of care imposed on directors is purely
subjective. However, the provisions of the wrongful
trading introduced an objective element to the standard
of care required from directors. The reason behind
introducing the objective element is to protect the
interests of the creditors in cases where the company is
insolvent. In cases where the company is insolvent and
continues in trade, it continues at the expense of
creditors. Thus, a higher standard of care with an
objective element is required from directors in such a
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case. It is submitted, however, that the deployment of
an objective standard of care is confined to cases where
the company is insolvent and should not be extend to
apply to directors' duty of care in cases where the
company is solvent.
In relation to shareholders, the general rule is that
directors are immune from liability to individual
shareholders. In some circumstances, however, directors
may owe duties to individual shareholders. If there is
an agency relationship between a director and a
shareholder, fiduciary duties owed by that director to
that shareholder may arise. Those duties are governed
by he rules of agency. Thus, a director who can be
considered as an agent to a shareholder must not exceed
the powers vested in him; he must act in good faith and
must exercise reasonable care in performing his duties;
he must further the interests of his principal and must
not place himself in a position where his interests
conflict with those of his principal.
In deciding between two rival bids, directors owe a duty
to give an accurate advice to individual shareholders.
Further, directors' duties to shareholders Tuay stem from
the family nature of the company and the dominant
position of the J/recft^ri over it.
Directors' duties to shareholders may stem from the
legislation. For example, under S.16G FSA 198G
directors are obliged to issue accurate prospectuses.
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Consequently, a director may be held liable to
compensate shareholders for the loss suffered as a
result of untrue or misleading statements in
prospectuses. In addition, under some conditions
c/
contained in S. 314 and S.315,, a compensation for loss of
office obtained by a director must be held by him in
trust for individual shareholders.
In addition to their duties to the company and the
shareholders, directors owe a duty to consider the
interests of the creditors of their company. When a
company is insolvent or threatened with insolvency,
directors owe a fiduciary duty to the company to
consider the interests of its creditors. A breach of
that duty cannot be ratified by the shareholders in
general meeting because, it is submitted that, when the
company is insolvent or threatened with insolvency, the
interests of the creditors are to prevail over those of
the general body of shareholders. However, since the
duty is owed to the company and not to individual
creditors, an action in respect of such a duty can only
be brought by the company (normally through a
liquidator). It follows that individual creditors must
not be allowed to sue directors for the alleged breach
of duty. Otherwise a problem of double recovery and a
multiplicity of suits will arise.
The legislation offers a protection to a company's
creditors through section 213 and 214 of the Insolvency
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Act 1986. That is, through the provisions which are
governing both fraudulent and wrongful trading. Under
both S.213 and 2 14 the recovery is corporate. Thus,
neither of those two provisions violates the principle
that all creditors participate pari passu in the
bankrupt estate. Finally, a director may in some
situations be held concurrently liable for his company's
debts. For example, a concurrent liability is imposed
by the Companies Act 1985 on a director if he is the
sole member of the company or if he acts while
disqualified. In addition, a director is liable to the
holder of a negotiable instrument for its amount if it
is signed by the director without stating the company's
name on it as required by the legislation.
According to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle, directors'
duties to the company can be enforced by the company
alone. In some exceptional cases, however, a derivative
action can be brought by a minority shareholder on
behalf of the company to enforce a duty owed to the
company. In some other cases a personal action can be
brought by a minority shareholder to enforce a duty owed
to that shareholder. Those exceptions are known as the
exceptions to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle. In
addition to the protection offered to minority
shareholders at the common law (which is represented by
the exceptions to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle) the
legislation offers them effective measures of
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protection. Under 3.459 CA 1985, proceedings may be
initiated by minority shareholders who allege that the
affairs of their company are being or have been
conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to their
interests. 3.459 avoids many defects suffered by its
predecessor 3. 210 CA 1943. However, the section fails
to abolish the judicially created rule that a member can
only bring a petition under it in his capacity as a
"member qua member". It is submitted that such a
failure limits the effectiveness of the section as one
created to protect the interests of minority
shareholders. However, the courts are willing to give
the word "interests" its widest interpretation so as to
include the "legitimate expectations" of members. So,
it is submitted that such a wide interpretation is
capable of overriding the "qua member" requirement at
least in respect of private companies where employment
and management participation are, usually, "legitimate
expectations". Another way of protection is offered to
minority shareholders by 3.122 < 1 > < g > of the Insolvency
Act 1986. The section entitles the court to wind up a
company on the "just and equitable" ground. The section
contains a deadly weapon to protect minority
shareholders. It should be noted that the availability
of an alternative remedy, such as the one offered by
3.459 CA 1985, does not, in general, deprive the court
of applying S.122 (l)(g> to restore justice. It is
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submitted that the outcome of a petition under S.459 CA
1985 is more satisfactory and more favourable than that
under 3.122 (l)(g). A wide range of remedies available
for the petitioner under 3.459 in comparison with the
sole and undesirable outcome of applying S.122 <l)(g).
The winding up of a company may not benefit the
petitioner since the break—up value of the company's
assets may be sma 1 1 . In addition, suffice to imagine
the undesirable effects of applying S.122 (l)(g) on the
existence of a prosperous company, its employees and the
society as a whole. Therefore, it is suggested that an
order for the winding up of a company should not be made
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